FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Daily Report

Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-119
Wednesday
21 June 1995

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Daily Report
Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-119 *21 June 1995*

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ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 21 Jun

LD2106075595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0436 GMT 21 Jun 95

["Press Review" — ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW June 21 (ITAR-TASS) — Virtually all today's leading newspapers print reports from the route of Chechen terrorists' convoy, comment on the talks between the Russian government delegation and representatives from separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev in Groznyy and try to comprehend the tragedy in the southern Russian city of Budennovsk, especially actions by Russian authorities, the Kremlin and the government.

The IZVESTIYA newspaper devotes nearly a whole page to opinions on this topic expressed by member of the Presidential Council M. Chudakov, jurist Y. Feofanov and publicist A. Plutnikov.

The same daily reports some particulars on functions and powers of a just established interdepartmental commission headed by Oleg Lobov, secretary of the Russian National Security Council, on investigation of reasons for the Budennovsk tragedy.

Analysing the situation after the Budennovsk tragedy, the ARGUMENTY I FAKTY weekly writes: "The Caucasus as well as other small ethnic groups received a second Shamil (Shamil was a Chechen leader in the war between Russia and North Caucasian peoples at the time of Catherine II).

"It can be safely said that Dudayev does not exist any more, starting from Wednesday or Thursday. Quite fantastic versions are possible: some people may nominate Shamil Basayev as Chechen leader if elections are called."

The same newspaper carries an interview with speaker of the Federation Council (Russian parliament upper chamber) Vladimir Shumeyko, in whose opinion Chechnya "has turned into an ordinary criminal zone over the past three years. It did not resemble a state in any way.

"That criminal zone had to be destroyed, naturally without infringing on human rights and without afflicting civilians," the speaker stresses.

At the same time, Shumeyko expresses concern that Russia now has no streamlined national security system which would conform to the scale of our state.

Under the headline "Don't make heroes of rebels. Terrorism is an armed baseness", the army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda writes in its leader: "Some are obviously disinterested in repeating an evident thing that animals rather than people attacked Budennovsk.

"It is evidently more attractive, even in tragedy, to have one's own, 'different' from others, point of view. As a result, commandos and interior troops are in the forefront. Why did they attack? Where did they shoot? Why did they rush as to a fire? It would be better for them to wait until a kind man came and freed all hostages without a single shot," the newspaper writes.

The Trud newspaper runs a feature by legislator Vladimir Lukin, dealing with the Halifax summit. He writes: "This world reckons with force (naturally not only with military). The lot of the weak is to be on the sidelines.

"The main thing is not to spend depleting prestige for illusions and for quickly vanishing speechifying. A responsible statesman should understand the importance of the real weight of his country."

The KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper claims, referring to sources at the Russian Defence Ministry, that units from the Moscow Military District as well as cadets from the airborne forces school in Ryazan started coming to Moscow.

According to the newspaper, some 40 pieces of armour were in Moscow when the newspaper went to the press. The daily explains that joint patrolling of the defence and interior ministries' troops is resumed in the Russian capital.

The official reason is the events in Budennovsk and the need for raising safety of Muscovites.

The ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA newspaper carries a commentary by Viktor Gordeyev a high-ranking official from the Russian president's office, on a federal bill on amendments and addenda to the Russian criminal code, which was submitted by President Boris Yeltsin to the Lower House of the Russian Parliament.

The ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI newspaper claims that, according to experts' estimates, retail prices for milk and butter may rise by 40 per cent and for sugar by 83 percent when customs duties on imports are imposed on July 1.

Financial expert Ivan Zhagel comments in IZVESTIYA on a sharp drop of the dollar's rate in Russia. Referring to the opinion of bankers and specialists, he tries to give an answer to rank-and-file citizens to a question of interest to anybody: is it worthwhile changing "greenbacks" for roubles? The author notes that the Russian Central Bank is a poor adviser in this case.

Legislator Boris Fedorov criticizes some Russian politicians in the same newspaper who got accustomed to refer to foreign economic experts but who are utterly unable to apply their ideas to Russian actualities of life.

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Churkin Briefs Press on Meeting With Milosevic

LD2006142895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1352 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By Ivan Ivanov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BELGRADE June 20 (ITAR-TASS) — Vitaliy Churkin, Russia's Ambassador to Belgium and NATO, had another meeting with Serb President Slobodan Milosevic today. They discussed ways of settling the Yugoslav crisis. The Russian diplomat, who arrived in Belgrade on Monday, until recently represented Russia at the negotiating process on the settlement of the crisis in the Balkan Peninsula. On Monday night, after the first meeting with Milosevic, he left for Pale, where he held consultations with leaders of Bosnian Serbs.

On the basis of the results of those talks, he told Russian journalists today, responding to a question of ITAR-TASS, that he had arrived to Yugoslavia as a "semi-official person" with the aim to hold "semi-official talks, hoping to find a way out." "I think, the trip was useful. I heard a lot of interesting things from the people I talked to, and I made some interesting observations. I shall report the results of the talks to Moscow today, and it is for them to decide what kind of policy Russia will pursue in the Balkan Peninsula in the future," he said.

According to Churkin, his visits to Belgrade and Pale are the result of Moscow's concern over the current sliding down of the conflicting parties to military methods of the settlement of the crisis. This is why all ways and means are being used for making them give priority to political methods of achieving settlement.

Local diplomatic and political circles believe that in this case Russia may come up with proposals on changing the plan of the "contact group", including the partial changing of maps of the territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbs and the Muslim Croatian Federation, suggested by the international mediators, and on granting the right to establish federal relations with Yugoslavia to the Bosnian Serb Republic.

Demurin on Russia's UN Vote on Reaction Forces

LD2006150995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1441 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By Vladimir Suprun]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (ITAR-TASS) — Mikhail Demurin, official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, told a briefing here today about the motives for which Russia abstained from voting in the U.N. Security Council on June 16 on the resolution envisaging sending multinational instant reaction forces to Bosnia.

We, he said, approve in principle the main orientation of this resolution but "taking into consideration a number of circumstances", abstained from voting for this document.

The clauses of the resolution "create impression" and the quick reaction forces will be directed against only one of the Bosnian sides, the Russian diplomat pointed out explaining the "circumstances".

"Such an approach is incorrect as condemning actions of Bosnian Serbs, we cannot but note at the same time that the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina also bears responsibility for provocations, violations of agreements and direct attacks on United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR)," the official representative of the Russian Foreign ministry indicated.

The U.N. resolution may also give a "wrong signal" that the UNPROFOR from the peacekeeping force is turning into the force for coercing into peace, Mikhail Demurin said.

Our concern about this comes from Russia's position on the settlement of the conflict in former Yugoslavia which implies a political but not a forceful solution to the problem, he stressed.

"The financial aspect of the activities of instant reaction forces was not clear to us either," the Russian diplomat noted.

Moscow will watch closely to ensure that the U.N. Protection Forces retain an unbiased and peacemaking character and their use for the protection of the U.N. staff or in crisis situations be carried out "with maximum circumspection and maximum responsibility for possible political and military consequences", Mikhail Demurin emphasized.

Spokesman Questions UN Impartiality

LD2006170595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1644 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By Valeriy Sevryukov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (ITAR-TASS) — The impartiality of the UN Security Council in assessment of the actions of the sides in the Yugoslavia crisis is the pivotal condition for carrying out peace-keeping operations in this region, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman told a briefing on Tuesday.

First deputy director of the ministry's information and press department Mikhail Demurin said that unfortunately, members of the Security Council deemed it pos-

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sible to refrain from adopting a decision denouncing the recent illegal actions of the Moslems, while similar actions of the Serbian side entailed the delegation of UN forces to the region.

Demurin said that Russia, a persistent advocate of a peaceful settlement of the crisis, will continue exerting effort aimed at insuring an unbiased reaction of the UN Security Council to the current situation.

Further on Demurin Remarks on Bosnia

LD2006180695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1641 GMT 20 Jun 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: reports by our diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (INTERFAX) — The unwillingness of U.N. Security Council members to approve a statement condemning "concrete illegal actions by Bosnian Muslims" and demanding to wind them up is out of line with the Council's policy of impartiality in the assessment of actions by the warring sides, foreign ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin told a news briefing in Moscow Tuesday.

According to Demurin, the U.N. Security Council's unbiased stand "is a crucial condition to holding a peacekeeping operation in Bosnia authorized by the Security Council."

He said that an appropriate proposal was made by Russia last week following the seizure of an observation post of Russian peacekeepers near Sarajevo by Bosnian forces who used it to open fire on Serb positions and Russians as a live shield.

"The similar actions by the Serb side in the recent past, unambiguously condemned by the Russian side, served as a pretext for a resolution under which the rapid deployment force was created," he emphasized.

Demurin announced Russia's intention "in the context of its consistent policy in support of a political settlement of the Bosnia crisis to continue its efforts to ensure an unbiased reaction of the U.N. Security Council and the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] top command to the situation emerged in the region."

On Russian Ambassador in Belgium and former Russian Envoy for former Yugoslavia Vitaliy Churkin's visit to Belgrade, the spokesman said Russia was seeking to use whatever chance there was for a Bosnian peace.

Demurin said regional tension was running an all-time high, which demanded the urgent use of all channels of influence available.

According to Demurin, Churkin had "the widest contacts and the highest authority possible" in the region. "He flew to the conflict area, asked to do so by the Russian Foreign Ministry leadership," he added.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman on G-7 Summit Results

LD2006175695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1641 GMT 20 Jun 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: reports by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (INTERFAX) — The crucial precondition of the success of the Halifax summit which "proved respectable, rich in content and with results" was Russia's wider participation in its preparation and holding, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Mikhail Demurin, told a briefing in Moscow Tuesday.

According to Demurin, "it is the G8 part of the summit that proved the most productive." "The central result of the Halifax summit became the adoption of President Boris Yeltsin's proposal to hold a top-level G8 conference on nuclear security in Moscow in March-April 1995," he added. "The subject must be closer political coordination between the G8 countries, strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency and perfecting the everyday cooperation between the special services."

Demurin said Moscow hoped that the conference will both produce a program of specific activities in the field and strengthen the G8 itself.

Army Daily Views Effectiveness of G-7 Summit

MM2006114795 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jun 95 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Kuzar: "The Circle of Violence Must Be Broken on a Joint Basis. The attention of the Halifax Summit Was Centered on Questions of Combating Terrorism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Halifax-Moscow — It is perfectly clear that in recent days Russians have been more concerned about the country's internal problems than what is happening beyond its borders. The Budennovsk tragedy has overshadowed even such a world- scale event as the meeting of the biggest industrially developed countries. Although in Halifax too, where it was held, there was nobody who was indifferent to the barbaric action by Dudayev's guerrillas. One elderly Canadian, on learning that I was a Russian journalist, stated:

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"I can't find the words to express my outrage at these people's actions. Are they real people? Taking children, women, and sick people hostage and using them as shields! Only savages behave like that!" Two of the girls working at the international press center — Joni and her friend — were also following the reports from Russia and sympathized with the fate of those totally innocent people. "Terrorists are the scourge of the planet. They also attempted to derail us here in Halifax." Joni said. "We must fight them worldwide."

This idea of combating organized crime through joint efforts was repeated during the summit itself. U.S. President Bill Clinton, for example, equated the actions of the guerrillas in Budennovsk, the terrorist act in Oklahoma City, and other bloody crimes by terrorists and said that the circle of violence must be broken on a joint basis. "There is no justification for terrorism. We condemn it in any form," he stressed. Unfortunately it has to be noted that it took the bloody drama in Budennovsk to get Western politicians to finally comprehend the real causes of the Chechen crisis. The G-7 leaders not only demanded the immediate release of the hostages but also acknowledged that Chechnya is an internal matter for Russia which must be resolved by political means within the framework of the Russian Federation Constitution.

The danger posed by terrorists of any kind increases a hundred times over if they possess means of mass destruction. And the fact that this threat is real is evidenced by the actions of the Japanese Aum Shirinkyo religious sect, the frequent attempts to sell radioactive materials needed to produce nuclear weapons, and other facts. In this connection the participants in the Halifax summit considered it necessary to accept Russia's proposal and hold an unscheduled meeting devoted to nuclear security problems, to which they will invite the leaders of other states. It is noteworthy that this conference will be held in Moscow. A fact which experts assess as evidence of the growth of Russia's role in solving global problems.

It should certainly be stressed that in this respect the Halifax summit marked a breakthrough for Russia. As is known, these meetings of the leaders of the world's leading countries have been going on for 20 years. Russia has also participated in the last four. And its involvement in the work of this "select club" is increasing from year to year. Commenting on the results of the summit which has just ended and the role played by the Russian delegation, Sergey Medvedev, the Russian Federation president's press secretary, noted that Halifax saw a reappraisal of Russia's significance in the international arena. Its voice is now heeded, and it is taken into account when decisions are being made.

And you do not have to look far for examples. There were corridor discussions on the following subject, for example: Some Western leaders were pushing for the inclusion in the political statement of a point relating to approval for the idea of expanding NATO eastward. But thanks mainly to Russia's principled stance this did not happen. For the most part the G-7 also took a positive attitude to most of Russia's proposals for solving global economic problems. In particular agreement was given to the restructuring of the Russian external debt and Russia's admission to world financial and economic organizations.

Probably the only point on which Russia's view did not meet with due understanding was in the quest for a solution to the Bosnia problem. As is known, the G-7, disrupting its order of work, discussed this political problem on the very first day, without waiting for the Russian delegation to arrive. Admittedly Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien subsequently informed the Russian president that this "haste" had been dictated by the dangerous developments in Bosnia. The Bosnia question was subsequently raised during Boris Yeltsin's bilateral meetings with French President Jacques Chirac and U.S. President Bill Clinton and also during the G-7's political discussion.

The Russian position on the problems of former Yugoslavia is abundantly clear: They can only be solved by political means, at the negotiating table. No bombings or rapid reaction forces will help matters; on the contrary, they will only make things worse. As for the rapid reaction force, Russia, in the words of the Russian Federation president's aide Dmitriy Ryurikov, took note of the G-7's explanations that it is intended solely to protect the "blue helmets" and not for operations on anybody's side. To a question from your correspondent about whether Russia intends to put its own troops into the rapid reaction force, Dmitriy Ryurikov answered that we would like to see how this force operates and then make a decision.

So the latest summit meeting has been held. Did it fulfill its task? In principle, yes. The leaders of the world's leading countries met around a table and, looking each other in the eye, discussed a number of economic and political issues. Admittedly not, for the most part, the ones which had been planned beforehand — problems which arose as emergencies dominated. Possibly this is also why they decided against setting the agenda for the next meeting, which will take place in France.

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U.S.-PRC Rift 'Not Necessarily' Good for Moscow

MM2106091195 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 95 p 3

[Report by Vladimir Skosyrev: "Moscow and Beijing: Friends In Spite of Themselves"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Beijing — At the same time as ties between Moscow and Beijing are developing successfully — witness the visit by Prime Minister Li Peng to Russia which begins this week — a serious crisis has arisen in U.S.-Chinese relations. Just seven or eight years ago this would have given the Kremlin deep satisfaction.

Matters have reached the point where China has recalled its ambassador from the United States. The U.S. ambassador to the PRC, J.S. Roy, has in turn left Beijing. True, Roy's departure is linked to the fact that his tour of duty in China is coming to an end. However, the new head of the U.S. diplomatic mission has not arrived here as, according to reports by U.S. journalists, Beijing is not giving him its assent.

The discord between the two powers intensified after Washington allowed the Taiwanese president, Li Teng Hui, to make a "private" visit to the United States. Having rightly worked out that the trip belies the Taiwanese leaders' desire to break the diplomatic embargo imposed by Beijing and to enhance their international status, the PRC responded by freezing contacts in that area which is of greatest interest to the Americans. That is, the area of ties between military departments and the monitoring of the transfer of "sensitive" technologies to third countries. Beijing also let it be known that several U.S. companies may have their access to the Chinese market restricted. The ambassador's recall was the strongest measure in this series of diplomatic sanctions.

However, The PRC's relations with a number of other countries, both great and small, have become strained. The dispute with Britain over Hong Kong continues. The premier, Li Peng, had to postpone a visit to Poland planned long ago due to the protests of Polish parliamentarians who are unhappy at human rights abuses in the PRC.

Against the background of these complications in its foreign relations, the forthcoming summit meetings in Moscow come at a very opportune time for Beijing. Russia is expected to confirm its support for Beijing's position in the Taiwanese question. Conversely, the Kremlin too needs the demonstration of friendship with China.

In short, it is not only a mutual interest in economic cooperation but political events which are bringing Moscow closer to Beijing,. Nevertheless, this rapprochement has clearly defined limits. After all, China's open door policy is aimed first and foremost at the West. Which is the source of investment, technologies, and commercial contracts worth billions that are flowing into China. Therefore, this deterioration in Sino-American relations does not presage a rapid rise in relations between Beijing and Moscow. The Cold War is now the past, and what is bad for Washington is not necessarily good for Moscow.

Zaveryukha To Chair Joint U.S. Agriculture Body

MM2006151195 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jun 95 First Edition p 3

[Russian Federation Government Directive No. 792-r signed by V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government, and dated 9 June 1995, Moscow — from the "Document" section]

[FBIS Translated Text] 1. A.Kh. Zaveryukha, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government, is confirmed as chairman of the Russian side of the Agribusiness Committee of the Russian-U.S. Commission for Economic and Technological Cooperation.

V.I. Fomin, chief of a Russian Ministry of Agriculture and Food Main Administration, is confirmed as executive secretary of the Russian side of the aforementioned Committee.

2. A.Kh. Zaveryukha is instructed to draw up a list of personnel of the Russian side of the Agribusiness Committee of the Russian- U.S. Commission for Economic and Technological Cooperation.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government

Deputy Foreign Minister Departs for Iraq, Jordan

LD2006193795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1723 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By Alexander Zhudro]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (ITAR-TASS) — Pursuant to accords reached in early June during Iraqi Vice-Premier Tariq 'Aziz' visit to Moscow, Russian Deputy minister of foreign affairs Viktor Posuvalyuk left for Baghdad on Monday, a spokesman for the Russian Foreign ministry announced today.

Viktor Posuvalyuk is expected to discuss a wide range of problems relating to the post-crisis settlement in the Gulf. "It is important for Iraq to continue fulfilling the U.N. Security Council's resolutions relating to it. We also count that in the course of further development of cooperation between Iraq and the U.N. ad hoc

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commission, the so-called disarmament dossier would be finally closed after the one remaining major question is clarified — in the sphere of biology," Russian spokesman Mikhail Demurin said.

"We also intend to assist the search for a prompt solution to other important questions, including the clarification of the fate of the missing Kuwaiti subjects," Demurin said.

After Iraq, Viktor Posuvalyuk will visit some other countries of the region including Jordan. During meetings in Amman he intends to give special attention to the Mideast peace process, its present state and prospects for further progress.

"This fact should be seen as the continuation of our regular practice of a systematic confidential exchange of views with Jordan on the MIddle East settlement with a view to further strengthening of political interaction between Russia and Jordan in this direction," the spokesman said.

Official Welcomes UN Resolution on Tajikistan

LD2006181695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1641 GMT 20 Jun 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (INTERFAX) — Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Albert Chernyshev said he welcomed the U.N. Security Council's Resolution No. 999 extending the U.N. observers' mandate in Tajikistan for six months, until December 15.

"This is a very important decision that the Security Council passed on Russia's initiative," he said.

Chernyshev emphasized that the mandate had been extended well beyond August 26, when the cease-fire agreement expires. The U.N. is issuing the warring sides a sort of credit of confidence calling on them to significantly extend the cease-fire agreement.

According to Chernyshev, the resolution confirmed the respect for Tajikistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity pointing out the need for a comprehensive political settlement on the basis of a dialogue between Dushanbe and the opposition. "It is of principal importance that the resolution contains an appeal for another direct meeting between the Tajik president and the opposition leader," he noted.

In Chernyshev's words, that part of the resolution which calls for end to hostilities on the Tajik-Afghan border addresses Afghanistan and those in Moslem countries who keep the Tajik opposition supplied as well as the opposition itself.

Chernyshyov admitted that Russia had to work a lot for the resolution to mention the joint Russian-Uzbek-Kazakh-Kyrgyz-Tajik initiative aimed to assign the operation in Tajikistan the status of a full-scale U.N. operation.

However, "it does not mean that the U.N. will make a decision to fund the Tajikistan operation already tomorrow." "Nevertheless, this is a clear step forward," he added.

Chernyshev described as "comforting" the U.N. security Council's satisfaction over the close link between the U.N. observers on the one hand and the CIS collective peacekeeping forces and the Russian border guards on the other.

Asked about the venue and timing of the next round of talks between Tajik factions, Chernyshev said that Ramiro Piriz Ballon, the U.N. general Secretary's special envoy, is attending to this. "He will visit the capitals of interested countries in July and give his advice. The talks are likely to be held in July and in any case no later than August 26," Chernyshev explained.

He said that Kabul, Tehran and Almaty have expressed their willingness to become the venue of the next round of talks. "We have not nominated Moscow but if the factions are willing to meet in the Russian capital, we will do our best," Chernyshev concluded.

Black Sea Fleet Mission Linked to Abkhazia

MM2106105595 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jun 95 p 1

[Report by Eduard Dolya: "Admiral Baltin Playing at Maps With Marines"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yalta — The ships were unable to leave Sevastopol unnoticed — Admiral Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, was on board one of them. Not much given to dealings with the press, the main "Mr. Black Sea" did not talk about the aim of the voyage to the shores of Georgia by the cruiser Kerch and the large amphibious warfare ship Olshanskiy.

The semiofficial version is that it is a hydrographic mission to survey the coastline in the interest of improving the safety of shipping between Novorossiysk, Sukhumi, and Batumi. This version would sound convincing were it not for the fact that the voyage coincides with a new upsurge of tension in Abkhazia. And were it not for the fact that (according to a source close to the Black Sea Fleet headquarters) the large amphibious warfare ship Olshanskiy is carrying an impressive subunit of marines.

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The naval spetsnaz troops are unlikely to be drawing hydrographic maps of the Sukhumi-Batumi coast. And Eduard Dmitriyevich himself (who, incidentally, has an almost friendly relationship with Eduard Amvrosiyevich [Shevardnadze]) is unlikely to be changing the bulbs on lighthouses.

Further on Belarus President's Petersburg Visit

Holds News Conference

LD2006171895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1335 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By Irina Zolotareva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ST. PETERSBURG, June 20 (ITAR-TASS) — Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka and St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak held a joint press conference here today to sum up the results of Lukashenka's two-day working visit to Russia's second largest city.

The two leaders announced that the visit resulted in the signing of a bilateral agreement on trade and economic cooperation, and they disclosed that their talks were "uncommonly easy to conduct".

Belarus intends to regain and even expand its positions on the St. Petersburg market. St. Petersburg, for its part, is set not to let slip the chance of introducing duty-free trade with Belarus, particularly after the introduction of new customs tariffs from July 1.

Participants exchanged proposals concerning the range of products and goods which they offer for trade exchange and agreed that a delegation from St. Petersburg would visit Belarus in July and August to specify prices and terms of delivery.

As concerns the political situation in his country, Lukashenka described it as "stable" and stressed that under his rule, the republic succeeded in curbing inflation and its debt to Russia amounting to 400 million dollars and inherited from the previous leadership did not increase by a single cent or a single rouble. Moreover, the republic repaid 30 million of the amount it owes Russia.

Also today, the Belarusian President flew from St. Petersburg to Minsk.

Favors Confederation With Russia

LD2006223595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1854 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ST. PETERSBURG, June 20 (INTERFAX) — Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka told a news conference on the results of his visit to St. Petersburg Tuesday that he was positive about the idea of creating a confederation of Russia, Belarus and other ex-Soviet republics.

Lukashenka emphasized that after economic integration with his country "Russia will live a dozen times better." He noted that during his presidency Belarus did not owe Russia anything, while "the debt of $400 million was inherited from the previous government."

Lukashenka said his country was interested in the markets of Moscow and St. Petersburg. He admitted that the markets were already occupied, in particular that of St. Petersburg by Finland and Lithuania. At the same time, he stressed that Belarusian food was 2-3 times cheaper, which opened up good prospects for cooperation.

Lukashenka had signed an agreement on trade and economic cooperation with St. Petersburg. He added he planned similar talks with Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov.

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Political Issues

Executive Branch Reacts to Duma No-Confidence Vote

Yeltsin Likely 'To Ignore' Vote

LD2106105295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1036 GMT 21 Jun 95

[By Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 21 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin is likely to ignore the Duma vote of no confidence in the government and will not dismiss it.

"The President has no grounds for mistrusting the government", Yeltsin's spokesman Sergey Medvedev told journalists Wednesday.

The Russian Constitution says that the President can either announce the resignation of the government or reject the Duma decision. In this case the Duma has three months to reconsider its stance and if it again votes no confidence in the government, the President has either to dismiss it or dissolve the Duma and announce new elections.

Premier: Cabinet Not To Be 'Hostage'

LD2106104195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0942 GMT 21 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 21 (INTERFAX) — Russia's Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin declared that neither Dzhokhar Dudayev's fighters nor radically-minded deputies of the State Duma would be able to take the Cabinet of Ministers hostage. He said this on Wednesday responding to INTERFAX after the morning sitting of the parliament's lower chamber considering the issue of voting no-confidence in Chernomyrdin's government.

At the beginning of the sitting Chernomyrdin himself proposed to the deputies to include this issue (on no-confidence) on the agenda.

Chernomyrdin described the criticism voiced by parliamentarians at the State Duma sitting against the government as "groundless and devoid of a constructive basis." "None of the deputies has said how to solve the existing problems," he noted.

"I know many of those who are sitting in this hall. I can only regret that nobody feels for the country. What country do they need? They need a mess, they strive for it but there will be no mess," Chernomyrdin underlined.

Asked about his attitude to the fact that recently many people pit him against Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin said that "this is useless to do."

Yeltsin Signs New Bill on Elections to State Duma

LD2106095795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0940 GMT 21 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW June 21 (ITAR-TASS) — President Boris Yeltsin signed on Wednesday a new version of the bill on elections to the State Duma (Russian Parliament lower house) which was adopted earlier by the Duma and approved by the Federation Council (upper chamber) on June 15, State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin told a plenary session of this chamber on Wednesday.

The present version of the bill was adopted as a result of tense work by the tripartite conciliation commission which includes representatives from the president and the two chambers.

Representation quotas of deputies at the Duma, nominated from electoral associations and regions, was "the main stumbling bloc".

The Federation Council demanded that the share of candidates nominated by party lists should be cut. The council argued that they represent "not all Russia but only its centre".

Although the ratio of deputies at the State Duma from parties and one-seat constituencies remained the same in the new version — 225 and 225, the bill takes into account some amendments made by the Federation Council, which limit the number of candidates from the centre and reflect, thereby, interests of members of the Russian Federation.

Government Continues To Deal With Budennovsk Aftermath

Yeltsin Satisfied With Premier's Actions

LD2006154195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1518 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW June 20 (ITAR-TASS) — President Yeltsin had a working meeting with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in the Kremlin today. They discussed priority steps to be taken for bringing the situation in Budennovsk and Chechnya back to normal, the Press Service of the Russian president reported today.

President Yeltsin expressed satisfaction with the actions of the prime minister, aimed at achieving the release of the hostages, the report says. During the conversation

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they stressed the importance of the implementation of outlined measures for saving the lives of the people, who continue to be held by terrorists, and helping them return home as soon as possible.

It was decided to investigate most thoroughly the circumstances of the tragedy, the report continues. The sides reiterated the need for holding a meeting of the Security Council, and Lobov was assigned to prepare it.

Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin discussed problems connected with the holding of a Government session on June 22, at which the President intends to set forth the main principles of the budget policy for the next year, says the report of the Press Service of the Russian president.

Yeltsin Discusses Chechnya With Shumeyko

LD2106075095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0741 GMT 21 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW June 21 (ITAR-TASS) — President Boris Yeltsin met Federation Council speaker Vladimir Shumeyko in the Kremlin Wednesday to discuss the Chechen crisis and the upcoming meeting of the Security Council which is to consider the hostage drama in Budennovsk and rule which officials were responsible for allowing it to happen.

Shumeyko is a voting member of the Security Council.

The President and the speaker of the upper parliament chamber also discussed the issue of forming the Federation Council, Yeltsin's press service said.

It gave no other details.

Further on Yeltsin-Shumeyko Talks

LD2106102895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1012 GMT 21 Jun 95

[By Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 21 (ITAR-TASS) — Ways of strengthening national security and ensuring its appropriate level to meet the needs of the Russian state were in the focus of today's meeting in the Kremlin between President Boris Yeltsin and Federation Council chairman Vladimir Shumeyko.

The discussion took place ahead of the forthcoming meeting of the Security Council which is expected to centre around the recent events in Chechnya and hostage-taking in Budennovsk, according to Yuriy Algunov, head of the Federation Council press centre.

The head of state and the speaker of the upper house of parliament also discussed question relating to forming the Federation Council.

Yeltsin Comments on Investigation Into Journalist's Death

LD2006184295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1230 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Moscow, 20 Jun — News about the murder of the journalist Natalya Alyakina has been contradictory, but an investigation into the circumstances of her death is already under way, said Russian President Boris Yeltsin, replying to an ITAR-TASS correspondent's question in the Kremlin following a ceremony on the presentation of credentials by a number of foreign ambassadors. [passage omitted]

Boris Yeltsin considers it necessary to clearly establish the time and direction of the shot that caused the journalist's death. The president expressed the opinion that if she had been shot from the side then it could have been accidental. "But if she was shot in the back then this was done deliberately," Yeltsin said, noting that if this were the case there should be a trial with a procurator present.

Budennovsk: Panel To Recommend If Heads Should Roll

MM2006145095 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jun 95 p 1

[Report by Vasiliy Kononenko: "Circumstances of Events in Budennovsk Will Be Examined by Security Council Commission"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The circumstances in which a large terrorist group entered Budennovsk and the subsequent murders of civilians there will be examined by a Security Council commission. As your IZVESTIYA correspondent was told by V. Ilyushin, the president's top aide [pervyy pomoshchnik], B. Yeltsin met with the Security Council Secretary [Oleg Lobov] in the morning of 20 June. As a result of the conversation a decision was made to set up an expert interdepartmental commission which is to analyze as soon as possible the power departments' actions in eliminating the terrorists and also ascertain the factors which made such a tragedy possible. O. Lobov has been instructed to fly to Budennovsk immediately.

It is only after that, or, to be more precise, at a special session of the Security Council, that the corresponding conclusions will be drawn. V. Ilyushin refused to answer

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a question on the dismissals that State Duma deputies are insisting on. However, to judge from the extremely tough line that O. Lobov is taking in the investigation of this issue, as this newspaper has learned, such recommendations will surely be made to the head of the state.

Is the dismissal of the interior minister and the leader of the Federal Security Service [FSB] a possibility? In the corridors of power this is being discussed as a logical step by a president who often resorts to such a method to defuse public pressure. Nevertheless, the president's top aide warned against hasty conclusions.

"When I received reports from V. Yerin and S. Stepashin for the president in Halifax it was clear that a strong-arm solution in Budennovsk was inevitable. Any delay in such a critical situation might have led to an inordinately greater calamity which could not be explained to people. That is why I urge everyone not to make hasty accusations but to wait for the investigation, which will make clear at what stage mistakes were made and by whom and why the earlier directives to step up the monitoring of the situation in the country and, above all, in the North Caucasus were not carried out."

According to V. Ilyushin, in the next few days the competent organs will present the president with a full report on the investigation of the Budennovsk tragedy including the circumstances of the murder of journalist N. Alyakina. "We view this tragic incident," he noted, "with particular sorrow. I hope that the culprits will soon be established."

Chechnya Commission To Propose Strengthening Security

LD2006165695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1641 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By Lyudmila Yermal.ova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW June 20 (ITAR-TASS) — The state commission for the analysis of the developments in Chechnya, headed by secretary of the Security Council Oleg Lobov, is preparing a report to the President, which will contain proposals on the strengthening of the country's security.

Valeryan Viktorov, Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council and member of the commission, stressed in an interview with ITAR-TASS, that they "should not concentrate in the report on the degree of guilt of this or that official, but come up with concrete proposals on the strengthening of the country's political, economic and even information security." The commission may submit the report to President Yeltsin within a month, he said.

Viktorov compared the breakthrough of the terrorists to Budennovsk with the landing of Rust's plane in the Red Square, describing them as "a chain of national disgrace." The developments in the Northern Caucasus show "how vulnerable we are, if criminals can set their own terms to the state."

Government Decree on Help for Budennovsk Victims

MM2006160095 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA First Edition in Russian 21 Jun 95 p 1

[Russian Federation Government Decree No. 579 "On Rendering Assistance to Persons Who Have Been the Victim of the Terrorist Act in the City of Budennovsk in Stavropol Kray," dated 19 June 1995 and signed by V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government]

[FBIS Translated Text] With a view to rendering assistance to persons who have been the victim of the June 1995 terrorist act in the city of Budennovsk, Stavropol Kray, the Russian Federation Government decrees:

1. It is to be laid down that in the event of the demise (death) or injury (wounds, physical injuries, contusions) of persons who have been the victim of the terrorist act in the city of Budennovsk in Stavropol Kray, a one-shot material aid payment is to be made:

to the members of the families of the deceased (dead) — 200 times the minimum monthly wage in equal proportions to each family member to be paid to wives (husbands), children who have not reached 18 years of age (or students up to 23 years of age) or who are older than this if they became invalids before reaching 18 years of age, and fathers and mothers;

to persons who have become Group I or II invalids as a result of injuries (wounds, physical injury, contusions) — 100 times the minimum monthly wage; and to persons who have become Group III invalids — 50 times the minimum monthly wage;

to persons who have received severe injuries (wounds, physical injuries, contusions) — 30 times the minimum monthly wage;

to persons who have received slight injuries (wounds, physical injuries, contusions) — 15 times the minimum monthly wage.

The one-shot material aid payment is not payable to persons covered by compulsory state personal insurance

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in the cases and in accordance with the procedure stipulated by Russian Federation legislation.

2. Compensation payments of up to 50 million rubles per family is to be paid to persons whose property and home has suffered material damage as result of the terrorist act.

3. The cost of burying deceased (dead) persons who have been the victim of the terrorist act is to be paid to the individuals or organizations who undertake the organization of the burial on the basis of the actual expenditure from the sources stipulated by current legislation for the payment of funeral benefits.

4. The Russian Federation Ministry for the Social Protection of the Population and the Russian Federation Ministry of Health and Medical Industry are to adopt measures to ensure medical-social rehabilitation and a summer vacation for children who have suffered as a result of these events.

5. The Russian Federation Ministry for the Social Protection of the Population in conjunction with Stavropol Kray Administration is to determine the procedure for and ensure the implementation of the measures stipulated in the present decree.

6. Federal organs of executive power, the Russian Federation Social Insurance Fund, the Russian Federation Pension Fund, and the compulsory medical insurance funds and organs of executive power of the components of the Russian Federation are to render the maximum possible assistance within the limits of their powers to persons who have been the victim of the terrorist act in the city of Budennovsk.

The Russian Federation Social Insurance Fund is to be recommended to give priority in issuing sanatorium and resort travel warrants to persons who have been the victim of the terrorist act in the city of Budennovsk.

Bomb Scare Reported at Moscow White House

LD2006155395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1541 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 20 Jun — A bomb may have been planted in the building of the Russian Government's house on Krasnopresnenskaya Naberezhnaya. Government sources told an ITAR-TASS correspondent that about an hour ago an unknown person phoned to say that the White House has been mined. All government officials not engaged in carrying out urgent tasks, as well as visitors to the building, have been instructed to leave the building.

White House Bomb Threat 'False'

LD2006184695 Moscow World Service in Russian 1818 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 20 June (ITAR-TASS) — A search has revealed that there was no explosive device in the Government House, and the anonymous telephone call proved to be false. An ITAR-TASS correspondent was told this by the security duty officer of the Russian Government House.

At 1815 Moscow time [1415 GMT] today an unknown person telephoned to say that Government House on Krasnopresnenskaya naberezhnaya had been mined. About 20 to 25 minutes later there was a second call threatening that "a bomb would go off in 30 minutes." Urgent extra measures were taken to ensure the safety of the government staff and technical personnel. All staff not engaged in urgent tasks, as well as bystanders in the building, were asked to leave. A special group of the state internal affairs directorate, together with a sniffer dog and two first aid vehicles, one of which soon left, arrived at Government House.

Security at Government House was increased from 14 June in connection with the events in Budennovsk.

Moscow Hospital Patients Evacuated After Bomb Threat

LD2006195895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1854 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (INTERFAX) — The patients of the 15th Moscow city hospital were evacuated for the second time in the past three days by Emergency Medical Aid Center personnel and police Tuesday.

The hospital is located at 23, Veshniyakovskaya street, East District.

At 15:55 an unidentified person dialed 02 (police) to say that an explosive device had been planted in one of the hospital's buildings, Igor Nadezhdin, head of the Moscow Health Care Department's press center, told INTERFAX Tuesday.

By 18:00 the evacuation of the patients, many of whom were in a serious condition, was over. Teams of policemen with specially trained dogs are now searching for the device.

All 1,211 of the hospital's patients were evacuated last Sunday, because an anonymous caller did not indicate the building in which the explosive device was said to have been planted. The device was not found that time.

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Moscow Authorities Boost Security Precautions

CHECHENPRESS Official Arrested

LD2006161795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1417 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By Olga Semenova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (ITAR-TASS) — Officials of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Moscow's department for combating organised crime today confirmed the arrest on Monday night of Ramzan Musayev, a representative of the Chechen Press agency, but refused to comment.

The FSB public relations centre only added that the media reports credited the arrest to counterintelligence alone whereas it was "a joint action, just as in the case with Khabat Kurbanov."

Ramzan Musayev was arrested for threatening acts of terror in Moscow following the first arrest in the early hours on June 15 of Kurbanov, who calls himself "a representative of the government of Ichkeria."

Kurbanov was freed on the same day. Concomitantly, Ramzan Musayev was holding a "confidential" press conference during which he received an "unexpected" telephone call from somebody who called himself a member of "an international brigade" and announced that the brigade would explode 10 tonnes of TNT secreted in Moscow unless Kurbanov was released before the deadline set by themselves. The "unexpected" telephone call for so well-timed that it was only natural to surmise that Ramzan Musayev had stage-managed it for the journalists to hear in the hope that the threat would help free his friend Khabat Kurbanov.

Incidentally, 400 grammes of TNT are enough to explode a common apartment. Ten tonnes would take half a railway wagon to move. After the hostage-taking tragedy in Budennovsk, even a false report about tonnes of explosive in a cache in Moscow makes a check a must. Ramzan Musayev is likely to shed light on the matter, even though he and Kurbanov are known to have arranged fraudulent telephone interviews for reporters with Chechen leaders and allegedly with Djokhar Dudayev himself.

Both Ramzan Musayev and Khabat Kurbanov who was again arrested in the Chechen Press office on June 17 are likely to face charges under clause 77 (banditism) of the Russian President's decree 1226, commonly known as concerning "the struggle against gangsterism."

'Caucasian' Visitors Being Checked

LD2006162095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1550 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By Yelena Gorelova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (ITAR-TASS) — It is quite probable that the guests of Moscow may include rather dangerous persons. That is why people of the "Caucasian nationality" are being checked, Vladimir Vasiliyev, deputy head of the Interior ministry headquarters of the Russian Federation, told a news conference at the White house here today.

According to him, only persons who are staying in Moscow without registration, are detained. In the past twenty-four hours about 2,000 people were revealed, he noted.

This is "not a planned operation but basic measures for ensuring security of Muscovites. Not only persons of the Chechen nationality are detained", Vladimir Vasiliyev stressed.

Security Strengthened on Metro

LD2006170095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1642 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By Denis Bykovskikh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (ITAR-TASS) — In connection with the tragic events in the town of Budennovsk and for preventing possible acts of terrorism it has been decided to considerably strengthen guarding of the Moscow metro.

Each square kilometer and even centimeter of the underground is being checked by police units, a spokesman for the Interior department of Moscow on guarding the subway told ITAR-TASS today.

Officers of the metro police have been working under a tighter operating schedule, and the number of their days off is reduced. Additional units of the Interior ministry and interior troops were involved in the last few days. As of today, the situation is under control.

Officers of the police call passengers as well to be vigilant and immediately report them about things left in the metro.

Workers of the metro are also on the alert: a few days ago an engine driver found some strange object under a seat of a metro car resembling a retort. Fortunately, the object turned out to be a new model of a fire extinguisher.

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MVD Steps Up Embassy Security

LD2006171395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1703 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By Yuriy Kozlov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW June 20 (ITAR-TASS) — Following the developments in Budennovsk, the Embassies Guarding Service, which is part of the Russian Interior Ministry [Ministry of Internal Affairs — MVD], has taken all necessary measures for ensuring a higher level of security of the personnel of diplomatic missions in the Russian capital. The round- the-clock guarding of foreign missions has been intensified for the purpose of preventing possible acts of terrorism. Police Colonel Stepan Bondarchuk, head of the Embassies Guarding Service, told ITAR-TASS. There are some 100 foreign missions in Moscow.

About all officers of the Guarding Service are taking part in enhancing the security level. Many of them gave up the idea to go on holidays and vacations. A specially created reserve force, which is equipped with armaments, communication and transport facilities, is in a constant state of preparedness. It can reach the premises of any embassy in Moscow within minutes.

According to Colonel Bondarchuk, the Embassies Guarding Service has experienced professionals on the staff, who are capable of controlling the situation and finding adequate solutions for fulfilling the tasks set before them. The tasks are being set on the basis of cooperation with the Russian Foreign Ministry, which keeps in touch and exchanges information with foreign missions.

Troops Reportedly Moving Into Moscow

MM2006194395 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jun 95 p 1

[Report by Igor Chernyak: "Troops Being Brought Into Moscow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At 1800 hours yesterday it became known from Russian Federation Defense Ministry sources that units and subunits [chasti i podrazdeleniya] of the Moscow Military District (the Tula and Pskov Airborne Divisions), as well as cadets [kursanty] of the Airborne Forces school in Ryazan, have begun to arrive in Moscow. Military hardware has also been arriving — armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, with some 40 of them already here by the time this issue was signed to press [1800 Moscow time; 1400 GMT]. They are being stationed at the parade area at Khodynka, beyond the city's air terminal. According to preliminary information, joint patrols by Ministry of Internal Affairs troops servicemen and Ministry of Defense servicemen are being resumed in Moscow. The official reason is the events in Budennovsk and the need to heighten Muscovites' level of security.

Chernomyrdin Bloc's Prospects Viewed

MM2006151795 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 17 Jun 95 p 2

[Article by Svetlana Shipunova under the "Power to the People" rubric: "About the 'Home'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sochi — While observing the unfolding process of the Russia Is Our Home bloc's formation, it is impossible to avoid feeling that all this has happened before. There used to be a party to which all leaders, regardless of status and rank, were simply obliged to belong; there used to be oblast, rayon, and primary organizations of this party, and the regional party organization's leader used to be the leader of the corresponding region as well. All of them, from bottom to top, were strictly subordinate to the Center. And the main point was that, no matter what happened, this party invariably won at elections.

Can you remember the party in question?

This feeling, called "deja vu" by the French, became especially stronger following the constituent conference of the Russia Is Our Home kray organization in Krasnodar. Everything was like in the good old times. Of course, the session was held at the kray administration's grand hall; of course, it was held during work hours; of course, there was a 100-percent attendance by delegates, the overwhelming majority of whom represented the executive power nomenklatura: heads and deputy heads of city and rayon administrations, chiefs of kray departments and agencies, major economic leaders, and bankers. Instead of the workers and peasants, who used to be mandatory in the past, there were entrepreneurs and private farmers — but no too many of them, if truth be told (it is said that only one private farmer attended). The intelligentsia was represented mainly by leaders of higher education establishments and creative organizations.

There were times when events like this were described as party and economic aktiv meetings which ostensibly made decisions on questions which had already been decided at top level.

The fact that so many of the Kuban leaders volunteered to join the ranks of Russia Is Our Home proves just one point: They were yearning for a "leading and guiding force." They found a lot that was missing over the last four years of homeless, in other words partyless, existence.... Like what, for instance? Could it have been

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the confidence in the future which stems from membership in the ruling party? All who managed to retain their leadership positions under the new authorities ran away from the former "beloved Communist" [party] as if it had been anathematized, but deemed it inconvenient and even indecent to join the sundry new puny and tiny parties. So, they became nonparty members. That was unusual, uncomfortable. And suddenly the premier himself, on whom they all depend in one way or another (materially), with the blessing of the president himself (on whom they depend politically), announced the launch of recruitment to none other but the party in power. How could they not join? With the greatest of pleasure!

The Kuban aktiv of federal authority unanimously voted "yes" on all questions. They unanimously (oh, for the bygone times of unanimous votes!) adopted the rules of the Russia Is Our Home kray organization and elected its leadership organs — council and auditing commission. Kray Administration Head Ye. Kharitonov was also unanimously elected chairman of the new party organization.

Fully in compliance with party traditions, the constituent conference was attended and addressed by the Russia Is Our Home chairman, the selfsame Russian Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin who, by a lucky coincidence, happened to be vacationing in nearby Sochi at the time. An important fact: People in the Kuban have always treated the state's top leaders with great respect. There have been many occasions when people who, in different circumstances, had gone all out to abuse Soviet or Russian leaders but behaved quite differently when they came across some of these leaders in person, in real life: In an outburst of loyalist feelings, they stood up, clapped hands, and enjoyed the event like children meeting a "real" Father Christmas. This psychological attitude is well known to politicians, and therefore they go out to meet with the people more and more often on the eve of elections.

Incidentally, this is exactly how some participants in the constituent conference — simple souls that they are — perceived this event: As a meeting with a top-level boss and, taking advantage of the occasion, raised with him their own eternal and unresolved questions. (According to the well-known tradition: Since the "master" has come, we must ask for something.) Hardly anyone in the hall felt that he was the premier's equal partner and comrade along party and election campaign lines.

Nonetheless, the kray organization was successfully founded. All that is left to do now is to shape grassroot structures throughout the kray (this process is already under way), start recruiting lower-rank leaders in them, and, when the time comes, nominate their representatives in each one of the single-seat electoral districts. In principle, it is not all that difficult to find really respected and authoritative leaders at rayon level, there have been and there still are quite a few of them in the Kuban. As for the kray leaders, attitudes toward whom are not all that unambiguous, this problem is usually solved quite easily: They are nominated in their native rayons, where they used to be either kolkhoz chairmen or plant directors in the past — voters are invariably driven by feelings of local patriotism and desire to help their own folk. It is rumored that Viktor Stepanovich [Chernomyrdin] himself will more than likely run for election in a single-seat electoral district in his native Orenburg Oblast.

And so, if they all win at the December elections, Russia's parliament will be entirely composed of major, medium, and small chiefs (although the small ones are hardly likely to make it). The struggle for democracy (people's power) in Russia could thus be deemed concluded. A ruling party will finally establish itself in Russia after four years of multiparty confusion. Glory to Russia Is Our Home!

Actually, it is too early to glorify. Elections have to be won first. There are certain doubts in this regard. Russia Is Our Home is still not quite the CPSU, even though it is directly adopting the latter's style and methods as it goes along. The difference is only too obvious.

First of all, this party has no history behind it, not even the briefest of history, covering at least the period of the building of capitalism in Russia. If Viktor Stepanovich and his comrades in arms had heeded the nice-sounding words that Russia is indeed our home and had, even as late as in 1992, taken them to heart and tried to actually put them in practice — without ruining the country by privatization, without starting the war in Chechnya, by curbing inflation, or at least by reducing crime — in other words if they had created their party for constructive purposes and had achieved at least a few things along these lines, then matters would have been different. Then it could have been said in all honesty: Here we have this party, it has already achieved this and this, it intends to continue struggling to achieve such and such goals, and it is contesting the next elections on this basis.

Alas. Russia Is Our Home lacks not only a history but even a program, and V. Chernomyrdin made no secret of this fact in Krasnodar, only promising that "there will be one." What have you, gentlemen, joined en masse if you do not even know the objectives of this party's struggle? So far we have heard only the most general and vague words. It is said, for example: "Russia Is Our Home is an

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association of people who are not indifferent about the country's future." Who is indifferent about it today? It is also said: "Russia Is Our Home has brought together people who are real professionals in their work." Indeed: Their work. To put it more simply, economic managers. Nobody doubts their professionalism. But we will not be electing sectoral ministers or a government as a whole, we will be electing a parliament which needs somewhat different specialists, competent in matters of state and law, of legislative activity.

It is only too obvious that the "new CPSU" is being created directly and exclusively for election purposes, with — so far — only one objective: To seize parliament; all the rest is vague and, generally speaking, unimportant. But the trick is that the voter does not know the party in this capacity, in his mind it is associated only with the incumbent government. And the voter knows the government quite well, he has the most serious grounds for doubting these people's moral right to claim a further term in power. Therefore, neither the change of tag nor the populist measures which will probably be implemented over the next six months (as far as the official capabilities of Russia Is Our Home members permit, of course) are likely to convince any sober-minded voter that black is white.

The kray newspaper KUBANSKIYE NOVOSTI notes in this context: "Will the Kuban justify Premier-Politician V.S. Chernomyrdin's hopes? Who knows! The Kuban's people are obstinate, it is in principle hopeless trying to dictate to them how to behave. The authorities in Krasnodar were quicker than Moscow in thinking up for the last elections their own bloc with a similar name — 'Our City - - Our Home.' It sounded wonderful, and much was promised. We would dare say that you, dear voter, did not manage to get even a toehold inside this home. And so it collapsed...."

Let me remind readers that, in the December 1993 elections, a stunning victory was achieved by LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] candidates in Krasnodar itself, and by the "Fatherland" bloc of patriotic forces in the kray as a whole. The life of people in the Kuban, just like the life of Russians in general, has not changed for the better over the last 18 months — so why should their moods have changed? Furthermore, 70 percent of voters in this region are countryside dwellers, and their party preferences are well known — the Agrarian Party, the Agrarian Union, and, to a considerable extent, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Chernomyrdin's party is alien to them not only because it is the "government party" which has kept the countryside on financial starvation rations all these years, but also for strictly professional shopfloor reasons — they perceive it mainly as the party of industrialists.

One more point: The Cossacks are highly influential in the Kuban. As a matter of fact, a sizable proportion of the population will vote the way the atamans tell them to. V. Gromov, ataman of the All-Kuban Cossack Host, addressed the constituent conference of Russia Is Our Home in Krasnodar. Having positively appraised the new movement and wished it success, he — contrary to expectations - - did not announce that the All-Kuban Cossack Host would collectively join "Our Home," saying by way of explanation that "by their Statute, the Cossacks are under a lifetime ban on joining parties and movements of a political nature."

So, what are the expectations of the party in power?

Let us now discuss expectations. And let us begin with the president. His position on the eve of elections is unique, if only because now there is not a single party or a single social movement in the country on which he could rely. They have all gradually switched to the opposition's ranks. I do not know if a similar situation has ever occurred anywhere else in the world. If it had, it would probably have offered the leader in question an excuse to review his policy since that policy would have been at odds with the moods prevailing in society. Things in our country are done differently. If there is no party supporting the president, it should be created.

This is not the first such attempt. You might recall that Burbulis, Gaydar, Shumeyko, and A. Yakovlev had all voiced similar intentions but they all failed somehow. Reliance on Chernomyrdin has proved better placed — the attempt has succeeded. But this, it seems to me, creates a certain danger for the president himself. Viktor Stepanovich, both in his official capacity and as a personality, is rather too independent. He may even be exercising as much, if not more, real power in the country as the president himself. When Burbulis, for example, was trying to create a party, it was obvious from the very beginning that he was only executing orders, he may even have been a "confidential adviser," but there was no doubt that the president himself would have been the leader and chief. This is altogether different in the case of Chernomyrdin's party.

It is clear that, if he succeeds in winning the elections (or at least in gaining a respectable number of votes), this would be his rather than the president's victory, it would be his rather than the president's party, and from that moment on he would be sufficiently independent of the president to further pursue the political game autonomously right up until the 1996 [presidential] elections when — and this is no longer in any doubt — he will announce his candidacy.

While expecting to lay a foundation, the president may be digging a pit for himself. Chernomyrdin's victory at

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the parliamentary elections could mark the beginning of the end of Yeltsin's presidency. The most that the latter could expect is that Russia Is Our Home candidates would not criticize him during the election campaign like all the rest. But they are more than likely to try and distance themselves from him as much as possible.

At first glance, the expectations of Chernomyrdin himself are clear and understandable. But is this so in reality?

It must be admitted that the prime minister enjoys unquestioned prestige among the local elites. Let us recall the attempt made by Shakhray the year before last to create what was essentially the same regional party, an attempt which failed completely — they are two completely different personalities. This year, too, there is nothing left for him but to lead his PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord] under Chernomyrdin's wing.

In my view, however, those who are, in the long-term, morally prepared to put Chernomyrdin in Yeltsin's place while hoping that the course will not change, are somewhat misguided. Today there are already too many signs indicating that his personal ideas about Russia's future development differ from those of the incumbent president and his immediate entourage. It is worth recalling that his appointment as premier at the end of 1992 was a compromise between the Congress of People's Deputies at the time and the president. At that time he was seen as one of the "red directors" and, on taking up this position, he let it be understood that he did not share Gaydar's "shock therapy" methods, for which he was actually backed by the deputies. Nevertheless, having occupied the premier's seat, he took into account the lamentable experiences of Rutskoy and Khasbulatov and started behaving more carefully and cautiously than them. There has not been a single occasion during the 2.5 years of his premiership when he may have given the president grounds to suspect him of deviating from the "general line."

But today, launching his election campaign, he has suddenly started making statements, rather strange for the premier of a reform government, to the effect that "Russia is not a test site for experiments," "Russia has had enough of experiments," and so on. What is the meaning of "enough," seeing that the reform itself is nothing but a wholesale experiment with Russia? Speaking of Russia Is Our Home's future program, he uttered words to the effect that it "will not always coincide with the government's program, and at times may differ sharply from it" (what? what?).

There is also the equally strange initiative to cease the war in Chechnya, promulgated by him autonomously, as if in detachment from the president, which, even if it does not materialize, has already forced the press to talk of him as almost the main top-level peacemaker in Russia.

But the main point is something else — the base on which Russia Is Our Home is being created. I think that the executive structures themselves no longer contain people who cannot perceive and realize the fully objective need to replace the national leader and the political course. Of course, they do not discuss this aloud even among themselves, but individually they probably ponder this question seriously, focusing mainly on what will happen to them when....

Russia Is Our Home is 90-percent based on the old nomenklatura which has survived the storms of reforms. Somehow it is difficult to see in its ranks any representatives of the political forces which are considered democratic in our country (even Chubays was not admitted). For example, not a single local democrat figures among the members of the action group for creating a Russia Is Our Home branch in the Kuban. On the contrary, all the faces are familiar. Familiar from a long time ago, ever since the era of the building of developed socialism.

Chernomyrdin says about himself: "I am a product of that selfsame system, a former Soviet minister." When he launched the slogan "Stability!", the economic managers and administrators understood him well: He was talking primarily about the stability of cadres, about ensuring that the next change of power did not involve a new reshuffle of leaders, and this is why they rushed to join Russia Is Our Home. Even though these cadres have accepted the rules of the game suggested by the "experimental laboratory chiefs," they certainly think along more traditional lines than the younger democratic generation. By saying this I do not at all wish to equate them with the patriotic opposition because — if for no other reason — during the four years they have spent in the thick of reforms the bureaucrats did not waste their time and managed to exploit privatization in their own interests. Today the majority of former "red directors" and executive structure functionaries are people who have done quite well for themselves, owners of property and shares, and essentially masters of enterprises, concerns, and entire sectors.

But it is no accident that they are trying the old uniforms on for size. They have already succeeded once, at the cost of compromising with their own conscience, in saving themselves and retaining their positions. And yet they were involved in a blood relationship, a genetic relationship: The CPSU was really their own beloved mother. So, are they likely to stand on ceremony with their democratic stepmother? Should it become

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necessary in order to retain power at the new stage, they will trample democracy as well without any great mental anguish. "There was love without joy, there will be parting without sorrow."

Thus, there is no need to fear the Communists' coming to power. They may be Communists, but they are new, they have revised a lot of their ideology and practice, and have elaborated profound and modern approaches toward reality during the years in opposition. They are approaching the elections with a clear-cut program, with clear ideas of what they would do if they win.

If it comes to power, Russia Is Our Home will be simply forced to distance itself from the democrats' bankrupt policy and will find itself altogether without any ideology. Could this be why they are in no hurry to produce their program?

It is not worth rushing to dub "Our Home" a pro-president party; this may be nothing more than a "cover." It cannot be ruled out that we are dealing with the formation of a second (or is it already the third?) covert opposition in Russia.

While struggling for votes, the party in power will of course strive to trump the real opposition's aces. You keep on weeping about the destroyed Union? Yet we, without your help, have reached agreement with Belarus, settled matters peacefully with Ukraine, and look — we are even denouncing our own Belovezhskaya Forest agreement. You are lamenting the poor Russian ruble, yet we, without your help, have taken the necessary measures and the ruble has gone up, see? You dislike the slump in production? We advocate stability. Yes, we, not you. Therefore, they say, we are Russia's genuine patriots and you are nothing but "extremists."

True enough, when speaking in Krasnodar, Viktor Stepanovich explained that the well-known statement that his own bloc and Rybkin's hitherto hypothetical bloc would "trim off" those selfsame "extremists" from the left and the right was apparently nothing but emotion. He magnanimously gave his permission: "Let them struggle, let them compete with us...." Thank you very much!

And what about the opposition? It appears somewhat confused and its members — some with annoyance, others with envy — are watching the "triumphal march" of the Russia Is Our Home bloc across Russia. And although everyone realizes that belonging to the power structure is not the best image for the elections, nonetheless.... They fear that voters will be simply bought (the bloc evidently has money), and they also fear that vote-counting will be rigged (everything is in the hands of local authorities). If only the duel were absolutely honest, on equal terms.... But when has anything like that happened in Russia?

Nonetheless, the opposition should not give in to Russia Is Our Home. I am speaking, of course, of the leftist-patriotic opposition, to which the party in power is in no way a rival because the patriotically inclined section of the voters is not likely to vote for candidates from the government. Chernomyrdin will be poaching votes from another section of the voters, the section on which Gaydar, B. Fedorov, and Yavlinskiy are counting... They really have something to worry about.

But even this is not important. The leftist opposition enjoys indisputable advantages over Russia Is Our Home, the main one among them being the fact that it is not responsible for the results of the four years of rule by the democrats. Nor is it tainted by the war in Chechnya. Nor is it compromised by the expropriation and sell-off of state property or by the political and financial deals with the West. Throughout these four years (and not just in the six months before the elections) it has consistently advocated and continues to advocate protection of the people's interests.

Its hands and conscience are clear, and this may be the only thing that the people, who have lost their ideals, still want to see among those who rule them.

But the moral advantage of the opposition parties over past and present parties in power is, of course, not perceived by all voters who have been thoroughly brainwashed by the propaganda of the last few years. It therefore seems to me that the unification of all leftist forces in a single bloc, something that is the topic of so much talk today, is certainly not the main condition for their success at the elections. Unification, you know, is a double-edged sword — you may succeed in attracting part of voters, but another part will be alienated. Things are different when it comes to presidential elections — it would be preferable to have a single candidate so as to avoid splitting the vote. As for parliamentary elections, left-wing candidates can gain seats along different ways and may even win more seats in total.

But it must be borne in mind that now, after ten years of perestroyka and reforms, the people are more apolitical than ever before. This may be to someone's advantage, but certainly not to the opposition's. This is why, it seems to me, the main condition for success lies in election campaign propaganda and agitation. And since it is impossible to rely on the bulk of the mass media, reliance should be placed on personal contacts between opposition candidates and the voters. Follow Viktor Stepanovich's example! True enough, he is still working exclusively with the regional elite (it is, of course, easier for him — if he summons them from Sochi,

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people will come from Siberia). In exchange, however, the opposition is left with the virgin land of contacts with ordinary voters, with the people from whose ranks candidates for single-seat districts and for the regional section of party lists should be nominated.

If there is a party in power, why should there not be a party of the people?

Shakhray Comments on Reforms, Ideology

954F2563A Nalchik KAVKAZSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian May 95 No 5, p 3

[Article by Sergey Shakhray: "Postulates of Conservatism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The starting point for the conservative idea is respect for tradition as the universal, transcendent value and principle. Political precepts must be adapted to customs, to Russian national traditions. When designs are foisted on a country which contradict its national essence, only catastrophe can result.

We relate with respect to our past. We must not trample on our forefathers. A country with a despised and trampled past cannot rise up to great deeds. Whatever the past was—it is our past. We are proud of the fact that we are citizens of Great Russia with all its history—tragic and heroic. The rebirth of Russia and its people, primarily spiritual rebirth, is possible only if we appeal to the great traditions of morality, industriousness, patriotism, faith, and family and home values.

Conservatism presupposes that political figures are obliged to guide their conduct through the wisdom inherited from past generations and approved in practice, rather than decide each issue on the basis of personal opinions that turn out far more frequently to be erroneous. Conservative thinking proceeds from actuality. It is devoid of design and entirely alien to the idea of foisting abstract plans of a "bright future" upon society—the constant sin of communists, social-democrats, and liberals. In this sense we are anti-utopians, we are pragmatists.

But does this mean that conservatism precludes any kind of change or reform, that it sees the ideal of social structuring in the past? Far from it. Conservatives simply have a different approach to reforms, one that assumes that a predisposition to preserving things and the ability to improve them at the same time. We always prefer the known to the unknown. In reforming society, we will not set about the destruction of what exists until we are convinced that something better will come to replace it. Edmund Berk, one of the founders of conservative ideology, emphasized: "My guiding principle in effecting reform of the state consists of using available materials. Your architects are engaged in building without a foundation."

Conservatives will never agree to irresponsible experiments conducted on a country or its people. Reforms that are conducted in the name of the future but harm the currently existing generation are utterly worthless. "I am a supporter of expedient measures dictated by the moment," noted conservative Winston Churchill, not known for his indecisiveness.

"I would like to see my contemporaries more secure and fortunate. If, contrary to expectations, my activity in this sphere turns out to be useful to my descendants as well, so much the better. But at no cost will I sacrifice the happiness of my generation for the sake of principles—even the most noble, or truth—even the most pure."

The concept of freedom is sacred to us, insofar as it alone, embodied in the principles of democracy, is capable of protecting us from the threat of political and economic despotism. But we have to know the paradox of freedom, which consists of the fact that freedom destroys itself unless it is limited. Unlimited freedom means the right of the strong to subordinate the weak and deprive them of freedom. We are therefore fighting for a limitation of freedom by the state such that the law protects the freedom of each individual. "The state is maintained not by freedom alone, and not by constraint and rigidity alone, but by a harmony that has so far been elusive to social science, a harmony between the discipline of faith, power, laws, customs, and traditions on the other hand, and on the other— true freedom of the individual...," observed Konstantin Leontyev, one of not very many conservative Russian thinkers.

We see the chief threats to freedom in the anarchy of human wills, and to no lesser degree—in the abuse of state power to the detriment of people's interests.

As realists and pragmatists, we view people and society the way they are. If all people were angels, the state would not be necessary, nor would its enforcement structures. People are different—you have good and bad, teetotalers and alcoholics, talented and inept.

The ideas of universal equality often advanced by ideologists and utopians have always evolved into still greater inequality, which was maintained based on hypocrisy and force. Moreover, equality of all people without exception (the innocent, the criminal, the scholar, and the fool) is not only absurd, but counterproductive as well. Universal equality is the absolute enemy of freedom, talent, initiative, and productive labor. People should have equality of rights and opportunities

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in the realization of their capabilities, but not equality of results regardless of their capabilities.

The role and functions of people in the social organism differ. Therefore, it is inevitable that diverse social groups will exist, with different economic situations, political interests, and other characteristics. It is entirely natural to have hierarchical structures whose individual components ensure the vitality and unity of society as a whole, components capable of confronting the prevalence of mediocrity, incompetence, and ochlocracy. Kitchen maids, with all due respect to this profession, must not govern the state.

One of the main guarantees of freedom of the individual is private property. This is the consequence and expression of human diversity, without which true liberty is impossible. "The 'rationality' of property ownership does not consist of satisfying requirements, but rather in the fact that the naked subjectivity of the personality is removed"—Hegel wrote. "Only in ownership does the individual appear as an intellect." Private property is the basis of economic democracy, without which political democracy is inconceivable.

Communal property, within the limits necessary for each society, is unavoidable, and in certain spheres is the only thing possible. But absolute predominance of state property leads, on the one hand, to its usurpation by the nomenklatura, and on the other—to the universal pilfering and squandering of public possessions.

Optimal development takes place when the motive force for the process lies not in the government, but in society. In present-day civilizations, the changes that ensure economic growth occur mainly of their own accord, without the authority taking part. We have a long way to go before reaching such an ideal. But it is necessary to strive to see to it that society acquire maximum capabilities for self-development as a condition for economic growth, while the authority assumes the function of attenuating blows that may be struck by the economic process.

Military Issues

Moscow District Loyalty Questioned as Army Dissent Grows

MK2106103095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jun 95 p 1

[Report by Igor Korotchenko in the "in Brief" column: "Does the Army Trust the President?" — from 21 Jun "special issue"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The discharge of Aleksandr Lebed from active military service has led to a situation in which the 14th Army has, in fact, gotten out of the supreme commander's control and, having bypassed him, has appealed to the entire Russian Federation Armed Forces personnel to support its former commander, which could create a dangerous precedent.

Judging by sentiments of the officers at the Defense Ministry central apparatus and the General Staff, this appeal has found a lot of proponents at top military administration bodies — and if it evokes a similar reaction in military districts and fleets, it may have very negative implications for the political fate of President Boris Yeltsin. The subsequent developments in Tiraspol will hardly permit Chief Military Inspector Konstantin Kobets to successfully fulfill his mission on handing over the 14th Army's control levers to Valeriy Yevnevich, the more so that the officers of the formation to be abolished intend to sabotage any orders from Moscow. The rise in anti-president sentiments has been noted not only among Russian officers in Tiraspol, but also in military districts on Russian Federation territory, including the Moscow Military District. It should be mentioned, however, that as early as at the end of last year General Aleksandr Korzhakov, head of the Presidential Security Service, held a number of meetings with commanders of divisions, brigades, and detached regiments of the Moscow Military District, stationed near Moscow, and was given guarantees of their loyalty in case of a critical situation.

New 14th Army Commander Promises To Preserve Army's 'Core'

LD2006201895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1854 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TIRASPOL, June 20 (INTERFAX) — The commander of the Russian troops in Transdniester, Major General Valeriy Yevnevich, entered upon his duties as Deputy Defense Minister Konstantin Kobets presented him to the 14th Army's officers Tuesday.

Speaking at the meeting, Yevnevich announced his intention "to preserve the army's core" and "to ensure the combat readiness of the Russian troops and that their arms are intact." He emphasized that the Defense Ministry's directive to reorganize the army's command will be implemented by July 1 as arranged.

Yevnevich noted he "will not let affect servicemen's both moral and material interests."

Sources in the army's headquarters told INTERFAX that the commander of the 59th division, Major General Yury Popov, has stopped his hunger strike he announced earlier.

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General Lebed handed in his office to his successor Tuesday afternoon. The procedure will take several days and will be monitored by Defense Ministry representatives.

Federal Assembly

Duma Considers Vote of No-Confidence in Government

Fedorov Demands Resignation

MM2006132095 Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Jun 95 p 2

[Report by Albert Kozlov: "To Declare in Good Time..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] "A complete absence of will, uncertainty, the inability to control events.... And it goes on from one month to the next" — that is how State Duma Deputy Boris Fedorov, leader of the "Forward, Russia!" movement, described the government's actions at a press conference devoted to the deterioration in the situation in the North Caucasus and southern Russia in connection with the events in Budennovsk.

After sharply criticizing the authorities for their inability to resolve the Caucasus problem, Boris Fedorov and his colleague in the movement, State Duma Deputy Vasiliy Kovalev, stated that in the upcoming Duma vote they will support the vote of no confidence in the government. It is not just two or three "power" ministers, but the entire cabinet that should resign. But when the "Forward, Russia!" leaders were asked how they think the problem that arose in Budennovsk should have been tackled, they cited their own lack of authority on such matters and came out in favor of concessions to terrorists.

The impression created is that the closer we get to the State Duma elections, the more energetically the parties and movements criticize their political opponents who are in power, whether in connection with the Chechen events or the Sakhalin earthquake. What matters is to catch the people's mood accurately and speak out toughly....

Factions Intend To Support Vote

LD2006194895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1917 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, June 20 (ITAR-TASS) — The Russian parliamentary factions of communists, agrarians, liberal democrats, and democratic Russians, traditionally oppositional to the government, intend to vote for the resignation of Viktor Chernomyrdin's cabinet, journalists learned after the factions regular sessions on Tuesday.

All of them, with the exception of communists, confirmed their previous decision to join the position of 107 deputies who demanded to cast a vote of no-confidence in the government.

The faction of communists cannot yet take the final decision in the absence of its leader Gennadiy Zyuganov, who is currently away on a business trip. Apparently, the decision will be taken tomorrow, before the voting.

"The Women of Russia," as well as other not numerous groups "Russia's Way," "The Power," and "The Union of December 12," also intend to come out for the government's resignation. Their votes, together with the independent deputies and parliamentarians who initiated the resignation, add up to some 200, which is 26 votes short of the 226 margin necessary for the decision to be taken.

Therefore, analysts believe, it will be up to the democratic factions — "Russia's Choice," "Yabloko," and PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord] — to decide the destiny of the government.

It has become known that the like-thinkers of Yegor Gaydar ("Russia's Choice") and Sergey Shakhray (PRES) will vote against the resignation.

As for the "Yabloko" faction, its leader Grigoriy Yavlinskiy said that the question of tomorrow's vote at the Duma session is still open.

Abstentions Likely To Save Government

MM2006144295 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jun 95 p 1

[Report by Sergey Chugayev: "Government's Resignation May Bring People Responsible for War in Chechnya to Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Events in Budennovsk have caused a dramatic deterioration in the political situation in Moscow. At the end of last week the attempt — considered doomed to failure a week ago — by S. Glazyev, leader of the Democratic Party of Russia [DPR] Duma faction, to raise for discussion in parliament the question of a vote of confidence in the government, solely as part of the initial stages of the election campaign, looked very much as though it could have the most serious of consequences, including the resignation of the Cabinet.

By Monday, judging by the statements made that day by Duma faction leaders, it was possible to talk with

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a large degree of confidence about the government being doomed. V. Zhirinovskiy, B. Fedorov, and G. Yavlinskiy (who each voiced regret that he could not at the same time impeach the president) advocated the dismissal of the whole government. The Communists, "Russia's Choice," and I. Khakamada's group made their support for the government conditional on the resignation of the power ministers. The government could thus at best count on the support of 120 deputies from the Party of Russian Unity and Accord faction and the "Stability," "Russia," and "New Regional Policy" groups. In order to survive the Cabinet of Ministers needed the votes of at least another 105 supporters, which seemed quite impossible.

The result was that the president was to all intents and purposes faced with the dilemma of either sacking Pavel Grachev, Viktor Yerin, and Sergey Stepashin and thus, having satisfied the demands of most Duma factions, preserving V. Chernomyrdin's Cabinet, or sacrificing the prime minister and preserving the "power ministers" loyal to him. By the evening of 19 June, the view was starting to be voiced more frequently in the Duma that the second scenario might be the more likely. First, this makes it possible to neutralize Chernomyrdin, who has grown considerably stronger through his actions to resolve the Budennovsk crisis; second, it shifts responsibility for the removal of the man who is perhaps the most popular and respected state leader onto the parliament's shoulders. By and large the scheme seemed an extremely fine one.

There is every indication that deputies instinctively sensed the danger of leaving untouched those who are responsible for the political decisionmaking once they have removed the ministers "with economic responsibilities" and as a result causing a tightening up of the regime. On the evening of 19 June Ye. Gaydar said that, according to his information, if the Duma tabled a vote of no confidence, the president would most probably agree to the dismissal of the government and appoint a new premier. "The man responsible for the war in Chechnya could head the government," the leader of the "Russia's Choice" faction said. Yegor Gaydar himself did not publicly name the premiership candidate but, according to his immediate entourage, he was referring to Oleg Soskovets.

The latest round of consultations between representatives of the Duma factions 20 June highlighted the possibility of a compromise. The leaders of "Russia's Choice" and the Communists deem it advisable to postpone the discussion of a vote of confidence in the government and instead submit for Duma discussion a draft law on amendments to the Constitution that would enable the parliament to monitor the government's activity. It is primarily a question of the Duma's right to give its assent to the appointment of the "power" ministers and vice premiers and as a result to table a vote of no confidence in each of them (and not the government as a whole, as is now the case). This draft law is ready and could be the subject of debate at any time. As far as is known, the idea has the support of the "Yabloko" faction and within the Agrarian Party. Thus by midday 20 June only Zhirinovskiy's and Glazyev's factions were still firmly pressing for the removal of Chernomyrdin's government.

A definitive decision will most likely be taken on the morning of 21 June after the factions' next meeting. But, as I discovered, if the question of a vote of confidence in the government is nonetheless submitted for discussion, the Communist, "Russia's Choice," and "Yabloko" factions will not take part in the ballot.

Factions Seen Wavering on Vote

MK2106073095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 21 Jun 95 p 1

[Report by Petr Zhuravlev under the "Parliament" rubric: "Government Resignation Is in Question. Premier's Stance During Budennovsk Crisis Shakes Deputies' Confidence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Duma legislation committee will propose to parliament today to postpone consideration of the question of no-confidence in the government. Most of the committee members attending its latest session, including those who hold different political views (Viktor Pokhmelkin of "Russia's Choice;" Communist Anatoliy Lukyanov; Viktor Sheynis, Yavlinskiy's follower; and Agrarian Vladimir Isakov, the committee's head) came to the conviction that it is more important now to pass amendments to the Constitution calling for stronger parliamentary control over activities of the executive branch. One of the amendments, which were developed in the committee quite a long time ago, calls for securing the State Duma's consent for the appointment and resignation of not only the prime minister but also the power ministers.

Despite a relative unanimity of committee members, the State Duma is unlikely to vote for postponing the no-confidence question. On the other hand, judging by the result of yesterday's sittings of the factions, there is no firm confidence that the no-confidence motion will be carried. The Agrarians, the DPR [Democratic Party of Russia], and the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia], as well as "Women of Russia" will vote for the cabinet's resignation. The unregistered "Russian Way," "Derzhava," and the rump of Boris Fedorov's group will

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perhaps do likewise. It is also known that PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord], "Stability," and "Russia" are going to support the government and vote against no-confidence.

Next, there is uncertainty. The Communists and "Choice" have not yet arrived at a single view, stating that everything would become clear only this morning. Gaydar said that the faction's stance would depend on the future of the hostages still in Shamil Basayev's hands. A spokesman for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation said for his part that the faction's sitting had discussed "not how to vote but rather how to talk" with the government. The views of the NRP [New Regional Policy] members became divided. Supporters of the "Yabloko" bloc decreed to work for having the question of no confidence postponed, but if the decision is not made, they would most likely vote "in all honesty."

It should be pointed out, observers believe, that this confusion has been caused by Viktor Chernomyrdin who, in the Budennovsk crisis, sharply altered the image he projects. At any rate, a growing number of deputies are now inclined to view the government as an aggregate of ministers, part of whom need to be replaced.

Duma Begins Debate

LD2106064495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0628 GMT 21 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, June 21 (ITAR-TASS) — The Russian State Duma began on Wednesday to consider no confidence in the government motioned by the Democratic party faction in connection with the act of terrorism in Budennovsk.

It was believed that the lower house may postpone the consideration till Friday, but speaker Ivan Rybkin told lawmakers that Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin had asked not to drop the issue from the Wednesday agenda.

Glazyev Urges No Confidence

LD2106082995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0811 GMT 21 Jun 95

[By Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, June 21 (ITAR-TASS) - Sergey Glazyev, who took the floor in the Lower House of the Russian Parliament today on behalf of the 107 mps, demanding the government's resignation, has urged the Duma to refuse confidence to Viktor Chernomyrdin's cabinet.

Explaining the motives of this demand, Glazyev, who is Chairman of the Duma Committee for Economic Policy, stated that "the government has not fulfilled any of its commitments during the past two years". He claimed that not a single paragraph of the president's annual message to the parliament was fulfilled.

"We are again being told about successes in our economy at the time when the population's real wages have dropped by 29 per cent," Glazyev said, adding that "the cabinet's new programme contains no effective measures to pull the country out of the crisis". Glazyev predicted that "not a single one of the socially declared goals will be attained as long as the present government remains in office".

Assessing most negatively the work of Chernomyrdin's team in the socio-economic sphere, Glazyev said that "the Budennovsk tragedy is a typical example of lacking professionalism and of the government's inertness".

Most Factions Support Vote

LD2106092795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0856 GMT 21 Jun 95

[By Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, June 21 (ITAR-TASS) - Most State Duma factions are backing a no confidence vote in the government, according to their leaders who addressed the lower house during the discussion of the issue Wednesday.

Liberal reformer Grigoriy Yavlinskiy said his Yabloko faction supports the resignation of the government, but would back Viktor Chernomyrdin if he is entrusted with forming a new Cabinet without the present so-called "power" ministers, i.e. of Defence, Interior and Security, who are responsible for the Budennovsk act of terrorism.

Leader of the Agrarian party Mikhail Lapshin said his faction would vote no confidence in the government and will also join the motion of communists to impeach the President because he "inadequately reacts to developments in the country".

Nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy also stands for the resignation of the government, however, his faction does not want "to clear the way for other destroyers of Russia". He urged the creation of a coalition government in which political parties would be represented proportionally to their rating during 1993 elections. Zhirinovskiy's Liberal-Democratic party won most of the votes during those polls. The nationalist leader also proposed that the post of the President be occupied by a woman with "a healthy sense of self-preservation and conservatism".

Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov also backs the resignation of the government, but believes that would

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not solve any problem as Boris Yeltsin would anyway remain in the command.

The leader of the "Women of Russia" faction Yekaterina Lakhova said her faction would support no confidence in the government although it initially believed it to be an untimely move as only six months remain before parliamentary elections. However, the final decision of the faction was to vote no confidence in the government.

The resignation of the government is opposed by the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) of deputy premier Sergey Shakhray, the Russia's Choice of Yegor Gaydar and the "Stability" group.

However, Gaydar stressed that if the "power" ministers are not punished for the Budennovsk tragedy, his faction will raise the question of the "responsibility of the President".

PRES representative Vyacheslav Nikonov backed Prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin for his talks with Chechen terrorists which allowed to free all the hostages.

"Stability" representative Sergey Markidonov said the responsibility for the financial crisis in the country is shared by the government and the legislature. "We do not want the State Duma to act like (Chechen terrorist) Shamil Basayev in his attempts to blackmail the government", he said.

The "Russia" group will abstain from voting, but its representative Igor Shichanin said the group will insist on sacking the "power" ministers.

The "New regional policy" group head Vladimir Medvedev said his lawmakers remain split on the issue and each of them would vote according to their personal convictions. Medvedev also backed the sacking of the "power" ministers.

According to the Constitution, the State Duma needs a majority of votes to the total number of deputies of the lower house to approve no confidence.

If the Duma votes no confidence the President can either announce the resignation of the government or reject the Duma decision. The lower house then gets three months to reconsider the issue and if it votes no confidence again, the President either announces the resignation of the government or dissolves the State Duma.

Gaydar Rejects Vote

LD2106104495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0942 GMT 21 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, June 21 (INTERFAX) — The Russian government "has done its best" to safeguard the life of the hostages in Budennovsk and Russia's Choice faction does not support a vote of no-confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers.

Leader of the faction Yegor Gaydar declared this at the State Duma sitting Wednesday. At the same time he warned that "if the ministers guilty of a military solution to the Chechen conflict are not punished" the faction will raise the issue of Boris Yeltsin's responsibility.

Gaydar reminded that the Russia's Choice faction opposed military means of resolving the Chechen conflict from the beginning and warned about the possibility of a partisan war. He pointed out that the government "though late, nonetheless has stepped on the path towards finding a political settlement in Chechnya," therefore, the faction does not intend to vote no-confidence in the government.

No-Confidence Vote Viewed

MM2106080695 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 21 Jun 95 p 1

[Report by Lyubov Tsukanova: "Attempt To 'Take Over' the 'White House'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Duma will today examine the question of a vote of "no confidence in the government." The Duma Council has already included it in the draft agenda, and it is proposed that four hours of the plenary session be spent discussing it.

There is a common thread running through the history of "dismissals" of the government by the Duma: On each occasion the initiative was taken for general political reasons (the opposition factions' general dissatisfaction with the economic and political policies of Chernomyrdin's cabinet), but by some quirk they coincided with a specific deterioration in the political situation in the country. In October of last year the events of "Black Tuesday" coincided with a Liberal Democratic Party of Russia faction initiative, as the terrorist action in Budennovsk did in June. Political excitement has caused even those factions that are usually "calm" to make sharp statements, but, as we saw in October, the mood of a significant number of deputies changes as signs of stabilization appear. There are grounds for thinking that if the events in Budennovsk end without further deterioration, on this occasion it will also not be so simple to get the 226 votes necessary for a vote of no confidence

The vote of no confidence in the government is a very powerful political weapon in the hands of the State Duma, but it is a specifically political weapon, being a means of putting pressure on the president and the government, because the Russian Federation Constitution puts forward a fairly complicated procedure for the cabinet's dismissal. The president can disagree with it.

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Only when a vote of no confidence in the cabinet is passed twice in the course of three months does the president have to make a decision: either to agree to the dismissal or to dissolve the Duma. Given that time is short, the Duma hardly has an interest today in its dissolution (but this is more likely than the dismissal of the government, which is supported by the president), as the present deputies find it much more convenient to conduct their election campaigns while they are still in office.

Idealistic though this hope may be, I would, however, still like the deputies to be guided not by personal political advantage but by state interests when making such a crucial decision. Today, for all right-minded people these interests do not lie in contriving to change the cabinet at the first glimmer of economic stability. Nor in "derailing" peace negotiations in Chechnya now that they have gotten under way. Nor, indeed, in forcing a society that is troubled enough as it is to live through another political upheaval.

Text of Chernomyrdin's Address

LD2106104695 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0910 GMT 21 Jun 95

[Speech by Russian Federation Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin at State Duma session in Moscow — live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed Speaker, esteemed deputies in the State Duma. My colleagues and I have attentively listened to everything you wanted to say, to what has been said in this hall today. Of course, in principle everything is clear and everything understood. I think that each one of you has already made your choice. People have spoken here about the what, how, and why of it.

The country knows and will find out today. I cannot fail to speak about one thing, about the tragedy which has been mentioned so many times today. Gennadiy Andreyevich [Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party], the tragedy did not start today, it did not start in 1995 or even in 1994. Why do you not say so? We have to start from that, if we are to speak about tragedy in the country, about the tragedy of the people, what the Russian people have done wrong, why they are on their knees today. Let's deal with this tragedy. That's the first thing. [Commotion in the hall]

I heard you out. We will deal with the tragedy in the economy at the moment, and I can say to you, we know how to deal with it. I can also say to a former minister of mine who spoke at length here today about these problems, was it not you, Sergey Yuryevich [Glazyev, leader of Democratic Party of Russia], who started this problem? This problem started when you were involved You, as an economist, if you are an economist, if you have a conscience, you should speak honestly and conscientiously about this. You are not speaking well. You should say what needs to be said, what has been done, what has been done badly, and how things need to be done. Which is what I have not heard from you today.

As for the questions put to me by Yekaterina Filipovna [Lakhova, leader of Women of Russia] on the tragedy which took place. I have to say to you: yes, talks have started now, specific, clear and precise talks and the talks will be conducted and monitored. We are ready to sit down and talk with anyone, if this will produce results, if people want to resolve the problem, including people in Chechnya.

As for Budennovsk. You know: yes, the operation carried out there was bold and audacious. On the fifth day, I think it was on the fifth day, Mr. Govorukhin, that we launched that operation. And nobody was afraid of anything, even to go there. But I was sure that here in Moscow I would be able to do this very much more expertly and more quickly. At no time was I afraid of anything. And nothing frightens me now. Never, including this. Yes, the operation was difficult, it was grave, yes, we are in mourning. But thousands of people were not hurt. While we were talking, not a single person was hurt. They were hurt before that, when they came there.

Now about measures which are to be taken. The president appointed a commission of experts which today left for Budennovsk. It will examine and sort out all the issues, and I am sure that conclusions will be drawn up on the results of this examination, conclusions which are needed in the country today.

Esteemed deputies. I can repeat here that I am not in favor of evading problems or smoothing them over. I have never done that and I will never do that. Nobody has ever reproached me for that. And all of you here, please, do not try to catch me doing this. I have never tried to evade any problems and will never do this. I am in favor of tackling those problems. I am in favor of tackling those problems together, that is if we really want to settle things for the country's sake. Let's not just talk, trying to gain supporters, and set up one person against the other here today. Let's tackle things. I am convinced that there are solutions, that there are solutions, and that we know how to tackle things but we need time. I am sure that certain people here today wish to see destabilization so much, yes, some still wish Russia to have great shocks. There will not be any shocks, under any circumstances. There will not be any.

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No-Confidence Motion Passed

LD2106093195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0926 GMT 21 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, June 21 (ITAR-TASS) — The State Duma today voted in favour of no confidence in the Chernomyrdin government.

The lower house of the Russian parliament voted 244-72, with 20 lawmakers abstaining, while a simple majority of 226 in the 450 member house was needed to topple the government.

The Duma then took a vote on overruling the President on the law concerning elections to the Duma.

Duma Votes for Ministers, Director To Stay

LD2106100495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0943 GMT 21 Jun 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 21 June (ITAR-TASS) — The State Duma today threw out the recommendations to have Nationalities Minister Nikolay Yegorov, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, Interior Minister Viktor Yerin, and Sergey Stepashin, director of the Federal Security Service dismissed.

The voting on these proposals took place after the State Duma passed a vote of no confidence in the entire government of Viktor Chernomyrdin.

One hundred and thirty nine deputies voted to have Nikolay Yegorov dismissed and nine voted against, with two abstaining.

One hundred and thirty eight people voted for the dismissal of Pavel Grachev, Viktor Yerin, and Sergey Stepashin, with nine voting against amd six abstaining.

Communists Collect Signatures To Impeach Yeltsin

LD2106093695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0906 GMT 21 Jun 95

[By Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, June 21 (ITAR-TASS) — The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has instructed its faction in the Lower House of the Russian Parliament to urgently begin the collection of 150 signatures of MPs under the demand to begin the procedure of impeachment against Russian President Boris Yeltsin, says a statement released by the party here today.

At the same time, the Presidium of the Communist Party has confirmed that it would strive for a Duma no-confidence decision on the government.

Yeltsin Urged To Sign Law on Chechen Settlement

LD2006144595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1221 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, June 20 (INTERFAX) — The Duma group of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord discussed the hostage crisis Tuesday and urged the president to immediately sign the law on provisional steps to a political settlement in Chechnya passed by both houses of the Federal Assembly.

In the opinion of the party this will be the first step to a consistent line of all federal authorities to resolve the Chechen crisis.

It also suggested postponing the vote of confidence in the cabinet till a period after the release of the hostages.

Group members favored an investigation of the developments in Budennovsk and suggested that the president hold responsible persons whose actions or inaction permitted the unprecedented act of terrorism.

The group also decided to vote against the appointment of Tatyana Paramonova to the post of the Central Bank Chairman.

Rybkin, Shumeyko Discuss Caucasus, Elections

LD2006180595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1640 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, June 20 (INTERFAX) — According to INTERFAX sources, State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin met with Federation Council Speaker Vladimir Shumeyko in his Moscow office Monday afternoon.

In an exclusive interview with INTERFAX Rybkin confirmed that he did meet with Shumeyko to consider the situation in the North Caucasus on the eve of its discussion in the Federation Council.

According to Rybkin's sources, Russia's Security Council will concentrate Wednesday on the situation in the North Caucasus. He did not say, however, whether a draft presidential decree on introducing a state of emergency in this region will be submitted for discussion to the Federation Council.

Meanwhile, President Yeltsin stated earlier Tuesday that the Security Council was to gather for a session next week.

Rybkin said that with Shumeyko he had also discussed the forthcoming parliamentary elections. On Wednesday, Yeltsin is likely to sign the election law, he said.

The two officials also discussed the forthcoming Duma debates on the draft law on electing the Federation

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Council. To quote Rybkin, Shumeyko agreed that the upper house of the Russian parliament must be shaped from among the leaders of local executive and representative branches of authority, elected in accordance with the law.

Federation Council spokesman Yuriy Algunov told INTERFAX that during a working meeting Rybkin and Shumeyko discussed cooperation between the two houses of the Russian parliament in law-making. Shumeyko and Rybkin, the only permanent members of the Security Council who are not connected to the executive bodies, also discussed the current political situation, including the events in Budennovsk and in Chechnya in general, he said.

Legislative, Regulatory Documents 7-20 May

WA1706171495

[FBIS Media Note] The following is a listing of Russia legislation recently published in the press of the Russian Federation compiled by FBIS. Numbers within parentheses indicate approximate wordage. Entries followed by the notation "Text" have been translated into English and are available in FBIS publications.

SECTION I: ECONOMIC LEGISLATION (EXPORT-IMPORT, BANKING, PRIVATIZATION, AUCTIONS, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT)

State Standards Committee 21 September 1994 Decree Setting Out Procedure For Certificating Products, Including Imported Goods. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 May 95 p 11) (6000)

Customs Committee 13 April Order "On Exemptions From Value-Added Tax." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 May 95 p 9) (1000)

Chernomyrdin-signed 15 April Government Decree No. 331 "On Elaboration Of Socioeconomic Development Prediction And Draft Federal Budget For 1996." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 May 95 p 4) (2100) (Text)

Government 15 April Decree Appointing New Members To Privatization Program Committee. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 May 95 p 4) (150) (Text)

Chernomyrdin 15 April Directive No. 490-r On Obtaining DM73 Million German Loan For Purchasing Equipment For "Rosstankoinstrument". (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 5) (150)

Government 17 April Directive No. 516 On Distribution Of Income From Caspian Oil Pipeline Consortium Membership. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 9) (250) (Text)

RF Government 18 April Decree No. 362 Approving Draft Agreement With IBRD On Loan To Finance Housing Construction. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 May 95 p 3) (400)

Government 18 April Decree No. 363 On IBRD Loan To Modernize Revenue Service. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 May 95 p 3) (250) (Text)

Government 19 April Decree No. 442 On Urgent Measures To Increase Corn Seed Production In 1995-2000. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 9) (900)

Government 20 April Decree No. 373 On Financing Program For Development Of Kabardino-Balkaria Oil Industry (No Specific Funding Figures; Decree Specifies Which Ministries Are Responsible For What). (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 4) (450)

Government 20 April Directive No. 539 On Staging An International Conference On Navy, Shipbuilding Next February In Petersburg. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 May 95 p 4) (400)

Yeltsin-signed 24 April Federal Law No. 51 Formalizing Ratification of Dual Taxation Agreement With Uzbek Government Adopted By Duma 7 April, Approved By Federation Council 12 April. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 May 95 p 4) (50)

Yeltsin-signed 24 April Law Ratifying Agreement With Ireland On Avoidance Of Double Taxation, Adopted By Duma 17 March, Approved By Federation Council 12 April. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 May 95 p 3) (100)

Chernomyrdin 24 April Decree No. 402 On Signing Of Agreement Between Russian Federation, IBRD On Loan For Tackling Aftermath Of Accident On Komi Republic Oil Pipeline At Usinsk. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 5) (350)

Government 25 April Decree No. 410 On Procedure Governing Exploitation of Sea-Bed Mineral Resources Beyond Continental Shelf. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 May 95 p 5) (300) (Text)

Chernomyrdin-signed 25 April Government Decree No. 415 "On Federal Investments Program For 1995." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 May 95 p 5) (300)

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Government 25 April Decree No. 417 Ordering Firms To Submit By Mid-1996 Report On 1995 Economic Performance So Government Can Draw Up "Intersector Balance Sheet Of Production Of Goods (Services)." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 May 95 p 5) (400)

Government 25 April Decree No. 421 "On Additional Measures To Implement Corporate Bankruptcy Laws." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 May 95 p 10) (1800)

Chernomyrdin 25 April Directive No. 567-r Authorizing Export Via Pipeline In 1995 Of All Oil Extracted By "Transneft" Company (Not To Exceed 5 Million Tonnes). (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 5) (350)

Government 28 April Decree No. 429 Fixing Gas Export Totals For 1995. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 May 95 p 3) (150) (Text)

Government 28 April Decree No. 430 On Improving Raw Material Provision For Textile, Light Industry Enterprises. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 May 95 p 5) (600)

Government 28 April Decree No. 436 On Formation Of Government Commission For Customs, Tariffs Questions, Plus Text Of Commission Statute. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 May 95 p 4) (300/600)

Chernomyrdin 28 April Decree No. 437 Approving Statute On Government Panel On Protective Measures In Foreign Trade. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 5) (200)

Government 3 May Directive No. 609 On Submitting Draft Law On Amendments To Foreign Economic Activity Concessions To Duma, Appointing First Deputy Finance Minister Vavilov As Government Representative During Federal Assembly Examination Of Bill. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 May 95 p 4) (100)

Yeltsin-signed 5 May Federal Law No. 71 "On Introducing Russian Federation Arbitration Procedure Code" Adopted By Duma 5 April, Plus Text Of Code. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 May 95 pp 6, 9-13) (1200, 39500)

Yeltsin-signed 7 May Edict No. 472 Approving Basic Guidelines For Energy Policy, Fuel-Energy Complex Restructuring Through 2010, Plus Text Of Guidelines. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 May 95 pp 6, 8) (1800)

Yeltsin-signed 10 May Federal Law 73-fl "On Protection Of Citizens' Savings And Maintenance Of Their Monetary Value." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 May 95 p 1) (1400)

Yeltsin-signed 11 May Edict No. 478 On Securing Budget Income From Privatization. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 May 95 p 3) (1000) (Text)

Yeltsin-signed 17 May Federal Law 77-fz On Ratification Of Treaty With Kazakhstan On Leasing of Baykonur Space Center. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 5) (50)

Yeltsin-signed 17 May Federal Law 78-fz On Ratification Of Agreement On General Conditions And Mechanism For Supporting Developing Of Production Sharing Between Enterprises And Sectors In The CIS States. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 5) (100)

SECTION II: POLITICAL (INTERNATIONAL AND CIS AFFAIRS, ELECTIONS, CRIME, POLLUTION)

Yeltsin-signed 28 April Federal Law No. 66-fz Introducing Amendments And Additions To RSFSR Criminal Code And RSFSR Administrative Crimes Code As Regards Elections Law Provisions. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 May 95 p 3) (3300)

Yeltsin-signed 28 April Federal Constitutional Law No. 1 On Courts Of Arbitration In Russian Federation Adopted By Duma 5 April, Approved By Federation Council 12 April. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 May 95 pp 6-7) (9500)

Chernomyrdin-signed 3 May Government Decree No. 448 "On Measures To Improve Government Cooperation With Mass Media." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 May 95 p 3) (900) (Text)

Federal Law No. 67 Amending Criminal Code, Procedures On Membership Of Armed Bands. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 May 95 p 4) (800) (Text)

Federal Law No. 68 Amending Civil Code Fine Thresholds To Account For Inflation. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 May 95 p 4) (300)

Government 10 May Decree No. 457 Setting Up Single State Air Service To Deal With Emergencies. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 May 95 p 5) (900)

Finance Ministry Regulations For Collecting Duties On Alcohol. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 May 95 p 10) (1300)

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Legislative, Regulatory Documents 21 May-3 Jun

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[FBIS Media Note] The following is a listing of Russian legislation recently published in the press of the Russian Federation compiled by FBIS. Numbers within parentheses indicate approximate wordage. Entries followed by the notation "Text" have been translated into English and are available in FBIS publications.

SECTION I: ECONOMIC LEGISLATION (EXPORT-IMPORT, BANKING, PRIVATIZATION, AUCTIONS, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT)

Shumeyko 13 April Decree No. 447-1 sf Approving Federal Law 'On Amendments And Additions To RSFSR Law "On Banks And Banking Activity In The RSFSR."' (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Jun 95 p 6) (50)

Government 21 April Directive No. 553 On Allocation Of Relief Aid To Komi Republic For Repairs And Other Work Relating To Accident At Boiler House In Usogorsk In November 1994. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 May 95 p 11) (60)

Government 24 April Directive No. 559-r Accepting Proposal For Privatization Of "Katunskaya Gidrogeologicheskaya Partiya" Enterprise. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Jun 95 p 4) (100)

Government 28 April Decree No. 438 On Procedure For Holding Interregional And All-Russia Auctions For Sale Of Shares In Joint Stock Companies Plus Appended Procedure. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 May 95 p 11) (2000)

Government 29 April Decree No. 446 On Urgent Measures Of State Support For Socioeconomic Development Of Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 May 95 p 5) (500)

Government 6 May Decree No. 453 On RF Government/EBRD Signing Of Agreement On Loan For Eliminating Consequences Of Usinsk Pipeline Disaster. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 May 95 p 5) (450) (Text)

Government 6 May Decree No. 454 Ratifying Import Customs Duties, Canceling Old Rates. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 May 95 p 4) (1200)

Government 15 May Decree No. 458 On General Terms Of Issue And Circulation Of Federal Loan Bonds, Pegged To 1995 Issue Of Such Bonds By Finance Ministry. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Jun 95 p 4) (150) (Text)

Government 15 May Decree No. 460 On Introduction Of System Of Registration Documents For Self-Propelled Road Building Vehicles, Trailers and Semi trailers. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 May 95 p 11) (500)

Government 15 May Decree No. 465 Setting Up Special Construction Administration For North Caucasus. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 May 95 p 4) (700) (Text)

Government 15 May Decree No. 469 On Sale At Auction Of Property (Assets) Of Liquidized State And Municipal Enterprises. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Jun 95 p 4) (1100)

Government 15 May Decrees Nos. 470, 471, 472 Ordering Handover Of Centrally Owned State Enterprises To Local Ownership In Khakasia, Vologda Oblast, Chuvashia, With Lists Of Premises Involved. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 May 95 p 9) (850)

Government 15 May Decree No. 474 On Measures To Implement Intergovernmental Agreements On Basic Principles Of Trade And Economic Cooperation With CIS States In 1995. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 May 95 p 5) (400) (Text)

Government 15 May Directive No. 626 Concerning Privatization of Tyva Aviation Enterprise. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 May 95 p 10) (120)

Government 15 May Directive No. 636 Accepting Proposal For Privatization Of Moscow Polymetals Plant. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 24 May 95 p 4) (150)

Government 16 May Resolution No. 481 On RF Team In IBRD. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 May 95 p 10) (400) (Text)

Government 17 May Directive No. 668 On Submission Of Draft Legislation On Taxation Of Small Scale Enterprises. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 May 95 p 3) (100)

Government 18 May Directive No. 669 On Submission Of Draft Federal Law On Quarterly Division Of Budgetary Revenues And Expenditures. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 May 95 p 6) (200) (Text)

Presidential Edict No. 495 Of 18 May On Socioeconomic Development Of Kaliningrad Oblast. (Moscow

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ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 24 May 95 p 4) (850)

Presidential Edict No. 496 Of 19 May Setting Up Russian Aviation Consortium Financial-Industrial Group. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 24 May 95 p 5) (500) (Text)

Government 23 May Directive No. 683 On Examination Of Changes To Pension Law And Appointing P. Kaminskiy As Government Representative When Parliamentary Chambers Examine These Amendments. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 May 95 p 5) (100)

Chernomyrdin 23 May Directive No. 687-r Approving Proposal To Set Up 'Housing' Financial-Industrial Group. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Jun 95 p 6) (250) (Text)

Chernomyrdin-signed Government Decree No. 501 On Functions, Composition Of RF Government's Operations Commission For Improving System Of Payments And Settlements. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 31 May 95 p 5) (750) (Text)

Government 24 May Decree No. 505 on Measures To Implement Federal Law On 1995 Federal Budget. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Jun 95 p 5) (3000) (Text)

Shumeyko 24 May Decree No. 483-1 sf On Measures To Strengthen Housing And Municipal Services In Market Conditions. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Jun 95 p 4) (150)

Chernomyrdin 24 May Directive No. 688-r Allocating R15 Billion To Tashlinskiy Rayon Administration In Orenburg Oblast For Construction Of Highway. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Jun 95 p 6) (50)

Chernomyrdin 24 May Directive No. 711-r Submitting Draft Law 'On Federal Railroad Transport' To State Duma, Appointing Railways Minister Representative In Debate. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Jun 95 p 5) (50)

Government 24 May Directive No. 713-d On Establishment Of Procedure For Customs Registration Of Commodities Imported In Connection With Program For Housing Discharged Servicemen On Basis Of U.S. Government Grant. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Jun 95 p 5) (150)

Shumeyko 24 May Decree No. 484-1 sf Approving Federal Law 'On State Regulation Of Foreign Trade Activity'. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Jun 95 p 6) (100)

Federal Law No. 83-fz of 25 May 'On Amendments And Additions To RSFSR Law "On Competition And Restriction Of Monopolistic Activity In Commodity Markets."' (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 May 95 pp 4, 5) (11000)

SECTION II: POLITICAL (INTERNATIONAL AND CIS AFFAIRS, ELECTIONS, CRIME, POLLUTION)

Federal Law No. 82 of 14 April On Public Associations. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 May 95 pp 3-5) (10500)

Government 25 April Decree No. 428 On Approving And Submitting To President For Ratification Of Agreement On International Legal Guarantees For Activity Of Interstate Mir Television And Radio Company. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 May 95 p 5) (200)

Government 25 April Directive No. 571 Approving List Of Villages And Settlements In Orel Oblast Considered As Zones Experiencing Radioactive Pollution. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 May 95 p 6) (400)

Government 15 May Decree No. 459 On Introduction Of New Procedures For Registering Invitations To Aliens. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 May 95 p 11) (400)

Government 15 May Decree No. 462 On Russian Federation Border Representatives With Appended Statute. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 May 95 p 11) (1500)

Government 15 May Decree No. 468 On Status Of Russian Space Agency. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 May 95 p 12) (100) (Text)

Yeltsin-signed 17 May Federal Law No. 76 On Presidential Elections. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 May 95 pp 4-8) (28000)

Government 17 May Decree No. 482 On Federal Targeted Program For Improving Legal Know-How Of Voters And Organizers Of Elections. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 May 95 p 5) (300)

Government 17 May Decree No. 484 On Provision Of Infrastructure For Soviet-Finnish Border In Karelia Territory. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 May 95 p 6) (250)

Government 17 May Decree No. 487 On Organizing Cooperation With Commission Of European Communities Concerning Consultative And Technical Aid.

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(Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 May 95 p 6) (300)

Government 17 May Decree No. 488 On Sending Russian Observers To International Conference On Former Yugoslavia. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 May 95 p 10) (500) (Text)

Government 17 May Decree No. 490 On Signing Agreement Between RF and Bulgarian Governments On International Road Communications. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 May 95 p 3) (200)

Government 17 May Decree No. 495 Approving Agreement On Setting Up International Science And Technology Center In Moscow. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 May 95 p 4) (75) (Text)

Government 17 May Directive Accepting Science Ministry Proposal For Russian-Czech Sci-Tech Cooperation. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 May 95 p 4) (50)

Government 17 May Directive No. 662 On Meteorological Cooperation With Australia. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 May 95 p 6) (70)

Government 17 May Directive No. 663 On Meteorological Cooperation With Finland. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 May 95 p 6) (70)

State Duma Decree No. 770 of 17 May On State Duma Statement On Exacerbation Of Situation In Croatia, With Text Of Statement. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 May 95 p 5) (650) (Text)

State Duma Decree No. 772 of 17 May On State Duma Statement On U.S. Congress Examination Of Bill On Increasing Economic Blockade Against Cuba With Appended Text Of Statement. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 May 95 p 5) (500) (Text)

State Duma Decree No. 773 of 17 May On Question Of Removing Economic Blockade Against Iraq. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 May 95 p 5) (900) (Text)

Presidential Edict No. 494 Of 18 May On Presidential Press Service, Plus Commentary By M. Gurevich. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 24 May 95 p 4) (1500) (Text)

Yeltsin-signed 18 May Federal Law No 79 Amending Criminal Code, Trial Processes. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 May 95 p 9) (2400)

Presidential Decree No. 499 Of 19 May On Changes To Statute On Russian President's State-Legal Administration. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 May 95 p 3) (250) (Text)

Yeltsin 22 May Edict Setting Up Presidential Public Liaison Administration. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 May 95 p 1) (200) Plus Associated Statute. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 May 95 p 1) (1800)

Presidential Edict No. 521 of 23 May On Certain Organization Measures To Expedite Judicial Reform. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 May 95 p 3) (350) (Text)

Government 23 May Decree No. 500 On Transit Of Freight And Means Of Transportation Across Russo-Azerbaijani Border. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Jun 95 p 5) (700)

Government 24 May Decree No. 502 On Implementing Customs Union Accords Signed With Belarus 12 May. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 27 May 95 p 3) (100)

Chernomyrdin 24 May Decree No. 506 On Approving Proportions For Distribution Of Resources Of State Fund For Combatting Crime In 1995. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Jun 95 p 5) (100)

Government 24 May Decree No. 509 On Partial Amendment To 19 December 1994 Government Decree Relating To Interim Curbs On Crossing Of Russia's State Border With Azerbaijan And Georgia. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Jun 95 p 5) (250)

Government 24 May Decree No. 512 On RF Government's Collaboration With Agrarian Union Of Russia. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Jun 95 p 4) (450) (Text)

State Duma 24 May Decree No. 809-sd On Ensuring Safe Storage For Armaments, Property, Munitions Of Russia's 14th Army. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Jun 95 p 5) (400) (Text)

Shumeyko 25 May Decree No. 490-1 Approving Activity Of Federation Council Delegates To CIS Interparliamentary Assembly Session. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Jun 95 p 6) (150)

State Duma 26 May Decree No. 819-sd On Adoption Of Statement Protesting Violation Of Rights And Freedoms Of RF Citizens And Russian Compatriots In Kazakhstan. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Jun 95 p 5) (100)

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Yeltsin Edict No. 540 of 30 May On Amendment To Ratified Program For Beefing Up Fight Against Crime In 1994-95. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Jun 95 p 4)

Government 27 May Directive No. 735-d On Designation Of Deputy Environment Minister to Shepherd Draft Law On Plant Kingdom Thru Federal Assembly. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Jun 95 p 4) (100)

Legislative, Regulatory Documents 4-17 Jun

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SECTION I: ECONOMIC LEGISLATION (EXPORT-IMPORT, BANKING, PRIVATIZATION, AUCTIONS, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT)

Government 7 April Decree No. 325 On Signing Agreement With Uzbekistan On Cooperation Against Tax Evasion. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Jun 95 p 5) (200)

Government 20 April Decree No. 367 Keeping Hanoi Technical Center In RF State Ownership. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 5) (200)

Government 24 April Decree No. 403 On Implementing Economic Cooperation Agreements With Tajikistan. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Jun 95 p 5) (900)

Government 3 May Decree No. 451 On Agreement With Cuba On Trade, Payments In 1995. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Jun 95 p 5) (450) (Text). 'Oil-For-Sugar' Protocol On Trade, Payments Between Russia, Cuba Approved By Government 3 May Decree No. 451. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Jun 95 p 11) (1200) (Text)

Government 15 May Directive No. 636 On Privatizing Moscow Polymetals Plant. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Jun 95 p 4) (100)

Government 24 May Decree No. 508 On System Of State Support And Organization Of Supplies To Far North, Equivalent Areas In 1995. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 3) (1200)

Government 24 May Decree No. 515 Setting Up Institution Of Agricultural Attaches In Embassies Abroad, With Aleksandr Gavrilyuk Commentary. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Jun 95 p 5) (100/500) (Text)

Government 24 May Decree No. 516 On Implementation Of N. Caucasus Business Congress Plans For Region. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jun 95 p 3) (900)

Government 24 May Decree No. 518 On Social Protection For Inhabitants Of Chukotka Village Of Polyarnyy Due To Local Gold Mining And Cleaning Combine Changing Technology And Eliminating Village. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jun 95 p 5) (700)

Government 24 May Decree No. 522 On Agreement With IBRD On Loans Program. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jun 95 p 6) (250) (Text)

Government 24 May Directive No. 700 On Membership Of Commission To Handle IBRD Agriculture Credits. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jun 95 p 6) (200) (Text)

Government 24 May Directive No. 706 Extending Period Of Payment Of Foreign Currency Increments To Aid Experts Working In Lebanon. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 5) (200)

Government 24 May Directive No. 708 On Granting Federal Loan To Mineralnyy Vody Civil Airline. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Jun 95 p 4) (100)

Government 24 May Directive No. 712 Approving Foreign Ministry, Labor Ministry Proposal For Talks On Caspian Sea Issues With Littoral States, Appointing Deputy Premier Bolshakov As Delegation Head. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 4) (200) (Text)

Government 24 May Directive No. 716 On Use Of French Loan For Medical Services. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jun 95 p 3) (100)

Government 24 May Directive No. 717-r, Signed By Premier Chernomyrdin, Approving Proposal To Liquidate 'Ogareva 5' State Enterprise. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jun 95 p 5) (100)

Government 24 May Directive No. 721 Approving Holding Of June Wholesale Agricultural, Food Fair

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In Moscow. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 4) (300)

Government 25 May Decree No. 527 Ratifying IBRD Loan For Modernizing Revenue Service. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 95 p 6) (200) (Text)

Government 25 May Decree No. 530 On 1995 Food Supplies To Moscow. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jun 95 p 4) (1200)

Government 29 May Directive No. 741 Allocating R11.5 Billion Recovery Loan To 'Saranskiy Mekhanicheskiy Zavod' Association. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 5) (50) (Text)

Yeltsin 29 May Edict No. 534 On Additional Federal Support For Buryatia Socioeconomic Development. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 3) (200)

Government 31 May Decree No. 534 On Measures To Stabilize Socioeconomic Situation In Novosibirsk Oblast. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 95 p 6) (2400)

Government 31 May Decree No. 535 On Measures To Stabilize Socioeconomic Situation In Tyumen Oblast, Khanti-Mansi, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Oblasts. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 3) (600)

Government 31 May Decree No. 538 On State Takeover Of Sverdlovsk Oblast Transport Enterprise. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jun 95 p 3) (100)

Government 31 May Decree No. 540 Approving Appended Federal Program To Promote Employment In The Russian Federation In 1995, Together With Summary Description Of This Program. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jun 95 p 2) (900) (Text)

Government 31 May Directive Accepting Proposal For 15-20 August Petersburg International Conference On Reproduction, Utilization Of Water Bioresources. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 95 p 3) (500)

Government 1 June Directive No. 751 Approving Distribution Of Concentrated Feed From State Stocks. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 4) (200) (Text)

Yeltsin-signed 1 June Federal Law No. 85 Ratifying Eurasian Patent Convention. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 3) (50)

Federal Law No. 86 of 1 June On State Commodity Bonds. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jun 95 p 3) (500) (Text)

Government 2 June Decree No. 545 Approving Proposal To Create Federal Project Financing Center. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 3) (450)

Government 3 June Decree No. 549 Augmenting List Of Bodies Entitled To Issue Licenses For Various Kinds Of Licensable Activity. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 95 p 5) (100)

Government 3 June Decree No. 553, Signed By Premier Chernomyrdin, Amending Council Of Ministers Decree No. 1322 of 23 December 1993 On Duties Payable By Individuals Transporting Goods Not For Production Or Commercial Purposes. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jun 95 p 3) (300 plus table)

Government 3 June Decree No. 554 Handing Over Arkhangelsk Oblast Health Facilities To Local Control, With List Of Facilities Affected. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Jun 95 p 4) (550)

Government 3 June Decree No. 555 Handing Over Vladimir Oblast State Enterprises To Local Control, With List Of Facilities Affected. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Jun 95 p 4) (200)

Government 3 June Decree No. 556, Signed By Premier Chernomyrdin, Approving Appended Amendments And Additions To Earlier RF Government Decisions On Export Controls. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jun 95 p 6) (1500)

Government 3 June Directive No. 755 On Selling Shares In Moscow Milling Combine. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Jun 95 p 4) (200)

Government 3 June Directive No. 763-r, Signed By Premier Chernomyrdin, Deregulating Land Areas Previously Designated As Forest Areas. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jun 95 p 6) (250)

Government 3 June Directive No. 764 On Submitting Draft Law On Cash Registers To State Duma, Appointing Tax Service Leader Vladimir Gusev To Shepherd It Through Parliament. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 95 p 5) (100)

Government 3 June Directive No. 766 On Allocating Official Trucks, Drivers To Help With Harvest.

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(Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 95 p 3) (800)

Government 3 June Directive No. 768-r, Signed By Premier Chernomyrdin, Instructing Goskomprom And Finance Ministry To Produce Rules For Consolidated Accounts Of Financial-Industrial Groups. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jun 95 p 5) (300)

Government 3 June Directive No. 774-r, Signed By Premier Chernomyrdin, Appointing V.V. Kossov Government Spokesman During Federal Assembly Hearings On Law On Amendments To RSFSR Law On Foreign Investments. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jun 95 p 3) (100) (Text)

Yeltsin 6 June Edict No. 562 On Stavropol Kray Tax Experiment To Boost Production. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Jun 95 p 4) (250) (Text)

Yeltsin 6 June Edict No. 563 Setting Up State Committee For Small Business. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Jun 95 p 4) (700) (Text)

RF Government 7 June Decree No. 562, Signed By Premier Chernomyrdin, On Indexation Of Land Tax Rates In 1995. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Jun 95 p 6) (400)

RF Government 7 June Decree No. 564, Signed By Premier Chernomyrdin, Transferring Federally-Owned Enterprises In Krasnoyarsk Kray To The Kray. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Jun 95 p 4) (600)

RF Government 7 June Decree No. 565, Signed By Premier Chernomyrdin, Approving Loan Agreement With IBRD. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Jun 95 p 6) (300) (Text)

RF Government 8 June Directive No. 784-r, Signed By First Deputy Premier Chubays, Appointing V.V. Alaverdov Government Spokesman During State Duma Hearings On Procedure For Duty-Free Movement Of Goods Within Framework Of Russian-U.S. Space Cooperation. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jun 95 p 3) (100) (Text)

RF Government 9 June Decree No. 571, Signed By Premier Chernomyrdin, On Payment Of Russia's Contribution To World Customs Organization. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Jun 95 p 4) (250)

SECTION II: POLITICAL (INTERNATIONAL AND CIS AFFAIRS, ELECTIONS, CRIME, POLLUTION)

Government 24 May Decree No. 521 On Amendments To Statute On Procedure For Monitoring Export Of Equipment, Material Used To Create Missile Weapons. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 4) (650) (Text)

Government 24 May Decree No. 526 On 'Priority Measures' To Implement Vienna Convention, Montreal Protocol On Ozone Layer. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 95 p 3) (1100) (Text)

Government 24 May Directive No. 723-r, Signed By Premier Chernomyrdin, Approving Proposed Talks On Hydrometeorology Cooperation Agreement With Ukraine. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Jun 95 p 4) (100)

Government 24 May Directive No. 728 On Membership, Tasks, Powers Of Working Group To Study Archive Documents On History Of Development Of Nuclear Weapons In USSR, Formulate Proposals On Declassification. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 5) (900)

Government 24 May Directive No. 730 Approving Plan For Preparing Draft Legal Acts To Implement Law Amending Law On Mineral Resources. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 95 p 3) (250)

State Duma 26 May Decree No. 813-1 gd, Signed by Speaker Rybkin, Instructing Government To Adopt Measures To Boost Cooperation Between Slav Peoples. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jun 95 p 3) (200) (Text)

Government 27 May Decree No. 531 Approving Expenditure To Maintain Provisional State Committee For Elimination Of Consequences Of 1992 Ossetia-Ingushetia Conflict. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 4) (200)

Yeltsin 29 May Decree No. 540 On Change In Presidential Control Administration. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jun 95 p 3) (250) (Text)

Yeltsin 29 May Directive No. 252 On Legislative Program For Remainder Of 1995. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jun 95 p 3) (200) (Text)

Yeltsin 29 May Edict No. 243 Approving Statute On RF Delegation To European Congress Of Local, Regional Authorities, Plus Text Of Statute, Plus Listing Of Delegates. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in

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Russian 7 Jun 95 p 4) (100/1200/800) Government 31 May Decree No. 536 On Procedure, Conditions Governing Occasional Use Of Areas Where Separated Stages Of Rockets Fall To Earth. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 5) (600)

Government 3 June Decree No. 542, Signed By Premier Chernomyrdin, Approving Appended Federal Targeted Program On Comprehensive Measures To Combat The Abuse And Illegal Trafficking Of Drugs In 1995-1997. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Jun 95 p 5) (400) (Text)

Federal Targeted Program On Comprehensive Measures To Combat The Abuse And Illegal Trafficking Of Drugs In 1995-1997. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Jun 95 p 5) (2500) (Text)

Government 3 June Decree No. 550 Broadening Functions Of Justice Ministry. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Jun 95 p 4) (600)

Government 3 June Directive No. 769 Transferring Various Research Ships From Defense Ministry to Russian Space Agency. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 95 p 5) (150) (Text)

Government 3 June Directive No. 773-r, Signed By Premier Chernomyrdin, Ordering Elaboration Of Draft Decisions In Implementation Of Law To Prevent Spread Of HIV-Induced Diseases. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian p 14 Jun 95 p 6) (900) (Text)

Yeltsin-signed 6 June Federal Law On Amendments To 1992 Media Law (Replaces Word "Regional" With Word "Territorial" In Various Places). (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Jun 95 p 3) (100)

RF Government 7 June Directive No. 782-r, Signed By Premier Chernomyrdin, On Utilization Of Buildings Allocated For Federal Organs Of Executive Power. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Jun 95 p 4) (300)

State Duma 9 June Decree With Appended Appeal To Yeltsin Calling For An End To Bloodshed In Chechnya. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Jun 95 p 3) (200) (Text)

Yeltsin 13 June Edict No. 586 On Financial Backup For Presidential Programs Fund. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Jun 95 p 4) (400) (Text)

Yeltsin 13 June Edict No. 587 On Amendments and Additions To Register Of State Officials And Their Functions. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Jun 95 p 4) (400)

Regional Affairs

Budennovsk Hostage Drama Shifts to Chechen Territory

Kulikov Refuses Safe Passage

LD2006121195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1156 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By Gadzhi Shamov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MAKHCHKALA June 20 (ITAR-TASS) - Russian military commander in Chechnya Anatoliy Kulikov refused to meet the demand of Chechen terrorist leader Shamil Basayev to issue written guarantees for the safe passage of the terrorist convoy across Chechnya and Basayev is now demanding the guarantees from Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin or Interior minister Viktor Yerin.

The convoy of Chechen terrorists and Russian volunteer prisoners who agreed to act as a "live shield' for the militants on their way from Budennovsk to Chechnya remained in the Dagestani city of Khasavyurt on the Chechen border as for 15.00 hours Moscow time (11.00 GMT).

Kulikov refused to sign any guarantees saying he "obeys orders only from his superiors", and not from the terrorists, according to the Dagestani Interior department.

The convoy of seven buses and a refrigerator truck with dead terrorists is staying at the exit from Khasavyurt and everything is quiet around it. 73 terrorists and some 120 hostages are in the buses, according to the Daghestani Interior department.

The terrorists allow their voluntary prisoners to leave the buses to stretch their legs, it said.

Although the situation looks quiet the terrorists and their prisoners seem to be rather tense.

It is probable that the convoy would not cross into Chechnya right at Khasavyurt, but would drive into the mountains of the Novolak region of Dagestan. This will make it cross another 100 kilometres to reach Chechnya.

At present the convoy is surrounded by three rings of armoured vehicles, cars, army troops and police. Combat helicopters permanently fly over the convoy.

It is expected that the voluntary hostages will be freed in Zandak village of the Vedeno region of Chechnya, according to Russian negotiator in Groz y Arkady Volsky. The final place of destination of the terrorists is expected to be the village of Dargo 10 kilometres east of Vedeno.

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'Militants' Identified, Warrants Issued

LD2006141395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1221 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (INTERFAX) — Six of the Chechen militants who staged the terrorist attack in Budennovsk have already been identified and warrants for their arrest have been issued. The warrant for the arrest of Shamil Basayev was issued earlier under the article on banditism, Deputy Prosecutor General of Stavropol Territory Aleksey Selyukov told INTERFAX on Tuesday.

According to him, 40 investigators from the Stavropol Territory Prosecutor's Office and 20 investigators from the local police are involved in investigating the criminal case connected with the events in Budennovsk. Over 300 witnesses have already been questioned, Selyukov said. This work is led and coordinated by a group of officials from the Office of Russia's Prosecutor General, led by Deputy Prosecutor General Oleg Gaydanov.

A criminal case connected with the taking of hostages by Chechen terrorists in Budennovsk was instituted by the Stavropol Territory Prosecutor's Office last Wednesday under five articles of Russia's Criminal Code: on banditism, on mass riots, on premeditated murder, on hostage taking and on terrorism.

"The circumstances that led to the storming of the hospital by Russian special police units Friday morning and afternoon will be investigated in the framework of one criminal case," Selyukov explained. According to some information, tens of people died during the abortive storming.

A total of 100 persons died in the Budennovsk tragedy.

The militants for whose arrest the prosecution issued warrants have left Budennovsk in the buses with hostages, Selyukov said.

Correspondent Reads Basayev Statement

LD2006135695 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1300 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] One hour ago Aleksey Samoletov, correspondent for the Russia Television and Radio Company, managed to get through to us from Khasavyurt. He is among the volunteer hostages accompanying Shamil Basayev's fighters. As not all of you will have heard our previous broadcast and we have no new information at the moment, here is Aleksey Samoletov's report.

[Begin Samoletov recording] About 4,000 people are now on the central square in Khasavyurt. They came to meet Shamil Basayev's buses and the hostages this morning. They are separated from the buses by a rope specially erected round the perimeter, and nobody is being allowed up to the buses.

The situation can be assessed as pretty tense and strained. In fact, at the moment it is around 40 degrees in Khasavyurt and then people are inside buses and suffering from the heat anyway, since inside the buses the air temperature is about 60 degrees. The wounded and those people Shamil Basayev has brought with him, who are in a separate Ikarus bus, are in a very grave condition. Because of the heat they have been put out onto the street and are now in full view of everyone under the cover of inspection covers on the trucks.

Just five minutes ago Shamil Basayev handed your correspondent an official press statement. This is the word-for-word text. The text is signed by Shamil Basayev. This is the full text.

Official press statement. Yesterday, 19 June 1995, General Kulikov changed the route for the group to follow, as agreed with official spokesmen for the Russian Government, saying that this was not going against the Russian Government statement, and designated a new route.

The group had then been under way for three hours. On our current route, we have been constantly on the move for 24 hours now. In order to avoid further provocations, I have asked for specific confirmation of the safe passage route, but have at this time not received a response.

The convoy has been standing in Khasavyurt for six hours now. In view of the grave condition of the wounded and the extremely exhausted hostages who have been under serious stress for six days now, I have decided not to wait for a response from the Russian authorities but to continue on our way along the route indicated by General Kulikov to the village of Zandak, so that all the remaining hostages can be released as quickly as possible and this whole tragedy can be brought to an end.

Should there be any delay or new changes to the route, or anything like that, the responsibility will lie with the Russian Government, which guaranteed the group unimpeded safe passage to its destination. The group's destination is the village of Dargo. Signed by Shamil Basayev, commander of the reconnaissance and sabotage battalion of the armed forces of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeriya.

The situation now looks like this: there are police and Special Unit Militia Detachment [OMON] posts set up around the buses, as well as Chechen fighters. The hostages are still in the Ikarus buses. We have no communications of any kind with Moscow. You are

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benefiting from a telephone we have found, and from the simple good will the people living have in Khasavyurt for us here. [end recording]

Journalist Reports From Convoy

MM2006152495 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jun 95 p 1

[Reportage by special correspondent Valeriy Yakov "from the hostage convoy": "They Have Promised To Free Us in the Mountains..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Khasavyurt, 20 June — We volunteers have spent all 18 hours of the Basayev convoy's unpredictable journey in a state of tension from the endless problems that arise on the road and could ultimately result in some kind of provocation. A particularly critical point came after the first six hours of traveling, when six military helicopters started loitering above the convoy and the route that had been approved at the highest Russian level began to be changed. Each of us started thinking that at any moment, amid these deserted fields and forests, the convoy would hit an ambush, and then nobody would be laughing.

But we passed one turning after another, and everything passed off OK. True, after 165 km it became clear that it was better to go a different way, and in that incredible heat we turned around and went back 100 km. We traveled all night with only occasional stops to have a drink, because stocks of water were sufficient literally for two hours.

At around midnight on 19 June, after the latest change of route, the bus broke down, and with the help of the Radio Liberty correspondent's satellite link, Sergey Adamovich Kovalev began trying to contact V. Chernomyrdin's office to ask the premier to give the military the order not to change the route any more and to refrain from provocations.

The convoy halted at Khasavyurt to clarify the onward route into the mountains. A huge crowd gathered around the bus and a rally immediately started, turning into a real celebration. Basayev's group was brought water, bread, buckets of cherries. They are feeding all of us — gunmen and hostages alike.

As I dictate this report, we are waiting, along with Basayev, for the latest fax from Chernomyrdin containing guarantees that after Shamil sets us hostages free in the mountains, he will not immediately be attacked. We do not know how long we will have to wait for an answer from the Russian leadership. Incidentally, we do not know where we will be released or whether we will be released at all. Although none of us, thus far, has the slightest complaint against Shamil and his people, because their treatment of the hostages is fine.

The only upsetting thing is that each of us has in his hands a specially prepared paper which the representatives of the Russian authorities handed to the volunteers prior to our departure from Budennovsk. This paper says: I, so-and-so, am voluntarily joining Shamil Basayev's bandit group and leaving for the Chechen Republic with it, being aware of all the possible consequences of my decision....

Basayev Gets New Guarantees

LD2006151795 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1456 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gadzhi Shamov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Khasavyurt (Republic of Dagestan), 20 Jun — After today receiving a new confirmation of guarantees of safe passage from Oleg Soskovets, Russian first deputy prime minister, Shamil Basayev left Khasavyurt with his fighters and the volunteer hostages at 1650 Moscow time [1250 GMT]. The convoy plans to cross the administrative boundary between Dagestan and Chechnya after 1900 Moscow time.

'A Number of Hostages' Released

LD2006153895 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1500 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received information from the press service of the Russia's Democratic Choice Party on a conversation at 1740 between Yegor Gaydar and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who briefed him on an instruction given to Oleg Soskovets on the need to sign the safety guarantees for safe passage of terrorists with hostages. Soskovets has already replied saying that such guarantees had been signed and a number of hostages had been released. We don't have any details yet.

'Terrorists' Reach Zandak

LD2006154395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1530 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gadzhi Shamov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Makhachkala, 20 Jun — At 1910 Moscow time [1510 GMT], the terrorists arrived at the village of Zandak in Chechnya's Vedenskiy [Vedeno] District together with the volunteer hostages. ITAR-TASS was told this at the operational headquarters of Dagestan's Interior Ministry. It is expected that the hostages will be released in Zandak, which is 20-25 km east of Vedeno. But ITAR-TASS has not so far received any confirmation of this.

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Basayev Interviewed in Khasavyurt

LD2006190495 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 20 Jun 95

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Among the volunteer hostages is Viktor Kuznetsov, deputy chief editor of the "Vremya" program, and "Vesti" correspondent Aleksey Samoletov. During the stop [of the convoy] they succeeded in transmitting a report to the editorial office.

[Begin recording] [Kuznetsov] At present we are in Khasavyurt, in Khasavyurt District. Not far from here is Zantag village where, we were told, Shamil Basayev's fighters will release all the volunteers who went out with them from Budennovsk in exchange for the release of several thousand hostages who were in the hospital in Budennovsk for five days.

[Unseen questioner] Could you describe the situation at the present moment?

[Basayev] The point is that a route was agreed upon which was talked through on TV, the route Budennovsk-Zelenokumsk -Mozdok- Bratskoye-Groznyy-Shali-Vedeno. Now problems have emerged a few kilometers before reaching Mozdok. Two helicopters landed on the roads and a major general passed over the following order. This order comes from Colonel General Kulikov, and it says that the columns with the militants and volunteers are to be escorted only round the Chechen Republic through Kizlyar and Khasavyurt to Zantag. In Zantag the volunteers must be released and after that let Shamil Basayev move in buses through Dargo to Vedeno on his own. It is written that this does not contradict the statement of the government of the Russian Federation.

[[Unseen questioner] Do you agree with such a move?

[Basayev] No. At that time I agreed because it was a pure provocation, only because there were volunteer hostages with us and they had come to protect specifically our safety, plus there were deputies and journalists. Only because of that I chose this, so as to avoid any kind of excesses, agreed to this route, agreed to everything. Now we are crossing the border here. This is already the Chechen Republic. The question is, the difference is whether it is an occupied or unoccupied part. That is for me, for them it is the Russian Federation, but for me it is a separate republic. Now, we cross the border and that is all. As it is written here — this does not contradict the statement of the government of the Russian Federation, so they will say the same thing here — it does not contradict the government's statement, you are already in Chechen territory , the guarantees of safety have ended, and there will be trouble. I am not worried for myself personally, I am worried for those people that have come to protect me.

[Unseen questioner] What decisions will you make now?

[Basayev] That is why I am forced to stop at the crossroads in the center of the town of Khasavyurt until I get a concrete designation and a guarantee — I said Zantag, and I agree to Zantag, but I need concrete guarantees on that particular point because this does not contradict the statement. It is written here: and his group to the point of destination. The point of my destination at the present moment is Dargo.

[Unseen questioner] You want to contact Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin now? Or at what level do you hope to reach a decision? Only with him, yes?

[Basayev] I have no intention of contacting any other level and deciding things. I did not find a single responsible person who had the authority to say anything, let alone decide anything.

[Kuznetsov] Now in this column consisting of seven Ikarus buses, one refrigerator truck in which the bodies of the killed are held, and escorting cars there are 114 or 116, I am not quite sure how many, volunteer hostages, and 16 journalists from various media, including the first and second TV channels, IZVESTIYA, PRAVDA, and SEVODNYA newspapers, and so on. There are eight deputies of the State Duma and the Federation Council here. The road was a very difficult one. [end recording] [Video shows parked buses with people inside, crowds of people around, civilians, men, women, and children, police trying to hold back the crowds, Chechen soldiers, some of them masked, Basayev speaking, armed soldiers standing on armored vehicles, people sitting on the ground in the shade of the buses and being given food, a green flag with two white and one red stripe on one of the buses]

Freed Hostages Head For Khasavyurt

LD2006181895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1812 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (ITAR-TASS) — The volunteer hostages who agreed to accompany the Basayev terrorists en route to Chechnya arrived at Zandak, Chechnya's Vedeno district at 7.10 p.m. on Tuesday and were released at 8.30 p.m. Moscow time, an officer on duty at the Dagestan Interior Ministry told ITAR-TASS by telephone.

The buses with the former hostages, including members of the Federal Assembly, journalists, doctors and

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other volunteers, are now moving in the direction of Khasavyurt. At 10.00 p.m. they were already in Dagestan, according to the republic's interior ministry. Their exact number was not immediately known.

The former hostage takers remain in Chechnya's Vedeno district.

Three Journalists Remain With Basayev

LD2006184995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1833 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Andrey Shtorkh and Andrey Yarushin]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Moscow, 20 Jun — The volunteer hostages who arrived with Basayev's fighters in the village of Zandak in Vedeno district of Chechnya were released at 1630 GMT. This has been confirmed to ITAR-TASS by Sergey Kolesnikov, head of the Russian Federation Government's information department.

According to his information, the total number of released hostages is 123. Among these are 96 volunteers from among the hostages who were held by Dudayev's terrorists over five days in Budennovsk hospital, nine Federal Assembly deputies, 11 journalists, and seven drivers. Three other journalists have decided to remain with Basayev's group in order to monitor the further development of the situation after the terrorists have been deprived of their "human shields." The fighters remain on the territory of Vedeno district of Chechnya and continue to advance toward their final destination, the Chechen village of Dargo. [passage omitted]

Released Hostages in Dagestan

LD2006201395 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1900 GMT 20 Jun 95

[From the "Vesti" program]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] It seems we have managed to record a telephone report by our special correspondent Aleksey Samoletov, who traveled the whole way with the terrorists and hostages in buses.

[Samoletov] The seven-day epic of releasing the hostages taken at the Budennovsk hospital on 14 June has been brought to a happy end. All 150 people have now returned to Dagestan. They are now having supper here, at the village of Novolakskoye, Novolakskiy district. This is the first thing that the local authorities and administration were able to do for the hostages, since for many days they simply had not seen food. The most astonishing thing is that not a single representative of the Russian ministries has arrived to meet the hostages who returned from Chechnya. They were met by Dagestan's local administration. [passage omitted]

In Chechnya Shamil Basayev was welcomed as a national hero. A huge crowd assembled and all, including children, shouted: Allah akbar [God is great]. They embraced and kissed the fighters. As regards our reaction to this, when Basayev approached a group of hostages standing near the buses and asked forgiveness for what he had done, he was told that it is in God's hands, Shamil, and we pray to God not to meet you ever again. [Video shows map of the area]

Basayev Denies Terrorism Accusation

LD2106090595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0840 GMT 21 Jun 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Oleg Velichko and Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Groznyy, 21 Jun — "Shamil Basayev and his fighters are now in a village in Vedeno District and he is closely following the progress of the talks in Groznyy," a well- informed source from Dzhokhar Dudayev's entourage told ITAR-TASS correspondents today. The source says he had a personal meeting with Shamil Basayev last night. [passage omitted: Basayev group's actions in Budennovsk recalled]

According to the source, Shamil Basayev categorically denies the accusation of terrorism. In his opinion, this is not terror but forced counter-measures to the federal troops' activities in Chechnya.

The source says that Shamil Basayev is ready to renounce both military and terrorist actions if the Russian side keeps its word to settle the crisis in Chechnya by peaceful means.

Hostages Return to Budennovsk

LD2106093095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0859 GMT 21 Jun 95

[By Nikolay Styazhkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BUDENNOVSK June 21 (ITAR-TASS) — 114 voluntary hostages who acted as a "live shield" for the terrorists of Shamil Basayev returned to Budennovsk on Wednesday noon.

The convoy was met by local residents in the central square. According to preliminary reports, all the hostages are feeling well.

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Task Force Seeks To Arrest 'Terrorists'

MM2006140795 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jun 95 p 1

[Report by Arkadiy Zheludkov: "Task Force Preparing To Seize Terrorists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] No one fully knew the terrorists' route. Shamil Basayev announced that the convoy with voluntary hostages would head toward the Chechen village of Dargo, 10 km east of Vedeno.

But at the same time, Arkadiy Volskiy, who is participating in the talks with the Chechen delegation in Groznyy, proposed that the hostages be released in the Chechen settlement of Zandak. The law enforcement organs, it seems, did not fully believe in the success of the operation. Their people gave us various information: The Federal Security Service [FSB] Public Relations Center had information that the hostages would be released in Nozhay-Yurt. At that time the convoy was still in Khasavyurt.

The convoy of hostages and gunmen changed route only once — after a joint statement issued by the interior ministers of Kabarda and North Ossetia. The ministers announced that they could not guarantee its safe passage because of the mood of local inhabitants. Anatoliy Kulikov, commander of internal troops, immediately made a decision to divert the buses toward Dagestan.

The law enforcement organs' actions with regard to the terrorists are predictable: As your IZVESTIYA correspondent was told at the Russian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Public Relations Center, measures will be taken to detain them as soon as the hostages are released.

At the time this issue went to press the buses were standing in Khasavyurt. Shamil Basayev has demanded written guarantees of safety from Internal Troops Commander Anatoliy Kulikov.

Progress Reported in Groznyy Talks

Government Issues Statement

LD2006131495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1306 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (ITAR-TASS) — The Russian government information department today released a statement which ran as following:

"As reported by the Federal executive's territorial administration for the Chechen republic, talks continued in Groznyy today on the political settlement of the conflict in Chechnya. The Russian government delegation was represented by Vyacheslav Mikhaylov, Nikolay Semenov and Arkadiy Volskiy. The Dudayev side was represented by Usman Imayev and Akhmed Zakayev.

"The sides agreed on a set of military questions, including:

- ceasefire
- mutual release of forcibly held persons
- discontinuation of acts of terror and subversion
- disarmament of the illegal armed forces and gradual withdrawal of troops.

"The sides agreed on the ceasefire for the duration of the work of the delegations on June 21, 22 and 23 of this year.

"Talks are due to be continued in the afternoon."

'Final' Accord on Military Issues

LD2006162795 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1500 GMT 20 Jun 95

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Chechnya, meanwhile, the talks for a peaceful settlement of the Chechen crisis continued today. They were held in the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission building in Groznyy. Less than an hour ago we received a report from our correspondent on some of the results of today's dialogue between the representatives of the federal authorities and the Chechen rebels.

[Begin recording] [Szandor Meszaros, OSCE mission head] Final agreement has been reached on a bloc of military issues. It stipulates the cessation of military actions, mutual release of individuals held by force, a cessation of terrorist acts and of sabotage, disarmament, and a stage-by-stage troop withdrawal.

The sides reached an agreement on mutual cessation of military actions on 21, 22, and 23 June during which time it is planned to conclude the work of the delegations.

[Unidentified correspondent] Yesterday an agreement was reached on the cessation of military actions as a first step, but, nevertheless, today in some of the areas in Chechnya shells were exploding and one could here gunfire even in the town itself. How soon will the terrorists' firing stop?

[R. Imayev, Dudayev's representative] If there are any provocations from either sides this, I think, can be settled by contact between the military people themselves in each of the places where such provocations happen.

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For my part, I appeal to everyone on both sides that the parties should abstain from possible provocations, so as to maintain the spirit that reigns today between the delegations and the atmosphere that we have here today.

[Correspondent] What role did the the prime minister play in the release of people?

[Arkadiy Volskiy, member of delegation] I think he did a great job, we saw it all, but I want to say that tomorrow, as far as I know, the State Duma will examine the question of no confidence in Chernomyrdin. I think that we, the delegation, consider that that would be absolute madness and a tragedy for the country. At present the country cannot be cast into anarchy. We see here what anarchy means. [end recording] [video shows delegations sitting in OSCE mission building]

Military, Economic Packages Outlined

LD2006201095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1854 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (INTERFAX) — The Russian government delegation and representatives of Dzhokhar Dudayev's regime continued their talks in Groznyy Tuesday afternoon, according to the federal territorial department. National Accord Committee First Deputy Chairman Lecha Magomadov also attended this stage of talks.

The government information department reported that the two sides agreed that the following political issues will be discussed and decided upon while solving the military package:

— creating the conditions for free democratic elections;

— developing and passing regulations on the elections of all bodies of power of all levels;

— holding the elections monitored by observers;

— refusing to use force, solving all issues by exclusively peaceful, political means, refusing to take part in revenge and ethnic strife.

The economic package includes the following issues:

— implementing a federal economic and social recovery program;

— returning scientific and cultural treasures taken out of the republic during military operations; granting Chechnya copies or duplicates of historical, cultural, archival and other materials and documents available to the Russian Federation;

— support of the creation of an international fund, "The Revival of the Chechen Republic."

Imayev Hails 'End' of War

LD2006193295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1901 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Sharip Asuyev and Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy, 20 Jun — The second day of talks between the Russian Government delegation and Dzokhar Dudayev's supporters ended with the signing of a protocol that reflects political, economic, and social issues to be discussed further.

Vyacheslav Mikhaylov, first deputy Russian Federation minister for affairs of nationalities, who heads the Russian delegation to the talks, said the sides agreed on the issues concerning the disarmament of Dzokhar Dudayev's military formations, a stage-by-stage withdrawal of the federal troops from Chechnya, a condemnation of terrorist acts, and the release of hostages. He noted that conditions would thus be created to hold free and democratic elections in Chechnya, to be held with the participation of observers.

Chechnya's former Procurator General Usman Imayev said that as a result of the talks today, "an end" has been put "to the war." "We attained the main thing. Not a single field commander wants the war to continue."

Replying to a question of Dzokhar Dudayev's possible participation in the elections, Vyacheslav Mikhaylov said that "Dudayev is a wanted person and the law does not provide for the participation of such persons in elections."

Usman Imayev categorically disagreed with this statement. "This issue has not been under consideration at our talks," he said. Usman Imayev also said that the issue of Chechnya's status was not discussed at the talks.

According to Arkadiy Volskiy, the talks will continue at least until 23 June.

Chechen Commander Joins Talks

LD2106070895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0644 GMT 21 Jun 95

[By Sharip Asuyev and Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY June 21 (ITAR-TASS) — Aslan Maskhadov, the military commander of forces loyal to separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, joined on Wednesday the peace talks with a Russian delegation in Groznyy and the chief Russian negotiator expects that a breakthrough would follow.

"This day may become a turning point", first deputy Nationalities minister Vyacheslav Mikhaylov told Tass Wednesday.

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The participants in the talks plan to "fill with concrete details the complex of military, political and economic issues agreed yesterday", he said.

Basayev's Brother Joins Talks

LD2106075295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0734 GMT 21 Jun 95

[By Sharip Asuyev and Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY June 21 (ITAR-TASS) — Shirvani Basayev, the brother of Shamil Basayev who staged an act of terrorism in Budennovsk where a hundred of people were killed, joined the Russian-Chechen peace talks in Groznyy Wednesday.

"The talks in Groznyy have been just joined by one of the (Chechen) field commanders, the brother of Shamil Basayev, Shirvani Basayev", a spokesman of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission in Groznyy told Tass.

Also on Wednesday the talks were joined by Aslan Maskhadov, the military commander of forces loyal to separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, and the chief Russian negotiator hoped a breakthrough would follow.

"This day may become a turning point", first deputy Nationalities minister Vyacheslav Mikhaylov told Tass.

The participants in the talks plan to "fill with concrete details the complex of military, political and economic issues agreed yesterday", he said.

Dudayev Supporters Violate Ceasefire in South Chechnya

LD2006104395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0925 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, June 20 (INTERFAX) — On Monday evening Dudayev's formations in Chechnya resumed hostilities that were suspended on the basis of understandings reached during the talks between Prime-Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin with field commander Shamil Basayev.

A spokesman for the Defense Ministry told INTERFAX Tuesday that at about 21:00 Monday a group of about 40 militants attacked the positions of marines in the mountains of South Chechnya. The attack was repelled. The losses on both sides are being finalized.

According to the spokesman, during the past 24 hours the Chechens were busy regrouping their forces. The concentration of their units was registered in the southeast of the republic on the border of Dagestan and in the west on the border with Ingushetia

The Russian military said that several field commanders favor the continuation of hostilities against federal troops primarily acts of sabotage and terrorism.

According to him, individual groups of militants in the mountains continue attempts to break through federal troops to the valleys. Chechens in groups of five to 20 men enter Novolakskiy and Khasavyurt regions of Dagestan and try to seize power. The Defense Ministry spokesman said federal troops did not conduct active hostilities in Chechnya.

Explosion Kills One at Vladivostok Bus Terminal

OW2106072595 Vladivostok Radio Vladivostok Network in Russian 0210 GMT 21 Jun 95

[From the "Lunch Hour Break" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] A report was received at 1130 [0030 GMT] that an explosion had occurred in a kiosk located in the bus terminal building. Naturally this caused alarm among the city's residents. Our correspondent, Lena Filatova, visited the place where this occurred, and this is what she managed to learn:

[Begin Recording] [Kaganovich] I am chief of the sector for (?economic) [words indistinct] of the Kray Procuracy Kaganovich. There is nothing much to say so far because we have temporarily stopped our examination. We are expecting more specialists and then we will continue the investigation. But apparently it was an accident involving careless handling of ammunition. The explosion was not really very powerful. As you can see, there is a dead body here and three injured people. Apparently it was a grenade. No, it was not trinitrotoluene [TNT]. If it was TNT, everything here would have been destroyed. It appears to have been an accident, so I think there will be no other suspects. Presently people are being questioned.

[Filatova] Were you on a break when this happened, or were you working?

[First woman] No, it was early for a break, I was working.

[Filatova] Did you see how this happened?

[First woman] There was a loud noise. I came out and this is what I saw. There was broken glass and injured people. Attention was directed more at the injured passengers, and they were given aid. The ambulance was a bit slow, but the police arrived right away.

[Second Woman] First there was a clicking sound and then an explosion. I jumped back. It was a powerful explosion.

[Filatova] You were not badly hurt?

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[Second woman] No, I ran back in time.

[Third woman] There was a man sitting in the kiosk, and a woman was standing beside him. He had something in his hands. She said: I'm telling you, don't do that! Or something like that. Then she slapped him in the face. There was the sound of a slap, and then instantly after that there was an explosion. And that was it, and we jumped back.

[Beloglazov] I am the deputy chief of the Public Security Police of Sovetskiy Rayon Beloglazov.

[Filatova] Will it be possible to leave through the terminal today, will everything be operating.

[Beloglazov] Undoubtedly. The bus terminal is already working. Its activities have not been paralyzed. There is the entrance and you can see people are arriving. The ticket office is working and so are the buses. So life at the bus terminal is not paralyzed. [end recording]

Economic Issues

Articles on Increase in Ruble Exchange Rate

Yasin Views Ruble Rate

LD2006200195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1640 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, June 20 (INTERFAX) — The ruble will continue to gain strength in the near future, Russia's Economics Minister Yevgeniy Yasin has said.

Concerning the dollar's continuing fall against the ruble Yasin said that the ruble rate would be "stable enough", because inflation will go down. He rules out the risk of a ruble crash next autumn similar to 1994.

At the same time Yasin is concerned by the situation on the currency market.

He says that sharp fluctuations in the currency market create an uneasy situation for exporters, threatening to dramatically change the trade balance. Imports could soar, while export revenues fall. This, in turn, could trigger another ruble plummet and currency crisis.

Yasin believes that fluctuations on the currency market must be made more predictable.

He said that the ruble's growth was faster than the fall in inflation which was a serious contradiction. "The ruble must gain strength strictly in keeping with a fall in inflation," Yasin said.

Central Bank Chief on Dollar Fall

LD2006133695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1259 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, June 20 (ITAR-TASS) — The main task of Russia's Central Bank is to ensure that the dollar rate decreases gradually against the rouble, that this process is predictable and its negative consequences are minimized. Acting president of the Central Bank Tatyana Paramonova told this a news conference of the bank on Monday.

Paramonova agreed that the rise of the rouble rate at the present pace has as a number of negative consequences, above all for Russian export. Although, at the estimate of bank experts, the main export branches still have certain reserves of durability, the Central Bank is taking a number of measures aimed at a more rigid regulation of the currency market.

First of all, the Central Bank's rate of refinancing was lowered from Monday to 180 per cent and the procedure of settling accounts at the Moscow International Currency Exchange (MICEX) was changed, which restricts the possibilities of banks to speculate for a fall of the dollar.

At the same time, the growing confidence in the rouble is viewed by Russia's Central Bank as an undoubted evidence of the success of the economic policy of the government and the Central Bank and as the main macroeconomic achievement of the year, Paramonova said.

Central Bank Seen Optimistic

MK2006094095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 20 Jun 95 p 1

[Report by Andrey Grigoryev under the "Perspectives" rubric: "The Central Bank Has Discussed the Threat of De-Dollarization. Refunding Rate Was Lowered to 180 Percent a Year Yesterday"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A "roundtable" was held yesterday at the Central Bank, the main topic of which was the current macroeconomic situation. The discussion was prompted by the continuing rapid strengthening of the national currency (yesterday, the dollar rate at the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange Market fell to 4,590 rubles). Central Bank Acting Chairman Tatyana Paramonova was the main speaker and chairman, and participants in the discussion included Central Bank Board of Directors members, bankers, representatives of the Finance Ministry and the Economy Ministry, and deputies of the Federal Assembly.

Characterizing the state of the financial system, Paramonova noted several factors which, in her opinion,

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clearly indicated an improvement in the general economic situation and provided grounds for financial stabilization. These factors include a marked decrease in the rate of inflation (from 17 to 7 percent a month), a rise in gold currency reserves, and an increased trust in the ruble. The latter trend is manifested in a rise in sales of foreign currency by exporters, a decrease in popular demand for hard currency in cash, and, correspondingly, a reduction in the amount of cash currency imported by banks. As a result, transactions in rubles have become more attractive than those in hard currency, the profitability of which was nearly zero. The optimism was underpinned by some practical deeds — the Central Bank lowered refunding rate to 180 percent a year yesterday.

At the same time, as the Central Bank head admitted, the current situation requires specific measures to be taken both by the Central Bank, the government, and by commercial banks. A very high liquidity of the ruble market (according to the Central Bank, available resources in banks' possession amount to over 16 trillion rubles), in Paramonova's opinion, is opening new possibilities for the government to use this money. The Finance Ministry was urged to "activate borrowing," while the Economy Ministry was urged "to suggest effective investment trends for banks." As for banks, in Tatyana Paramonova's opinion, they must offer people attractive terms for keeping saving accounts.

In general, the atmosphere of the discussion reflected the state of uncertainty and anxiety, observed throughout the country as a result of the ruble's sudden strengthening. The repeated reasoning by many participants in the meeting on the "threat of de-dollarization" and the sufferings of people caused by the national currency's strengthening, however, is somewhat puzzling. The Russian Government has never guaranteed — and could not guarantee — the dollar's stability to its citizens. Moreover, it was the rise in the U.S. currency's rate that was the result of the inaptitude of the government, allowing excessively high inflation rates in the country. It seems that people will bear the one-time devaluation of their dollar savings much less painfully than a permanent inflation tax on all of their earnings.

'Favorable' Trend Excludes Consumers

MM2006143195 Moscow TRUD in Russian 17 Jun 95 p 2

[Article by political observer Vitaliy Golovachev: "Ruble Gets Stronger While Prices Increase. Thoughts on Paradoxes of Our Economy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I would like to understand for myself and explain to readers why our economy is starting to get out of the crisis (there are no visible grounds to disbelieve the statements to this effect by First Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays, who is in charge of the "economic bloc") while the picture looks completely different to the ordinary person at the everyday level.

Let us begin on the positive side: In May not only did the physical volume of industrial production increase 1 percent compared with April, but the GDP also went up 2 percent. The graphs are showing growth, the export of goods to the wider world is up 17 percent on April, and as in the fairy tale the ruble is growing like Topsy. But so far no rejoicing has been apparent among the masses.

Generally speaking, a 1-percent increase (or fall) is too little to enable far-reaching conclusions to be drawn. Incidentally, statistical material on macroeconomic trends allows for an error of exactly 1 percent.

What could have caused this increase, if investment and capital investment are still sharply decreasing, totaling one-fourth of the 1989 level, is another question. The country is losing fixed capital because tool benches and machines are aging and wearing out.... In the past five months capital investment has decreased another 21 percent (compared with the same period last year). The sharply increasing industrial injury and accident rate is also a consequence of the ongoing collapse of industrial potential.

I wonder exactly what kind of "yeast" is going to start industry's growth and revival?

The sentiments of millions of Russians are not being included in the favorable picture. In five months prices have increased 67 percent and have already exceeded the initial official forecasts of inflation **for the whole year.** The price of cheese has more than doubled and prices of beef, pork, boiled sausage, rice, semolina, and apples have gone up 80-93 percent. Among industrial goods cotton textiles, yarns, toilet and household soap, and cardiovascular preparations have especially become more expensive.... Prices of housing and communal services have leapt over 150 percent. If this is stabilization, what is a deepening economic crisis?

Another shadow that is spoiling the encouraging rays of light in the landscape is the volume of retail trade turnover. Taking it not in rubles but in the trade volume (the most accurate comparison), it turns out that it decreased 9 percent over five months. This is a serious symptom of a lack of prosperity. Moreover, the population was sold 11 percent less food goods in terms of physical volume than in the five months last year. Russians are eating less and less not because they

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previously had an abundant diet but because of a lack of money. Over 10 million people are malnourished in our country. At the same time food consumption continues to fall. How much longer can this go on?

Market economy specialists who come here are extremely surprised by the frequent lack of essential goods in stores. During a May inspection carried out by Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] officials, there was beef in only one in two stores, butter and vegetable oil in three out of five stores, eggs and sugar in two out of three stores.... It is symptomatic that in May the amount of food goods in Russian stores decreased appreciably (the amount of sugar, for example, decreased 5 percent). Where exactly are the market "self-regulators"?

But maybe the most painful sign for Russians that it is too early to start rejoicing over a positive breakthrough is the **continuing increase in wage arrears.** As of 1 June, total debts amounted to **R6.36 trillion** (R5.5 trillion as of 1 May). The largest amount of unpaid money was in industry (R3.4 trillion). This unhappy situation has now developed at 8,000 enterprises. Moreover, one-third of the overall vast sum is arrears of over two months. In May workers in industry, construction, transport, and agriculture, for example, did not receive 18 percent of what they were owed (that is to say practically one ruble in five).

The highest level of arrears is in Tyumen, Kemerovo, and Chelyabinsk Oblasts and Krasnoyarsk and Khabarovsk Krays.

All this is still a long way from stabilization. The approaching "collapse" of the dollar (what has happened in recent weeks is "peanuts"), besides hitting citizens' savings again, will certainly cause new complications in the economy, primarily in the export sphere. Another deepening of the economic crisis in October cannot be ruled out.

There is only one way of preventing events from developing in this way — a much more consistent structural reorganization of industry and the attraction rather than the turning away of foreign and domestic investors. Why are many foreign firms so willingly going to China and its free economic zones but so carefully bypassing Russia? The answer to this question is not very complicated. But let government experts answer it (ideally in TRUD)....

Livestock Sector Performance Still Deteriorating

MM2006141195 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 20 Jun 95 p 1

[BIZNES-TASS report: "Slump Continues at Livestock Units"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Livestock and poultry output fell at Russia's agricultural enterprises in the first four months of this year compared with the same period last year. Sales of livestock and poultry for meat fell by 24 percent, milk production fell by 18 percent, and egg production was down 13 percent. These figures are cited in the report "On the State of the Agro-Industrial Complex Economy" distributed by the Russian Federation Ministry of Agriculture and Food in the Federation Council.

The situation on 1 May compared with 1 May 1994 shows that the number of cattle registered at agricultural enterprises was down by 13 percent — the number of cows was down by 11 percent — while the number of hogs was down by 18 percent, sheep numbers were down by 31 percent, and poultry numbers were down 15 percent.

Production volumes in the food and processing industry are continuing to fall. In this sector there are virtually no enterprises that have not reduced output and are in a stable financial position. In the first quarter almost one-fourth of enterprises had losses totaling more than 176 billion rubles.

State of Agricultural Crops Reported 'Critical'

MM2106083695 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jun 95 p 2

[Report by Anatoliy Safonov: "June Is Hot"]

[FBIS Translated Text] They say that the sun is high in June and that it is a long time from morning to evening. And this month is also called the grain grower. The main things plants need are warmth and moisture. And if there has been more than enough warmth just lately, May and June have been unusually parsimonious when it comes to moisture. A critical situation has taken shape for agriculture. A particularly grave situation is taking shape in the Central and Lower Volga Regions, the South Urals, the Central Chernozem region, and the south of the Central Region.

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According to a preliminary assessment, drought has gripped 23.8 million hectares of agricultural crops and of these over 14 million hectares of grain and feed crops are in a flattened [ugnetennoye] state, 7.4 million hectares are in a critical state, and 2 million hectares have perished from the drought, frosts, and hail, particularly in Saratov, Samara, and Orenburg Oblasts. Pastures are catching fire in a number of regions.

But the Russian villages are enduring more than the blows of the elements. Drought is from god, as they say, but much unresolved business depends on us ourselves. What is necessary to harvest that has been grown in the fields? There was a big and businesslike talk about this at a session of the Russian Federation Government commission for the harvest under the chairmanship of Vice Premier A.Kh. Zaveryukha. The harvest is approaching, but to this day not even half the harvesting equipment has been prepared in Vologda, Leningrad, Novgorod, Vladimir, Orenburg, Kaluga, Chelyabinsk, Ryazan, Kirov, and Nizhniy Novgorod Oblasts, Krasnoyarsk and Maritime Krays, and the republics of Kalmykia and Udmurtia.

The provision of fuel and lubricants to agricultural enterprises is causing serious concern. As of the start of June the farms had 643,000 tonnes of diesel fuel or 82 percent of last year's level and 274,000 tonnes of gasoline, or 74 percent of last year's level. Fuel stocks are particularly low on the farms of Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kostroma, Smolensk, Penza, and Sverdlovsk Oblasts and the republics of Mariy El, Mordovia, and North Ossetia.

Last month there were disruptions in the delivery of fuel and lubricants on credit secured against commodity deliveries to agricultural producers in Rostov Oblast, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Maritime kray, Saratov, Astrakhan, and Kursk Oblasts, and the republics of Karachayevo- Cherkesia and Kabardino-Balkaria. The reason was that the petroleum products supply organs were linked to "unrealistic" suppliers (Rostov Oblast, Karachayevo-Cherkasiya) or to oil refineries not supplied with oil (Maritime and Khabarovsk Krays, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast).

According to the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy and the oil companies, there is a shortage of oil products resources on the domestic market for the full implementation of credit secured against commodity deliveries and the fuel and energy complex's debts to the federal budget cannot fully cover credit against commodity deliveries. According to local reports monopoly suppliers are drastically increasing prices, in connection with which farms will be unable to pay for the credit with their produce. Thus the Yaroslavl oil refinery increased the price for gasoline by 280,000 rubles [R] a tonne (25 percent) compared with May and the price for diesel fuel by R83,000 (10 percent).

This year the area on which agricultural crops will be harvested in Russia will be 102.2 million hectares. That is 3 million hectares less than last year. And if you consider the areas that have suffered from the severe drought, then this figure will drop considerably.

Ministries Clash Over Drafts on Oil Exports

MK2006131095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 20 Jun 95 p 3

[Report by Konstantin Levin, Vadim Bardin: "Exporting Oil From Russia. Oil Export Liberalization Seance and its Debunking"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] There is no letup in the lobbying on oil export procedures in the wake of the abolished oil export quotas and licenses. The visible part of its latest round have been the competing drafts of a government decree devoted to regulation of oil and oil products shipments in line with intergovernmental agreements. The first to be submitted was the Fuel and Energy Ministry's draft, which leaves no room for the interests of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations [MFER]. The MFER's retaliation was not long in coming — a KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent has learned that the government is currently considering, as an official version, the one submitted by the MFER. [passage omitted]

The drafts ostensibly deal with a specific question: who will undertake to act on the Russian Government's obligations. But first, this involves at least one-fourth of all oil exports, and second, a government exporter becomes fixed at the pipeline. It is not accidental that last year's export "for state needs" was taken care of exclusively by traders. Now the Fuel and Energy Ministry insists that the producer enterprises should be the exporters and tries generally to suspend the MFER from the game — in accordance with the Fuel and Energy Ministry's draft, in the interdepartmental commission that appoints those who carry out government obligations, there is no room left for MFER representatives. As for the MFER, it trying to uphold its administrative rights, not only in the draft decree but also by conducting in practice a competition for the right to carry out Russia's obligations in regard to Cuba.

Despite the radically opposite approaches of the Fuel and Energy Ministry and the MFER, a compromise is surely possible. Attesting to this is an already agreed upon list of enterprises that Energy Customs recognizes

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as oil exporters. This list is rather remarkable primarily for its size. At the time of the special oil exporters' "demise" they numbered altogether 14; now the list forwarded by the Fuel and Energy Ministry to the State Customs Committee (rather than to the MFER, as was the case in the time of special exporters) includes 179 oil exporters. Naturally, its authorship has left its stamp on the list's makeup. Prevailing in it are oil extracting and oil refining enterprises, yet room has also been found for the formerly selected pure special exporters. Among them are the AO [Joint-Stock Company] MES, AOZT [Closed Type Joint-Stock Company] "Alfa," TOO [Limited Company] "Balkar-Trading," AO "Nafta-Moskva," AOZT "Torgovyy Dom Gosinkora," and the state enterprise "Mashinoimport."

It is increasingly difficult to divide the exporters into "seven pairs of pure" and "seven pairs of impure:" many former pure traders had been forced by realities to buy shares together with extracting enterprises (for example, the AO MES, and TOO "Balkar-Trading") with the result that they may, in the same way as the producers, can compete for access to the pipeline. Besides, the Fuel and Energy Ministry did not object against the proposal of the Economy Ministry (yet another participant in the interdepartmental haggling surrounding oil exports laying claims to being an arbiter) on permitting "to sell one's place in line," that is to say, to cede one's turn in the oil pumping schedule. It is actually in the mechanism of ceding, when a producer enterprise cedes its right to pumping its oil to the trader and gets paid for it both the price of oil and the commission money "for its place in the line," that the main and correct idea of the MFER is implemented: trading in oil should be done by someone who knows how to do it, and it is not at all necessary that they should smell of oil.

One can confidently forecast that the formal barriers to oil exporters will be lowered (the World Bank is asleep), and those exporters who make it to the pipeline first will gain. In the final heat, everyone is bound to use his elbows. The radical solution lies in widening the network of pipelines. The first signs of it are already here. These are the Caspian Pipeline Consortium plans calling for the construction of a terminal north of Novorossiysk and a corresponding branch line from Tikhoretskaya to the new terminal.

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International Affairs

Ministry Urges France To Revoke Nuclear Tests

LD2006134095 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1140 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry has urged the French Government to revoke its decision to resume nuclear tests in Southern Pacific. An appeal issued by the Ministry calls on France to facilitate a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing and to adhere to a moratorium on tests together with other nuclear nations.

The Foreign Ministry says that a resumption of nuclear tests would breach the declaration adopted at a conference of NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] signatories in 1995, "The Principles and Goals of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament," and would not be conducive to the development of positive trends in nuclear disarmament.

The Ministry says it has received unconfirmed reports on possible changes to the United States policy on nuclear testing.

Chernobyl Funds at 'Bottom' of Halifax Agenda

AU2006140395 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 17 Jun 95 pp 1, 4

[Report by Volodymyr Martsynovskyy: "Will the G-7 Resolve a 'Little' Ukrainian Question...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukraine is hoping to receive "Chernobyl" money from the G-7: In exchange for President Kuchma's promise to shut down the Chernobyl Atomic Electric Power Plant [AES] by the end of the current century. As is known, it is planned to replace the dangerous atomic plant with a steam-gas one and, by estimates of the Ukrainian side, this undertaking will cost over $4 billion. Of course, it is mainly the West that is expected to open its wallet, as it is under its pressure that the Ukrainian president's decision was made.

However, our problem is somewhere at the bottom of the Halifax agenda. According to Canadian officials, it is among those that "are also planned to discuss." At the same time, the decision on granting Ukraine the long promised money may become a "useful practical solution" at the summit, which is often reproached for idle talk and absence of concrete results of its meetings — even though shortly before the summit, Joan Spero, U.S. deputy secretary of state, stated that no big decisions should be expected from the present meeting in Halifax.

The main question on the agenda is the discussion of global economic issues, the possibility to prevent financial crises, to intensify efficient assistance to developing countries, and so on. It was also planned to seriously discuss the situation in the Balkans, and almost the entire first day of the summit was devoted to that. Displeasure was expressed to Russian President Boris Yeltsin in connection with the development of events in Chechnya and nuclear cooperation with Iran. France added unscheduled work to participants of the summit after it announced about the resumption of underground nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean.

For us, it remains to hope that the question of lessening Ukraine's share in eliminating the Chernobyl AES is not among "big" ones and may, therefore, be explicitly resolved. We will know the result today.

Commentary Derides Kuchma's 'Pro-Russian' Line

WS2006081595 Kiev VECHIRNIY KYYIV in Ukrainian 15 Jun 95 p 1

[Commentary by Hryhoriy Musiyenko: "The Outcome of Constitutional Hat-in—Hand Policy: Yeltsin — Emperor, Kuchma — Governor?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting between the Ukrainian and Russian presidents in Sochi has ended. The Black Sea Fleet was divided "equally" — 82 percent of its ships will belong to Russia, and the rest, 18 percent, was left for Ukraine. To make things look more exotic, they even gave us four submarines. But the main conclusion of the Sochi agreement was the fact that Sevastopol was declared the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. This means that armed forces of a foreign country will be deployed in Ukraine on undefined conditions and for an unspecified period of time. Ukraine's nonaligned status has thus been violated, and our state's sovereignty has been threatened. Official state institutions' attempts to refute such assessments of the Sochi summit are unconvincing. Ukrainian citizens are alarmed by the current developments in Russia and Crimea. What has happened in Sochi contradicts the principles of the Declaration of State Sovereignty and the Declaration of Ukrainian Independence. How could this happen?

For 10 days — from 31 May to 9 June — all of Ukraine was breathlessly waiting for the outcome of the political game between the presidential team and the Supreme Council On the last day of May, [Ukrainian President] Leonid Kuchma, unexpectedly for uninitiated people, threw into the game an edict on holding a nationwide poll to learn whom the people trust more — the president or parliament. At the same time, he resorted to an unprecedented move, delivering an "appeal to the Ukrainian people," and not to the "people of Ukraine,"

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something his predecessor and all Ukrainian politicians would usually do.

It is no secret that our president has never demonstrated any particular philanthropic love for the Ukrainian people, and he does not intend to kneel before them. According to him, he makes no exceptions for anybody, except, perhaps, for women. He took this step for one purpose — to put the vigilance of Ukrainian citizens to rest, and to use them as a means in the battle against political opponents to achieve his goals. The goals formally boiled down to a clear division of powers between the executive and legislative authorities, and the implementation of a program for economic reforms. Actually, everything is much more simple — his goal was to secure absolute power for himself at the price of preserving the colonial status of the "independent" Ukraine and the subservient situation of Ukrainians. The Supreme Council, except for an insignificant number of deputies, had the same goal.

The president seized the initiative and began attacking. Through his speech in the Supreme Council, he had a chance to strengthen his position and defeat parliament. The game had been supposed to end on 7 June with his 2-0 victory, but for some reason, it ended with a 1-1 draw. As the two participants in the match stated, they made concessions to one another in the name of the Ukrainian people's interests, peace, accord, and prosperity of a democratic, law- governed, and civilized Ukrainian state.

A splendid and solemn signing ceremony for the Constitutional Agreement between the president and the Supreme Council was held at Mariyinskyy [presidential] palace on 8 June, and was supposed to confirm the end of their dangerous confrontation, and the victory of principles of mutual understanding and respect between the pillars of the Ukrainian Olympus.

Impressed by the heartbreaking show and fraternization between Leonid Kuchma and [Supreme Council Chairman] Oleksandr Moroz, the touched nation believed in their sincerity and readiness to protect their interests by all possible and even impossible means. Unfortunately, the people's dreams did not come true.

In fact, the goal behind the signing of the Constitutional Agreement was somewhat different — namely, to sanctify dangerous compromises and an open hat-in-hand policy to protect clannish interests of the mighty of this world by all means, including trade in the Ukrainian state's fate and betrayal of the Ukrainian people.

The hat-in-hand policy was legalized and elevated to the rank of state policy. President Kuchma received carte blanche — the right to do whatever he wants on behalf of the people — and on 8 June, he departed for an official meeting with Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin in Sochi, along with a large entourage.

Meetings with the latter had always been desirable for Leonid Kuchma. As everybody knows, their friendship is based on common interests, and, primarily, a desire to see Russia as a great state "heading civilized mankind." Perhaps this is the essence of the Ukrainian-Russian "strategic partnership?"

Yeltsin continues the famous traditions of the Moscow czardom and Russian empire, beginning with Andrey Bogolyubskiy to Nikolay II and Brezhnev. As a faithful son of the CPSU and an advocate of the ideology of proletarian internationalism, he continues Lenin's national policy, including the idea of uniting all nations and nationalities under the scepter of the Russian empire. A powerful Russian party is operating in every former Soviet republic. Ukraine is no exception.

Everybody knew a long time ago that Leonid Kuchma was the leader of a Russian party in Ukraine for a long time. He himself did not conceal this either. Let us recall his election platform and actions while in the office of prime minister or president. The Interregional Bloc for Reforms — the "Masonic Brotherhood for Reforms" headed by Presidential Adviser Volodymyr Hrynyov — guarantees that his pro-Russian sympathies will remain unchanged.

Kuchma flew to Sochi with a firm desire to satisfy his Russian patron. And the latter wished only one thing — to break Ukraine's backbone in Crimea and dot all the "i's" with regard to the division of the Black Sea Fleet; that is, to hand over the entire fleet, including its onshore infrastructure, to Russia. To put it another way, Yeltsin wanted Kuchma — who was already president — to sign in Sochi the agreement concluded with former Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk in Yalta on 3 September 1993. By the way, this agreement was drafted by then Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov [current Ukrainian defense minister] and his Russian counterpart Aleksandr Shokhin in Moscow on 27 August 1993.

Everything recurred in Sochi, and we thus have another "Yalta-95." At this time, Ukraine capitulated with no resistance. Ukrainian, Russian, and Western diplomats deem the Sochi meeting a great contribution to European and world stability. The Ukrainian foreign minister termed it epoch-making. If this is really correct, then it is only as Ukraine's epoch-making diplomatic, political, and military defeat.

Let us recall the news conference held by the Ukrainian and Russian presidents in Sochi on 9 June, after

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their meeting. Yeltsin drawled his every word, and with gestures presented the triumph of Russia, which resolved the Black Sea Fleet problem once and for all. Kuchma stood with his hands behind his back, and he only raised them when Boris Nikolayevich hugged him and, according to "Russian custom," kissed him three times. According to assessments in the Russian press, the Ukrainian President looked so miserably, that he made people want to cry. One had an impression that Yeltsin was raping Kuchma for four hours, as Svoboda Radio noted, citing KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

One cannot but recall a similar scene in Massandra in 1993, when Yeltsin crucified Leonid Kravchuk. The latter stood with his hands in his pockets and his head hung low while the Russian master was shaking his fists.

However, Yeltsin is not only cruel but also gracious, as all tyrants. In Sochi, he actually proclaimed himself emperor of "All White, Little, and Many Other Russias." He did not offend our president either, and appointed him governor of Little Russia, and simultaneously vice-regent of Tavrida.

Yeltsin conquered Belarus from the land, Ukraine — from the sea. This confirms the existence of the Russian "Barbagreatrossa" plan [refers to Hitler's "Barbarossa" plan for invading the USSR] — a plan for humiliating Ukraine and restoring the Russian empire.

After the Sochi summit, for the game of world card players in Halifax, Russia became a trump "eight" and Ukraine a simple "six," which was not even allowed to cross the threshold. This is the price of Ukraine's constitutional hat-in-hand policy.

There are rumors that the meeting in Sochi was another Pereyaslav Council [at which Ukrainian hetmans signed an unification agreement with Russia in the 17th century], and that President Kuchma repeated the mistake of [Hetman] Bohdan Khmelnytskyy who "trusted the Muscovites." This comparison does not withstand criticism. Bohdan Khmelnytskyy, having routed Poland, attempted to build a Ukrainian state, and it was not his fault that he submitted it to Moscow bondage. He never intended to become Moscow's vassal. Leonid Kuchma, having become president of independent Ukraine, ruined it, along with his predecessor, and is currently voluntarily transferring the Ukrainian nation to the bosom of the Russian empire.

If he even resembles any Ukrainian hetman, then it is rather his compatriot from Chernihiv region, Ivan Brykhovetskyy. Although the latter promised Zaporizhzhya Cossacks to serve Ukraine, he sold himself to Moscow. His fate was horrifying. Hetman Bryukhovetskyy was torn to pieces by the same Cossacks who elected him as their hetman. This was the punishment for a traitor.

No nation in the world respects traitors. To punish treason is considered the highest act of justice. The judgment of history is severe, though just.

Meanwhile, the Russian onslaught on independent CIS states is continuing. Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia, and Belarus have already virtually fallen victims to it. Russia is finishing off the freedom-loving Chechnya with fire and sword. Ukraine is next in line. It is supposed to become the last link in the restored Russian empire. The Russian flag, already hoisted above Sevastopol, may soon flutter over Kiev. To achieve this, purposeful political, ideological, economic, power engineering, personnel, and military preparations have been, and are still conducted, including the destruction of Ukraine's nuclear defense shield. Western democratic countries are either voluntarily or involuntarily helping Russia in this respect.

The lethal threat of losing statehood and the Ukrainian nation disappearing from the face of the earth is looming over Ukraine. We are still able to avoid this threat today, but it may be too late tomorrow. Let us close our ranks in the name of our children's and grandchildren's lives, to protect our independence. Ukraine is our home, and we, Ukrainians, must restore order in it.

Sochi Summit Seen as Foreign Policy Success

WS2006114595 Kiev VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 14 Jun 95 p 3

[Commentary by Serhiy Nesterenko: "The Black Sea Was Divided in Sochi. But the Main Importance of the Presidential Meeting Does Not Lie Here"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The results of the Sochi summit between the Russian and Ukrainian presidents proved to be quite unexpected. A majority of politicians had anticipated that the meeting between Yeltsin and Kuchma, by taking the form of a traditional exchange of compliments, would produce no concrete results. And these prognoses had been based on quite a substantial foundation: Russian-Ukrainian relations had recently not distinguished themselves by their particular warmness, and with regard to the Black Sea Fleet problem, the sides had crossed a line beyond which it had been apparently impossible to step without harming the two state's national interests. Nonetheless, a "miracle" occurred: The presidents signed an agreement unraveling the Gordian knot of the most complicated problem — the division of the onshore infrastructure. At this time, Russia made a concession to**

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Ukraine by accepting the latter's version of wording: The main base of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet is in Sevastopol. Additionally, let us recall that the Kremlin had categorically insisted on its version of the document: Sevastopol is a base of the Black Sea Fleet. So, what underwater political currents removed the Black Sea Fleet problem "from the anchor?" Can one currently speak about Ukraine's success?

Was the Specter of Dagomys Present in Sochi?

The atmosphere during a joint news conference held by the presidents was euphoric. Boris Yeltsin stated that the "entire world should rejoice" over the results of the talks. "We have completely settled the problem of the Black Sea Fleet. We have dotted all the i's on this issue," the Russian president reported. "There are currently no obstacles to the signing of a large-scale agreement on friendship and cooperation, meaning that there are no obstacles to strategic partnership between our countries." Leonid Kuchma was slightly more reserved: "Strategic partnership, in terms of economics, should be consolidated by specific projects. They have already been drafted, and we should sign them within a month." The presidents told journalists that they had agreed to meet every month henceforth, and in addition to their signatures under the agreement, they consolidated the results of the talks by kissing one another.

So, has the main stumbling-block really been removed from the path of Ukrainian-Russian relations? In my opinion, it is premature to say that. The warmness of relations between the presidents by no means indicates a change in the two states' political trends, which often prove to be contradictory. All the more so, since we witnessed something similar during a meeting between Boris Yeltsin and [former Ukrainian President] Leonid Kravchuk in Dagomys a few years ago. There were the same promises to regularly inform one another (though not at private meetings but by telephone) and the same kisses. They even began calling themselves by their first names — Lyonya and Borya — (which, thank God, did not happen in Sochi). There was the same common euphoria and there were the same statements that the Black Sea Fleet problem had been resolved. And as a result, there were the most severe pressure from Russia, an openly offensive attitude toward the Ukrainian leadership at a meeting in Yalta, economic pressure, and a number of dangerous statements by representatives of the Russian establishment. This resulted in a two-year period of "coldness" in Ukrainian-Russian relations.

Will the same situation not recur this time? Certain political parties have already rushed to assess the agreement as harming Ukraine's interests. The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, for example, has called on parliament to refuse to ratify the Sochi agreement.

The Ukrainian leadership believes, however, that the Sochi summit was our country's victory, and thus not a defeat. Acting Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko has described the meeting in Sochi as "epoch-making and monumental," emphasizing that the concluded agreements correspond to, primarily, Ukraine's interests. "Not only our people have been waiting for this step, but also all of Europe, in which there cannot be peace without stability in its two largest countries," he said.

The Sochi summit was qualitatively different than the Dagomys one: In addition to an exchange of compliments, it produced certain solid results: First, a decision on dividing the Black Sea Fleet into Russian and Ukrainian parts was finally made, and second, the problem of dividing bases was generally resolved. However, problems may still emerge in this regard as well: While everything is clear regarding the site of the Russian Fleet's stationing, Leonid Kuchma is yet to define places for the Ukrainian Fleet's bases. Logically, once Russian troops are deployed in Sevastopol, the Ukrainian Fleet will have to search for another place. Vice Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyy, commander of the Ukrainian Navy, however, has already opposed the withdrawal of Ukrainian seamen from Sevastopol, deeming this step inconvenient for our Navy. The legal status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet has not yet been defined either. Contradictions have already appeared with regard to this issue. Judging from a statement by Boris Yeltsin's adviser Dmitriy Ryurikov, Russia is against giving its fleet, deployed in Ukraine, the status of a foreign fleet, explaining its stance by the "special nature" of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Moreover, the Ukrainian leadership adheres to a different viewpoint: According to international law, the Russian Fleet should have the status of a foreign fleet in the current situation. There are other stumbling-blocks as well, which will certainly "come to the surface" during the implementation of the Sochi accords.

It is thus too early to celebrate the victory. One can deem the Sochi meeting the first step along the path toward settling the Black Sea Fleet problem. Will our countries proceed along this path any further? Currently, one cannot completely respond to this question in the affirmative.

Ukraine's Trump Card

Therefore, the main importance of the Sochi summit, perhaps, lies somewhere else. And it is more global than

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the problem of dividing the Black Sea Fleet. Something more important lies in the signing of the Sochi agreement: For the first time since its independence, Ukraine talked to Russia if not from a position of a stronger side, than at least as an equal party. After all, Russia agreed to accept the Ukrainian side's wording — "The Russian Federation Fleet Is Based in Sevastopol" — not for benevolent reasons. This was caused by a foreign policy maneuver brilliantly performed by official Kiev, which was supposed to destroy the following old stereotype: Russia can do with Ukraine whatever it wants by manipulating the gas and oil "levers," meaning that Kiev is doomed to eternal dependence on the Kremlin.

Ukrainian politicians brilliantly played the card of Ukraine's geopolitical location and controversies between Russia and the West. Over the last six months, the Ukrainian leadership has been vigorously demonstrating its independence from Moscow and expanding cooperation with the West. Here are a few examples: Clinton encounters a cold reception in Moscow, but a warm one in Kiev. Ukraine virtually ignores the CIS, but our president easily finds a common language with the Baltic states, whose relations with the Russian Federation are far from friendly. As the conflict between Russia and NATO over the bloc's eastward expansion develops, Kiev announces that it is essential to cooperate with the North Atlantic alliance. This campaign was crowned by a demonstrative visit to NATO by Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov on the same day as the Sochi meeting was held. Moreover, he managed to obtain a "go-ahead" for "special" relations with the North Atlantic alliance from the leadership of this organization. Leonid Kuchma's successful visits to other Western countries and the signing of an agreement with the EU were also supposed to confirm that Ukraine is able to survive without a "special" partnership with the Russian Federation, and they unequivocally indicated that if Russia continued to treat Ukraine from the position of an "elder brother," Ukraine would not hesitate to make the West its priority. And it already has chances of doing so.

Of course, these developments could not but worry the Kremlin, since this implied a loss of its influence on Ukraine. And currently, when a division of spheres of influence between Russia and the United States and its allies is under way, this would be very inconvenient for Moscow. So it finally had to make at least a small concession in Sochi in order not to lose more. This most likely explains Boris Yeltsin's "pro-Ukrainian" warmness displayed at the news conference, which was quite unexpected after his recent statements such as "What should we do with Ukraine?"

Therefore, the Sochi meeting became the first summit in the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations at which the Ukrainian delegation stood on firmer ground than the Russian side. Will these trends continue in the future? Only one thing is currently clear: Russia will most likely attempt to take a number of steps to restore the status quo. Time will show to what degree it succeeds.

OSCE: Crimeans Do Not Need Dual Citizenship

LD2006171295 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1140 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — Crimeans can receive education and pensions from the Russian Federation without adopting dual citizenship, Max van der Stoel, OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] commissioner on national minorities, told a briefing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 20 June. He said such issues could be resolved through specific agreements between Kiev and Moscow.

Van der Stoel, who is visiting Kiev to discuss Crimean issues, said he had told Crimean Supreme Council Chairman Serhiy Tsekov that the problem of autonomy could be solved only by placing it in the Ukrainian legal framework. He said the Crimean speaker reacted with understanding to the OSCE position.

National Affairs

Premier Holds Consultations on New Government

LD2006223995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1858 GMT 20 Jun 95

["INTERFAX-UKRAINE" news item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, June 20 (Interfax-Ukraine) — Prime Minister Yevgeniy Marchuk is currently having "political consultations" with leaders of various groups in parliament on what structure the new government should have, the leader of one of the groups said on Tuesday.

The Rukh and Reformy groups have proposed candidates to ministerial posts, but the consultations are focusing on the structure of the future government and not on who is to hold what portfolios, Reformy leader Sergey Sobolev told Interfax-Ukraine.

Parliamentary groups plan to compile and approve a "single list" of candidates to the government, he said.

The chairman of a parliamentary commission said parliamentary groups would be consulted about the next government by President Leonid Kuchma as well. The president will meet their leaders on Wednesday or Thursday, Valeriy Cherep told Interfax-Ukraine.

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The president will listen to their proposals for the composition of the government but disagreements between them will induce him to make his own choice, Cherep said.

Some deputies offered themselves as candidates, he said.

The new government "will not be a long-lived one," he predicted. Production will continue to go down and prices will go on rising, which will provoke criticism of the government "from all sides, including Verkhovna Rada (parliament)," he said.

'Large Part' of Cabinet May Remain

LD2006165895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1250 GMT 20 Jun 95

["INTERFAX-UKRAINE" news item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, June 20 (INTERFAX-UKRAINE) — As President Leonid Kuchma and Prime Minister Yevheniy Marchuk work together to try to form a new government, unconfirmed reports say that a large part of former cabinet ministers are likely to retain their posts including three power ministers and the head of the country's foreign department.

Some say the prime minister will have one first and several ordinary deputy premiers though their number is to be reduced.

The posts of deputy premiers for construction, defense-related industries as well as for finances and banking activity are most likely to be abolished.

The make up of a new cabinet will not be announced until next week.

In the meantime, members of the Reform faction offered Kuchma a list of their own candidates for ministerial jobs.

It is now known that they want First Deputy Premier Viktor Pinzenik who is responsible for economic reforms to stay put in his job.

Vice Governor of Nikolayev Region Vladimir Yemelyanov is named for the post of a minister for engineering, defense industry and conversion matters. Deputies Serhiy Chukmasov and Serhiy Terekhin were named as candidates for the industry and finance ministries, and Oleksandr Yelyashkevich as the prime minister's economic adviser.

Deputies Vitaliy Musiaka and Oleksandr Ignatenko are offered as candidates for the justice and defense ministries and Oleksandr Yemets as a minister responsible for legal matters.

Further on Future Cabinet

LD2006210795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1644 GMT 20 Jun 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Petrovskiy, edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Leonid Kuchma and Prime Minister Yevheniy Marchuk have continued to form a new Cabinet of Ministers.

According to reliable sources many members of the previous Cabinet may retain their posts. Observers say that any changes of the defence, interior or foreign ministers are unlikely.

The new government will have the office of first deputy prime minister, whereas the number of deputy prime ministers will be "reduced somewhat". In the new Cabinet the offices of deputy prime ministers for construction, the military-industrial complex, financing and banking will probably be slashed.

The government's composition is expected to be finalized this week.

Meanwhile the Reforms parliamentary faction has proposed its own list of candidates for ministers in the new government.

Sources close to the faction's leaders say that the Reforms faction would like the first deputy prime minister for economic reforms Viktor Pinzenik to stay in office.

The faction nominated the deputy chief of the Nikolayev region's administration Vladimir Yemelyanov for the Minister of Machine Building, member of parliament Serhiy Chukmasov for Industry Minister, member of parliament Serhiy Teryokhin for the Finance Minister and member of parliament Oleksandr Yelyashkevich for the Prime Minister's economics adviser.

The Reforms faction believes that Oleksandr Yemets must be responsible for legal policies, Vitaliy Musiyaka is proposed for Justice Minister and Oleksandr Ignatenko, for Defence Minister.

Leaders of parliamentary factions and groups are planning to meet to agree a single list of candidates, leader of the Reform Group Serhiy Sobolev told Interfax. However, he said that current consultations focused on the structures of a would be government rather than personalities.

For his part, head of the commission for basic industries and regional economic development Valeriy Cherep said the leaders of parliamentary groups and factions

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would meet the president "either tomorrow or the day after" to discuss the composition of a new cabinet.

He said Kuchma would certainly hear out the deputies but would appoint his own candidates by playing on differences between various factions.

In his words, some deputies have offered themselves for ministerial posts, but a year spent in parliament is no reason for claiming them.

Cherep does not believe the new government will last long because continued production slump and rising prices would bring it under attack from all sides, including parliament.

Economic Issues

Kuchma Advisers Review Economic Progress

WS1906132095 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 10 Jun 95 p 8

[Article by Volodymyr Borodyuk, director of the National Institute for Economic Programs; Valeriy Lytvytskyy, Ukrainian presidential aide for economic issues; and Volodymyr Cherevan, Ukrainian presidential freelance adviser: "Realities of the Ukrainian Economy" — first paragraph is HOLOS UKRAYINY introduction; table not included]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The changes that have occurred in the Ukrainian economy over recent years cannot be assessed unambiguously along political lines, because obviously there are positive results and serious miscalculations, errors committed on the path of reforming the entire system of public relations and utilizing production potential.**

The new Ukraine of today is an entirely different state. It substantially differs from the republic that was part of the erstwhile USSR.

Essential changes were carried out in the production sector; privatization, although slow — is under way. Enterprises have been placed in new labor conditions. They themselves dispose of their products, look for consumers and suppliers of raw and critical materials, and conclude contracts with them. The state is gradually withdrawing from this type of activity.

The degree of political and economic activity of the people has increased and become a basis for the development of entrepreneurship, small business, and various market structures.

The people and enterprises have begun to learn to count and earn money. They realize that their economic independence and security depends directly on themselves and not on the state.

At the same time, one cannot act in disregard of the fact that — due to a variety of objective and subjective reasons — negative trends and ruinous processes also occur in Ukraine, particularly in the national economy. They strongly and negatively affect the situation in the country, particularly the life of the people and the future of the state. In addition, these processes did not begin recently but have been developing for four years now.

The questions "where are we going?" and "what are we building?" have been repeatedly raised lately. Many foreign countries have found answers to these questions. The Ukrainian president has also provided an answer to these questions. In fact, it was life that provided an answer to these questions. The absolute majority of the people resolved these questions long ago. They simply want to live their lives with dignity — in conditions of freedom and security — and with a feeling of personal importance. The people would also like this type of life to be provided for their children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren.... They hope that state authorities will provide favorable conditions for this, or at least not create obstacles to them.

The people in Ukraine generally have stopped perceiving the search for a new "...ism" with understanding. We believe that this time has now passed.

In our opinion, proposals to necessarily develop a new program for — or, at least, an outline of — the government's activities are unreasonable. This is, in our opinion, inexpedient.

Certain forces simply profit from this.

When one assesses the situation in the Ukrainian socioeconomic sector, he should not complicate it more than it really is. This is particularly true of recent assessments by certain political circles and of several statements published in the press.

A disinterested analysis of official statistical data on industrial performance shows that the drop in industrial output considerably lessened in the first quarter of 1995. March industrial output, at the end of the first quarter, stood at 93 percent of output in March 1994. If the reduction in industrial output was 38.4 percent in the first quarter of 1994, it totaled only 12.1 percent in the first quarter of 1995, or three times better than in 1994. So, an obvious trend toward a considerable slowdown in this industrial decline has been outlined. At the same time, a 7.3-percent less reduction in industrial output, compared with March, occurred in April of this year and became a subject of a special discussion at a meeting in which the Ukrainian president participated. This meeting shows the efforts of executive power to preserve the positive trends of the last months. We

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would like to stress that, given such conditions, the drop in industrial output in January-April 1995 was three times better than the same period of last year (39.1 percent in January-April 1994 against 12.7 percent in January-April 1995).

If one estimates the drop in industrial output based on such general economic statistics as GDP, there is also a trend toward a considerable slowdown in the decrease in economic production. For example, the Ukrainian GDP decreased by a little over 10 percent over the first quarter of 1995, while over the first quarter of 1994 it was 34.8 percent. It is clear that it would have been better if GDP began to grow. But we have what we have.

In assessing the economic situation in Ukraine, negative economic data has been considerably overestimated lately. It is emphasized that Ukraine has allegedly exceeded by 20-fold the European standards for costs of energy input required to manufacture a unit of national revenue, or that Ukrainian GDP allegedly dropped three-fold over 1991-94. Perhaps one could find an enterprise with such costs of energy resources or such a drop in output. The general picture, however, is different throughout Ukraine. For example, GDP has indeed decreased over the last four years; however, it decreased not three-fold, but by 47.5 percent (the 1994 GDP was 52.5 percent lower than the 1990 GDP in comparative prices); the national revenue decreased by 56.2 percent (or by 43.8 percent of the 1990 national revenue).

In addition, we believe that these statistics have also been considerably overestimated. If one considers the industrial output that has not been reflected in all-Ukrainian official statistics because it belongs to the shadow economy, the drop in production would not have been as low.

The situation in applying mineral fertilizers is also not so pessimistic, particularly due to statements that four-fifths of the national agricultural land has been sown without them. Less fertilizer — some 33 percent of the required amount — were spread on the fields, but if one considers the remaining 270,000 tonnes, the amount of mineral fertilizers required to cultivate fields in a spring campaign stood at 697,000 tonnes against 470,000 in the spring of 1994. This amount makes it possible to add fertilizer to winter crops twice and to sow crops with nitrogen fertilizer on the entire spring-crop area (17 million hectares).

The Ukrainian agricultural sector received 427,000 tonnes of nutriments of mineral fertilizer over four months and 15 days in May of this year (330,000 tonnes last year). Among them were 369,000 tonnes of nitrogen fertilizers (249,000 tonnes last year), 28,000 tonnes of phosphorous fertilizers (45,000 tonnes last year), and 30,000 tonnes of potash fertilizers (36,000 tonnes last year). So, the application of mineral fertilizers on the fields this year was up by 29 percent compared with the same period in 1994 (including the 1.5-fold increase in nitrogen fertilizer).

As regards the total amount of energy required to produce the entire Ukrainian national revenue, it should be mentioned that estimates — claiming that the energy input required to manufacture a unit of national revenue in Ukraine exceeds what is needed in [Europe] 15-20-fold — have been overestimated by several times. With regard to most types of products, the energy input required to manufacture an item in Ukraine is 2-4-fold (but not 15-20-fold as is often claimed) higher than in European countries. In general, World Bank experts have agreed that Ukraine consumed 60 percent more energy resources to produce its GDP in 1990 compared to what it would have consumed if it possessed European efficiency. These statistics went up 20-25 percent over recent years due to a drop in production.

Ukraine's foreign economic activities: The negative foreign-trade balance increased by $245 million in the first quarter of 1995 compared with the same period of last year. One, however, should not draw conclusions about the decrease in foreign trade this year based on this fact alone. First of all, procedures to estimate statistics on foreign trade accounts were profoundly changed this year. For example, foreign [davalnytska] raw materials and products manufactured from them were introduced in trade turnover: Imports were insured for $238 million, and exports $113 million. This, in turn, led to the imbalance, amounting to $125 million. There are also objective reasons for this: Our economy depends greatly on imported raw materials. To put all capacities of enterprises into operation, we are forced to process foreign raw materials — primarily from the CIS states — and to settle our payments with our finished products.

Second, deliveries of imported goods to Ukraine are based on SIF [expansion unknown] terms in 1995, while in 1994 — free-on-board [FOB] terms that did not take into consideration costs of transportation and insurance of goods. As a result, the value of imports increased by $27 million in the first quarter of 1995, and naturally, the negative balance became inflated.

In addition, Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics accounts register exports in SIF prices and imports in FOB prices, both over the first quarter of 1995. Hence, the amount of imports, as it was overestimated, compared with the amount of exports. This also led to the increase in the negative balance.

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If one considers the above-mentioned statistics, the negative balance that developed over the first quarter of 1995 will not exceed that of the first quarter of 1994 and, according to estimates, will total $497 million, if not less, as compared to the $548 million over the same period in 1994.

A more profound study shows that foreign trade is not being carried out according to its usual operating schedule this year, but certain positive changes were introduced in this sector. For example, industrial output went up 12.1 percent in the first quarter of this year, exports decreased only by 3.9 percent. Thanks to nothing other than measures for liberalizing foreign trade, it was possible to unblock routes for exporting national goods and for trading on foreign markets.

At the same time, the negative balance remains the most painful problem for the entire Ukrainian economy, but it can be resolved only through the enlivening of production, increasing production of traditional Ukrainian exports, and this will require some time.

According to our estimates, statements about the 30-percent reduction in the real income of Ukrainian citizens over the last six months are not true. Statistical data and estimates show that the real income of Ukrainian citizens went up 29.9 percent in March 1995 compared with December 1994.

These statistics show that the real income of Ukrainian citizens went up in February and March 1995.

The most important thing was that macroeconomic factors, which triggered the increase in real monetary incomes of the people in February, were developed and were even strengthened in March as well. These macroeconomic factors are as follows: The increase in nominal incomes in March (26.6 percent) was higher than in February (21.6 percent), while inflation decreased (11.4 percent against 18.1 percent). Real incomes (after deduction of taxes, obligatory fees, and the impact of inflation) increased by 14 percent in March. In general, nominal monetary incomes of the people increased by 46.9 percent in the first quarter of 1995 against the fourth quarter of 1994, and real incomes — under the impact of their sharp drop in January 1995 against December 1994 — decreased by 8.7 percent. Therefore, genuine incomes increased by 26 percent in February against January, and by 10.4 percent in March against February.

There was an increase in a few categories of wages [chastka oplaty pratsi] (from 58.5 percent to 62.1 percent), in pensions and welfare (from 20.3 percent to 23.3 percent) within the structure of monetary earnings over the first quarter of this year against the previous quarter.

We do not aim to divert attention from our acute current problems by providing true statistics of the economic development of the country. But facts are facts. Economic reform is still being implemented at an improper speed. The executive power is accountable for this. The Ukrainian Supreme Council, however, is also no less accountable for the current situation. Unless relevant laws are adopted, mechanisms [for implementing reform] will retain the nature of temporary presidential edicts which the president can adopt only with regard to issues that are not regulated by the current legislation.

As regards the revenues of the consolidated budget over the first quarter of 1995 compared with the first quarter of 1994, it should be mentioned that although the proportion of revenues on a yearly basis totaled 10.8 percent in the first quarter of 1994, it accounted for 15.2 percent in the first quarter of 1995, or 1.4-fold higher than over the same period in 1994.

When revenues of the first quarter of this year are compared with those of the fourth quarter of last year, one should consider the fact that 42.7 percent of annual revenues were transferred to the budget in the fourth quarter of last year. This shows that the plan for budget revenues was not fulfilled over the first three quarters of 1994, and attempts were launched to accomplish it in the fourth quarter of 1994. Therefore, there is no foundation for statements about an even distribution of budget revenues — on a quarterly basis — based on these data.

Mention should be made that the relative financial stabilization achieved last month was achieved at a high price. Credit-issuing decisions undermined our finance and credit system, extremely destabilized the monetary unit, and forced the executive power to undertake measures to rescue the unpopular, restrictive monetary policy. In April, this led to inflation that was the lowest of late — 105.8 percent. Also, unemployment did not acquire a threatening scale: It only increased 0.03 percent over the four months of this year across all of Ukraine and accounted for 0.32 percent of the able-bodied population. Hidden unemployment remains sizable: 30.5 percent of the total number of employed in the national economy in March 1995.

In our opinion, this is the genuine picture of the socioeconomic situation in Ukraine. Due to specific positive changes, it remains quite complicated. Positive trends have not yet stabilized. The turning point has not been reached. Each percent of this new decline continues to be a social burden, and no one should take comfort in the fact that the dynamics of this decline have

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been considerably reduced. The financial stabilization that has been achieved is still fragile and can be — at any time — violated by the unreasonable activities of both inordinate activists who support reform and those who would like to return to the erstwhile state system that regulated practically each detail in the economic sector. Therefore, all branches of power should look for opportunities to constructively — not destructively — contribute to the effectiveness of the anticrisis measures.

Only unity and agreement between all opposing forces can guarantee our survival.

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Belarus

TV Reports on 'KGB Top Secret Prison'

WS2106114195 Minsk BTK Television Network in Belarusian 1800 GMT 17 Jun 95

[Video "special report" for the "Resonance" program by Aleksandr Stupnikov, NTV correspondent for Poland and Belarus — in Russian; passages in quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] This door has never before been entered either by journalists or any unauthorized persons. Around us are the buildings of the Belarusian KGB and its working offices, and in the back — a KGB top secret prison or a KGB investigation isolation cell, which is called the American Prison [amerykanka] in everyday conversation.

The American Prison was built right after the war by German POW's. Almost the entire respectable center of contemporary Minsk was raised from the ruins by no other than them. Nobody knows, however, what happened to those who built the impressive and spacious buildings of the KGB, which are commonly called the Yellow House, as well as the KGB prison. Nobody knows how many of those subjected to repression trod these corridors later and to where these corridors led them.

In essence, the authorities were like criminals — they both kept secrets and kept themselves in secret. Many things have recently changed within these walls.

[Uladzimir Yahoraw, chief of the Belarusian KGB, identified by caption] "Regarding such a state institution as the State Security Committee, many changes and transformations have surely taken place. I think that these changes were of a positive nature. As earlier, according to the presidential edict approving the KGB Temporary Statute, we are concerned with functions ensuring the protection of state economic interests and citizens. Many new functions were added, which also existed before to some degree, but not on such a broad scale as now. I mean new directorates, created in the KGB last year, such as the directorate for protecting economy and combating organized crime."

The American Prison was given its name due to its construction reproducing the design of U.S. prisons on a microscale. Precisely the same prison, only bigger, is also in Chicago. True, in contrast to Chicago, this place is not intended for any special escapes. [apparent joking reference to Hollywood prison films]

[Officer with electronic blur on his face] "They have tried to, and they still try. There was such a case. It was in 1990. One escaped from us."

[Stupnikov] "One did escape?"

[Officer with electronic blur on his face] "Yes, he did. But he was captured after three weeks."

The times when we had political prisoners in Belarus have passed. Today the American Prison keeps in custody prisoners of other sorts: those involved in corruption, traffickers, other rotten fruits of society, and serial killers. Relatively recently, the case of Mikhasevich, who killed 35 people, was solved here, as well as that of Kazachonak, who murdered 11 people. Quite recently, child rapist Mirankow was investigated here. People with a more solid criminal reputation also are kept here. A recently crowned top criminal authority in Belarus, nicknamed Navum, asked to be sent precisely to this place. This place is quieter, even if there are no soldiers [pekhota — reference to a criminal authority's retinues]. Arrested suspects stay in the American Prison only for the period of their investigation. Paradoxical as it may seem, to get into this place today is as difficult as to get out of it.

[Stupnikov] "What about spies in Belarus? Have they become extinct these days?"

[Yahoraw] "After we had expelled, or declared persona non grata, two Turkish diplomats, the spy situation in Belarus somewhat eased, so to speak. This had a very sobering effect. This [word indistinct] testified to the fact that Belarus is a sovereign, independent state, and that we protect the inviolability of its interests. This also had its effect on all others, including not only diplomats or foreign citizens residing permanently and performing some functions in Belarus, but also our citizens who were inclined to contacts and, speaking frankly, transfer of prohibited information."

There are no thefts within these walls — neither by the personnel nor the others. Therefore, those under arrest receive their full daily rations. The maintenance of one person under investigation costs 8,000 [currency not specified] per day; for the time being, this sum does not include, as is the case in the West, the costs connected with land, facilities, services and guards. The prison cells, as any other (?holy places), are never empty. There are over 100 people currently detained for investigation. It is already getting tight there. The tenants of these places have the possibility to take regular showers and receive parcels once every two months; their bedclothes are changed every week; they are subject to daily medical checkups; they are also let out for a two-hour walk everyday. Their relatives are allowed to send them a television set. Sometimes, they naively try petty bribery.

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[Officer with electronic blur on his face] "They did offer."

[Stupnikov] "What was the highest sum, I wonder?"

[Officer with electronic blur on his face] "Well, a body searcher.... [pauses] About 60 to 100 [German] marks. (?There was a case like that.)"

[Stupnikov] "They put little value on themselves, do they not?"

[Officer with electronic blur on his face] "The point is not this. These were relatives offering such sums for handing over a letter or (?getting in touch) with a prisoner."

On average, those under investigation spend half a year here. Nobody is seeking high jail statistics, as was the case in the past. It even happens that prisoners are released from here.

[Officer with electronic blur on his face] "Recently, yes. It has been about a year as we sometimes even together with.... [pauses] It is a practice that one or two get out."

Nonetheless, the American Prison is almost the final phase of work for many KGB sections, which include also new ones — for economic crimes and terrorism. The main thing today lies probably in the fact that the composition of prisoners in the American Prison is no longer dependent on instructions from power offices or ideological biases on the part of officials.

[Yahoraw] "I can only be happy because the time has finally come when you are no longer instructed by telephone calls or written directives on what you should do and how you should do it. There is the head of state, to whom you report appropriate information for adopting resolutions on the state level. There is the president, who gives orders, and there is the law. These are two orientation points, to which we... [pauses] bring our prayers [smiles], and which guide our activity."

Some time in the past, there was a guard standing night and day in this place. In this small, almost cozy and miniature prison, which was based on a U.S. model, there were always many doors and only one entrance. Under the current circumstances of a new openness, however, this entrance is becoming more and more of an exit. This is already an exit.

This was Aleksandr Stupnikov, NTV correspondent for Poland and Belarus, in a special report for the "Resonance" [Saturday 1800 GMT newscast in the Minsk BTK Television] program.

'Difficult' Immigration, Refugee Situation Viewed

LD2006185895 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0800 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The migration situation in the Republic of Belarus is quite difficult. While before more people were leaving the Republic than arriving in it, now the situation has been reversed, with many people arriving illegally. Many of these people are not welcome here. Belarus, because of its geographic position, is becoming a transit republic. The Republic is filled with refugees. About 30,000 people are applying for refugee status. The situation is complicated by the fact that the issue of migration of the population is dealt with by several departments. There is no single coordinating center.

Moldova

Tiraspol Situation Called 'Worse Than Groznyy'

MM2006135895 Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Jun 95 p 2

[Report by Petr Rashkov: "Will the Divisional Commander Become an Army Commander?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Having finally gained entry to Tiraspol at his second attempt by a roundabout route, landing at Limanskiy airfield in the neighboring Odessa Oblast, Major General Valeriy Yevnevich, the new chief of the 14th Army command and until recently commander of the Taman Division, was forced to leave the city after all.

After he had been taken to the 14th's headquarters by helicopter and had even had a talk with its now ex-commander Aleksandr Lebed, members of the Committee of Women in Defense of the Dniester Region broke into the Army staff's territory and virtually forced Yevnevich to leave. They sent him, on iron rations, to a hotel, where he was blockaded and kept virtually under arrest. And in the end he was forced to leave entirely.

One of the leaders of the Army staff, who told me about this and who wished to remain anonymous, does not know "whether Yevnevich did this on his own initiative or after coordinating his actions beforehand with the Defense Ministry leadership."

The same source assessed the situation in the [14th] Army rather pessimistically, stating that the situation here is better than in Budennovsk but worse than in Groznyy. And not without reason. The fact is that the Tiraspol leadership, while refraining from making any official statements, is in effect supporting the newly appointed leader of the Russian formations stationed in the Dniester Region. That in itself has almost caused a

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major clash between official Tiraspol's power subunits and the 14th Army troops. When the women, occupying the runway, refused to allow Yevnevich's plane to land, elite subunits of the "Dnestr" battalion tried to clear the airfield. Their intentions were hampered by 14th Army special forces. It was only thanks to the degree of restraint that still remains on both sides that it was possible to avoid a conflict whose consequences would have been unpredictable.

The majority of the Army's officers have not only voiced a protest against Lieutenant General A. Lebed's resignation from the post of commander, calling these actions by Russia's top leadership "an outrage," but are even, according to my source, "prepared for more resolute actions."

Aleksandr Lebed, who has arrived from Moscow, is doing everything possible to keep the situation under control. However, when women interfere in the military's activity, he has difficulty in doing so....

V. Yevnevich is expected to make another attempt to embark on the fulfillment of his duties. Will he succeed?

Yesterday, as a protest against the "arbitrary act against General Lebed by Russia's military-political leadership," Major General Yuriy Popov, commander of the 59th Division of the 14th Army, went on hunger strike. Virtually all the division's officers wanted to join in this action, but Popov asked them not to. The hunger strike will go on until the directive on disbanding the Army is reviewed and Aleksandr Lebed is reinstated. Yuriy Popov is 43. At one time he studied in the same platoon as Lebed at paratroops school, and later he commanded a platoon alongside him in P. Grachev's company....

Kobets, Yavnevich Discuss 14th Army Situation

AU2106133995 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2053 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tiraspol BASAPRESS, 20/6/1995 — Russian vice Defense Minister Konstantin Kobets and the new commander of the Tiraspol-based Russian troops, Major General Valeriy Yavnevich, convened the 14th Army officers yesterday evening. The two presented the plan for the 14th Army restructuring. According to the Russian Defense Ministry directive, the number of officers was cut to 97, by more than one third. Despite of these cuts the salaries will be the same. Kobets said Lieutenant General Lebed was earlier proposed the rank of colonel general. "I am really sorry that Lebed refused this rank," Kobets said thanking the former 14th Army commander for his performance. He disapproved of the hunger strike started by Major general Yuriy Popov [to protest Lebed's replacement]. BASAPRESS learned from the 14th Army Command that apart from the cuts in the officers' corps, the number of soldiers will be halved. According to the directive, all soldiers discharged will be proposed new employment in the Russian Army and provided lodgings in Russia. Kobets also said that the reorganized Russian troops will draft Dniester citizens. According to him, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev requested the foreign ministry to open a Russian consulate in Tiraspol to speed up the process of granting citizenship to the drafted persons.

Kobets stated at the meeting that those who supported Lebed will not be punished. He does not intend to dismiss 59th Division Commander Major General Yuriy Popov either.

Kobets also said that "the 14th Army withdrawal agreement signed in October 1994 will be in effect, but it should be modified due to the 14th Army restructuring." In Kobets' opinion "Moldova does not want the Russian troops' withdrawal because it does not want to lose the financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund and other international organizations."

Representatives of the Women's Union Defending Dniester picketed the army headquarters during the meeting.

Division Commander Protests Lebed's Dismissal

AU2006124795 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1920 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tiraspol, INFOTAG, 19/6/1995 — The 59th Division Commander in the Russian 14th Army, Major General Yuriy Popov, announced a hunger strike today in protest against the Defense Ministry's decision to dismiss Aleksandr Lebed.

Popov has stated that he was demanding "observance of law in Lebed's resignation, and provision of guarantees that no protesting officers and women will be persecuted by the Russian military authorities and the power ministries in Dniester".

Other Russian officers were initially intending to join Popov is his protest action. However, Alekdandr Lebed prohibited them to resort to such extreme measures. "I have spent three years teaching the 14th Army to be law-obedient soldiers and officers serving in the extreme conditions in the conflict zone. And the Defense Ministry is forcing them beyond the law frames, and is making outcasts of them", Lebed said to journalists.

The situation in Army units is growing more complicated. Officers have synonymously spoken against Lebed's resignation, and are not going to change their mind. Last Friday, they appealed for support to all servicemen in the Russian Armed Forces.

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Snegur Speaks at Gagauz Bashkan Inauguration

AU2106115995 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1803 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Comrat INFOTAG, 20/6/1995 — Moldovan President Mircea Snegur has named as "historic" the moment of coming to office of the first Gagauz Bashkan (Head.) He took part in today's solemn ceremony of inauguration of 55-year-old George Tabunshik, who won a convincing victory in the 11 June elections. Introducing the new Bashkan, Mircea Snegur has announced a just-signed decree on appointing George Tabunshik member of the Moldovan Government. That is envisaged by the Gagauz Status Law adopted by the Moldovan Parliament at the end of 1994, which solved the painful problem of the Gagauz-dominated areas.

"Thank to the attained compromise, Moldova has demonstrated to the entire world that all differences may be settled politically," the president stressed.

He remarked that controversies between Moldovans and the ethnic Gagauz could not last long, because both peoples had "equally suffered denationalization under the Soviet totalitarian regime." In his opinion, the current linguistic legislation permits the Gagauz to develop and enrich their national traditions and culture, and the opening of new educational establishments, teaching students in the Gagauz language is indicative of that.

Snegur expressed hope that Gagauz will work hand in hand with other nationalities for the good of their motherland — the Republic of Moldova. He welcomed the political maturity of Gagauz who in the recent years managed to safeguard economic ties with the rest of Moldova, and took an active part in parliamentary and local elections.

Mircea Snegur stressed the necessity to concentrate on solving economic problems. He said he will soon go to Crans-Montana to meet with Turkish President Suleyman Demirel and negotiate granting a loan for development of southern Moldovan areas, including their provision with potable water.

The credit was promised by Mr. Demirel during his last June's official visit to Moldova — in case the Gagauz problem was settled.

Next Friday [23 June] the new Gagauz Popular Assembly will hold its first sitting to be attended by George Tabunshik.

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Kazakhstan

U.S. Consortium To Co-Manage Metallurgy Plant

MK2006124095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 20 Jun 95 p 7

[Unattributed report: "Karaganda Metallurgical Works Has Been Transferred to Management by an U.S.-Panama-Kazakhstan Consortium"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kazakhstan's First Vice Premier Vitaliy Mette said 17 June that the Kazakhstan Government has decided to transfer the republic's largest industrial enterprise — the Karaganda Metallurgical Works — to management by the United Steel-Universal Supply-"Gazinvestkonsalting" consortium, uniting companies from the United States, Panama, and Kazakhstan. Earlier, the republic's government had unilaterally canceled the agreement on its management by the Austria-Kazakhstan "Fest Alpine-Kazakhstan" joint venture. The first vice premier explained that this move was caused by the company's failure to fulfill its obligations regarding the infusion of $40 million to the works' account within one month to replenish working capital. The joint venture's leadership has announced that it intends to sue the government for illegal unilateral cancellation of the contract.

Central Asia Demographic Development Shown

954F2562A Almaty EKSPRESS-K in Russian 15 Jun 95 p 3

[Article by Tulegen Askarov: "Demographic Explosion in Central Asia Dies Down"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Almaty—According to data of the CIS Statistics Committee, the population of Central Asia is stabilizing. At the same time, we are observing entirely different models of demographic development in the states of the region, as illustrated by the following data:

The population of Kazakhstan at the outset of 1994 was 16,942,000, at the outset of 1995—16,683,000. This reflects an absolute growth of -269,000 people, or relative growth of -1.5 percent.

The population of Kyrgyzstan at the outset of 1994 was 4,463,000, at the outset of 1995—4,476,000. This reflects an absolute growth of 13,000 people, or relative growth of 0.2 percent.

The population of Tajikistan at the outset of 1994 was 5,704,000, at the outset of 1995—5,777,000. This reflects an absolute growth of 73,000 people, or relative growth of 1.2 percent.

The population of Turkmenistan at the outset of 1994 was 4,361,000, at the outset of 1995—4,455,000. This reflects an absolute growth of 94,000 people, or relative growth of 2.1 percent.

The population of Uzbekistan at the outset of 1994 was 22,192,000, at the outset of 1995—22,633,000. This reflects an absolute growth of 441,000 people, or relative growth of 1.9 percent.

The population of the CIS at the outset of 1994 was 285,464,000, at the outset of 1995—285,316,000. This reflects an absolute growth of -148,000 people, or relative growth of -0.05 percent.

The population of Kazakhstan, the only Central Asian state experiencing a population reduction, continues to decrease significantly as a result of emigration. The population of Kyrgyzstan has virtually stabilized. Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan comprise a group of countries in which the trend towards demographic development is maintained. Turkmenistan leads the region in rate of population growth (Tajikistan formerly held this position).

In absolute terms, the largest population growth is being seen in Uzbekistan—1.7 times greater than the population movement out of Kazakhstan. Maintaining this trend, Uzbekistan will be the home of over half the population of the region in the very near future (right now almost 46 percent reside in this republic). At the same time, the area of Uzbekistan comprises barely more than 11 percent of the territory of Central Asia.

The fading of population growth in the region is evident. The annual population growth of Kazakhstan over the years 1960-1991 amounted to 1.8 percent; Kyrgyzstan—2.4 percent; Tajikistan—3.1 percent; Turkmenistan—2.8 percent; Uzbekistan—2.9 percent.

The total population of Central Asia remained virtually unchanged, amounting to 49,569,000 at the beginning of 1995 (at the start of 1994 it was 49,301,000). However, the percentage of total CIS population attributable to this region grew from 17.2 to 17.3 percent.

Tajikistan

Rakhmanov Says Russia Remains Main Partner

LD1906121295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1154 GMT 19 Jun 95

[By Nuriddin Kurshibayev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] DUSHANBE, June 19 (ITAR-TASS) — "Russia remains the main strategic partner of Tajikistan," said Tajik leader Emomali Rakhmanov, addressing the personnel of the Vostokredmet production amalgamation during his tour of the Leninabad region on Sunday.

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Earlier, the sides reached an understanding on the use by Russia of Tajik munitions factories during a visit to the republic by Valeriy Serov, Russian Minister for Cooperation with Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

This will help to start work at enterprises of the military-industrial complex in Tajikistan and to stop the outflow of skilled specialists.

Government Draws Up List for Prisoner Exchange

LD1906194895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1902 GMT 19 Jun 95

[By Galina Gridneva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] DUSHANBE, June 19 (ITAR-TASS) — The Tajik government has drawn up a list of opposition militants to be exchanged for government troops on a one-for-one basis, the Tajik Security Ministry said on Monday.

The ministry said the list was compiled in accordance with the agreements reached at the fourth round of the intra-Tajik talks in Alma Ata in May-June.

A high-ranking Security Service officer refused to disclose the names of the militants, adding, however, that it includes opposition supporters who have been charged with various crimes committed during the 1992 civil war in Tajikistan.

The fate of the members of the Dushanbe terrorist underground arrested by the Tajik police in April and May 1995 will be decided by the Supreme Court of Tajikistan.

The officer said all of them have been charged with dozens of murders of civilians, policemen, and Tajik and Russian soldiers in 1994-95. These are criminal offenses and those who committed them should face a trial as criminals, not as fighters for the idea, he said.

However, the leaders of the movement for the Islamic Revival of Tajikistan and one of the radical Tajik dissidents told ITAR-TASS that the opposition has nothing to do with these murders and that all charges against it have been concocted by special services in order to discredit it in the eyes of the world community and present them as terrorists.

They also said the opposition leaders have means to check the legality of the charges brought against them and reserve the right to appeal to international organisations, including the U.N., for help.

Uzbekistan

Further on Ukrainian President's Visit

Karimov Speaks at News Conference

LD2006195595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1854 GMT 20 Jun 95

["INTERFAX-UKRAINE" news item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TASHKENT, June 20 (Interfax-Ukraine) — Uzbek President Islam Karimov believes that the future of the CIS is largely dependent on the way Russia behaves.

If it develops in compliance with its Charter, the CIS will enjoy the support of everybody on its soil, he said at a news conference in Tashkent Tuesday at the end of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's visit to Uzbekistan.

Karimov praised the CIS Collective Security Treaty. He said that the treaty helped protect the Tajik-Afghan border, which was of paramount importance to Uzbekistan.

For his part, Kuchma said that the Commonwealth has been "a form of transition from one state structure to another." In his words, the future of the CIS depends on establishing "mutually beneficial interests and equal cooperation."

Answering a question on the Budennovsk tragedy, Karimov emphasized that he deplores all kinds of terrorism. He added, however, that the root causes of the problem have to be dealt with. According to him, the hostage crisis in Budennovsk is a consequence of the situation in Chechnya in recent days.

"When one starts anything, one should think of the consequences," Kuchma said about the Budennovsk events and the situation around Chechnya.

During his visit numerous bilateral documents were signed, in particular a declaration on expansion of cooperation, a treaty on economic integration and agreements on cooperation in science and technology, education, public health, tourism and sports.

Leaders Sign Joint Documents

LD2006163195 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1420 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — Joint Ukrainian-Uzbek documents were signed during Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's visit to Uzbekistan on 20 June. They include, in particular, declarations on the expansion and

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deepening of Ukrainian-Uzbek cooperation; an interstate treaty on the development of economic integration between Ukraine and Uzbekistan; intergovernmental agreements on cooperation in combating crime, scientific and technical cooperation, and cooperation in the area of health care, education, tourism, and sport.

The main issue at the talks was a discussion of Ukrainian-Uzbek trade and economic relations and ways to improve the procedure for mutual payments.

The presidents of both countries examined current trends in the development of the CIS and discussed the situation in the community's hot-spots.

According to Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Uzbekistan were established in July 1992. A treaty on interstate relations, friendship and cooperation was signed in October 1991.

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Armenia

Prime Minister's Monetary Policies Criticized

954F2552A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian 10 Jun 95 pp 2-3

[Final installment of article by Yuriy Grigoryan: "Grant Bagratyan's Conjuring Act"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Concluding the publication of the "Grant Bagratyan's Conjuring Act" series, the editors express gratitude to the author Yuriy Grigoryan, who satisfied our request for a comment on the report speech of the premier of the Republic of Armenia at the start of the year. As we have learned, Yuriy Grigoryan is running for election in the 30th Electoral District. We wish him success and hope that, having been elected a member of parliament, Mr. Grigoryan will scrupulously defend his course toward a socially oriented economic policy.

'Battle' for Foreign Currency

There is no doubt as to the government's blame for the third cause. The industrial level presupposes the extensive integration of the elements of the economy and the corresponding form of management. The hierarchy of leadership in the economy that we inherited was not someone's whim but an essential component ensuring that it functioned. The Greek gift of property and "freedom" isolated enterprises and works, agricultural particularly. The interconnection was destroyed, the direct and boomerang effects of the extraction of the maximum profits increased mutual costs, and production, including that oriented toward the domestic market, came to a halt.

It is indicative that our production workers are now looking on helplessly at the flow of foreign currency coming in from outside and floating away into other countries (no less than $100-150 million a year). The nonstate sector exported in January-November 1994 less than $6 million of commodities, but imported more than $37 million of commodities. Net exports constituted minus $31.7 million. Even more busy importing is the private entrepreneur—99 percent of trade transactions. The confiscated currency, primarily received via private channels, leaves, stimulating labor outside of the republic. Armenia has become a transshipment point for dollars, which it itself merely consumes. In the said period, according to official figures alone, $20-25 million went to Iran, and $25-30 million, to Russia, essentially for the development of their industries. What about ourselves? We ourselves are confiscating currency from our few exporters, selling it on the market to importers, and supporting the value of the dram and....foreign producers.

In 1994 we obtained 13 quintals of grain per hectare, in 1990, approximately 20 quintals per hectare. Under similar conditions Mexico obtains 40 quintals per hectare. Expenditure on mineral fertilizer, irrigation, and equipment make it possible to raise grain production to 600,000-800,000 tonnes. In former years we could support over 12 million head of poultry, had the capacity for the production of 42,000 tonnes of poultry meat (live weight), and obtained annually almost 600 million eggs, today we import all three. There are considerable domestic possibilities permitting an increase in production and a significant improvement in the trade balance in terms of almost all food products imported into the republic, and imports in January-November constituted approximately 47 billion drams (approximately $150 million). Stanching the flow of currency by our own commodities, we could reduce imports and a considerable portion of transport costs, partially resolve the problem of a macro-deficit—trade—and contribute to satisfaction of the investment need.

Several circumstances are preventing this. One pertains to the profitless period from the moment of investment through realization of the end product—the time lag. Another, to the gap between the farms, which are capable of ensuring the achievement of the final goal only in a complex. It is hardly likely that any of the newly fledged owners, dispersed in terms of their holdings, would assume the risk of investing money in the specialization of their production sector alone, without general guarantees. We need to rectify the mistakes that have been made now and not wait until gradual improvements have created the conditions for a second integration of production facilities, in other words, for the occurrence of the natural evolutionary processes that occurred formerly in the history of other countries. Both circumstances could be tackled swiftly and effectively by the state. By restoring, modernizing, and organizing interconnected agricultural production facilities, contemplating their subsequent privatization, not, of course, according to the unthinking procedures that are being implemented currently.

The sources of the fourth cause should be sought back in the first vain endeavors of perestroyka. The general secretary's wisdom was sufficient merely for ultimately untying the hands of trade while keeping the cuffs on private ownership. It would be hard to devise a better distribution for an orgy of profiteering. Purchase-and-sale deals become too tempting for the ascetic principles of production facilities not to be perverted. Instead of agonizing work on the modernization of enterprises with slow and negligible personal benefits, an opportunity with the aid of the cooperatives or their small offspring to easily and rapidly get rich appeared. Neither gross

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output nor quality grew, the income of the directors and their retinue who reoriented themselves in good time, however, did.

The perestroyka people were replaced by, it might have seemed, their adversaries. The new slogans, though, emanated from just as simplistic an idea of society and its transformation. The bugbear of the private trader had prevailed previously, now the imaginary luminary of the market. The different ideological premises led with the solemn mode of introduction of novations and violence against reality to similar distortions. In both cases trade business flourished, and activity, the sole thing bringing society permanent wealth, remained in disfavor—initially political, then economic.

'We Are Headed For...'

During the news conference, in connection with a question concerning interest rates the premier expressed what was, in my view, a clumsy thought. Bank interest, he said, should be lower than percentage inflation, and whereas initially, at a time of high inflation, the conditions for the bank were more advantageous than for production, now the situation has changed. The premier clearly forgot here that there is an interest rate with zero inflation also. He got confused over the dependencies, where it is not the absolute values that signify but the ratio of percentage inflation and the difference between the nominal and actual interest rates corresponding to anticipated inflation. If the first value is less than the second, the bank is the winner, and the credit recipient—production, let's assume—is the loser, and the other way about. Many banks, however, found themselves in a difficult position for another reason. The expectation of high inflation was not justified since it was not natural economic factors, which had been expected, that were reflected but the determined actions of the government.

It is by no means my intention to focus attention on the level of erudition of Mr. Bagratyan, it is aspect that has been broached that is important. It should be considered when addressing bank interest that it is sensitive to inflation, but to no less an extent to the rate of profit also. Production found itself in a very adverse situation inasmuch as it was unable under our conditions to compete here with commerce. In the world's developed countries trade is content with 3-7 percent profit, yielding, as it should, to more intricate and useful activity. With us, however, everything has been distorted. The overwhelming volume of the national product (85.4 percent of GNP in 1994) is created in the public sector. At the same time, on the other hand, an unorganized system of purchase and sale is predominant in the sphere of exchange, which would be acceptable merely for just as unorganized an aggregate of independent, noninterrelated petty producers.

The mating of structurally fundamentally incompatible links of the economic chain is effected by a varilevel detachment of intermediaries, who, having gained access to, in fact, speculative deals, had inconceivably higher profits. As a result, first, there was an outflow of money into the trade sphere, the interest rate was oriented toward the corresponding rate of profit, and credit became unattainable for the producers.

Second, having wedged themselves between the product of the labor of industry and the consumer commodity, the commercial echelons depressed, several times over, at times, the public's purchasing power. Demand was constricted. Vitally necessary foodstuffs came to predominate in the consumer basket, and nonfood products of local manufacture went begging. Imports began to dominate on the market, and domestic supply was suppressed. The money supply was concentrated in the hands of the shuttle traders, and imports expanded, contributing to the growth of inflation.

In addition, the one-sided budgetary and financial policy pandered to the inflationary processes. Having taken as a starting point one extreme, when considerable budgetary resources were lost on account of the preferential lending for all kinds of hare-brained schemes, this policy was taken to the other extreme. The tightening of it, specifically, the reduction in spending on the support of the vast and useless or, to judge by the results, even harmful machinery of bureaucrats, as also the improvement of the tax service and the rational conditions hedging the allocation of credit, might have seemed perfectly comprehensible thriftiness. But the point is that the new policy amounted to the increasingly consistent surrender of the regulatory function of the government to the market relations being introduced on this occasion into the lending sphere.

Such anti-inflation measures could in practice intensify inflation. The auction battles for credit will undoubtedly be won by the businessmen, the high bank interest will become more accessible to them. Instead of being invested in our production, the available funds will gratify only the importers. The flow of dollars stabilizing the price of the dram will be poured into the same mill. The adverse balance will grow and swallow up an even greater supply of foreign currency. The slump in industry will continue (I say will continue inasmuch as, despite the dashing reports of the premier, of the 96 names of manufactured product cited, the manufacture of 66, according to the figures of the Statistics Administration, has diminished even compared with 1993, and the manufacture of 28 of them has diminished more

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than twofold) and find itself hopelessly dependent on foreign credit and private currency receipts—seeing as they have not yet dried up.

Effective independent actions are impossible without a stimulation of state trade and the well-considered regulation of credit and investments. State trade with a limited rate of profit with the use of barter and clearing would reduce the current costs of commerce, make the commodity more affordable, enhance the well-being of the populace, and balance demand better. There would be increased incentives for local industry, and the nondispersed currency receipts, as also some of the resources saved on the reduced imports, could find an efficient application in the sphere of production. The vector of the flow of savings, when the competition with state trade would start to hold down the rate of profit in private commerce, would shift in this same direction. Such measures, which differ fundamentally from the monetary manipulations on the market proposed by the government, are geared to a stimulation of a growth of the commodity supply—the sole dependable instrument of the fight against inflation.

State trade is obligatory considering the overwhelming contribution to the GNP of state production and it is essential for the stable operation of the public sector and as a guarantor of the permissible minimum life sustenance of the population, and state trade is important as a regulatory factor of the economy and useful as a competitive subject of the market, and if all these qualities are actualized, it is also an efficient mechanism of the curbing of inflationary processes.

But....state trade does not fit within the rulers' simplistic notion of the economy. In addition, the management of state trade today requires the constant tracking of the situation, an analysis of the changes, corrective decisions, calculations of repercussions, and so forth, which, to all appearances, are beyond the capacity of the present government. It is much simpler, having alluded to the hopeless situation that has been reached, to conclusively release prices, open the market, and distribute all production facilities and themselves become detached observers: What will be, will be.

The surrender of business is ennobled by the elevated slogan: We are headed for the market. This explains and justifies everything.

Those who believe that the government should measure its every step against the effect on production and well-being can in no way understand its present actions. Only the market provides a clear explanation for possible "why's." Why sell currency on the market, when it could be invested in production and, having reduced imports, improve the position of the dram? "We are reducing budgetary interference in business matters. We are switching to the market."

Why take foreign currency from exporters, preventing them from competing successfully and expanding exports? "We are giving preference to monetarism, we are headed for the market." Why is there an absence of protectionist policy in foreign trade, why are we not furthering the development and strengthening of our industries? "We are for full trade and freedom of trade. We are headed for the market." Why distribute credit at public auctions, not allocate it to the most priority industries in order via a growth of output to staunch the currency flows and channel them into the modernization of our production facilities? "Credit should be distributed on a market basis also. We are headed for the market."

Why wind down state trade and prohibit barter and clearing if they are able to beat back inflation? "We are headed for the market."

Chairman on Democratic Party Platform

954F2556A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian 15 Jun 95 p 2

[Comments by Aram Sarkisyan, chairman of the Democratic Party of Armenia, reported by M. Grigoryan: "DPA: Social Justice and National Solidarity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] GOLOS ARMENII Questionnaire:

1. Your main complaints against the present government?
2. What are the principal differences between the program of your party (bloc) and the other parties?
3. What are you promising, and what can you not promise the voters?

1. First: While not having a constructive program for reforming society, the present authorities have undertaken to manage the country. Second: They permitted the total plunder of the state, and took part in it themselves, which made it possible for corruption and graft to flourish. As a result, the state was transformed into a patrimony of one group of people. Third: Drastic changes in society and the abrupt transition to the so-called "market" have led to a whole generation ending up deprived and thrown to the whims of fate, inasmuch as the state has in no way ensured their social protection, retraining, etc.

The present authorities can also be rebuked for the fact that they still have not determined the priorities with which Armenia should enter the world market. In foreign policy they placed their hopes only on the

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fact that they will be able to outwit everyone and that they will be pleasant to Russia, the United States, and Turkey, while even in this sphere it is necessary to set priorities. As a result, Armenia has suffered irreplaceable losses in the past five years.

I think that the impunity of many crimes has created the possibility of the same thing happening in the future on the part of those who may come to power. Therefore, we issued the slogan on the fact that those acceding to power are obligated to conduct an inventory of what is still left in our country and a public trial of those guilty of theft. If this is not done, it means the new authorities intend to take the same path. One other fact is extremely important for us: The abrupt social polarization of society as a result of the policy that is being conducted is very dangerous in itself, inasmuch as this is one of the most glaring manifestations of the complete uncontrollability of the processes that are occurring in all spheres.

2. We espouse specific slogans, the principal one being: In the name of social justice and national solidarity. In our opinion, it is solidarity around national tasks that are the basis of any state policy that is needed. We have already ascertained the priority tasks for ourselves, and special programs are being instituted.

The difference also consists of the fact that the Democratic Party is the bearer of a specific social-democratic ideology. We are absolutely confident that it will be the social-democratic ideology that will compete with the liberal democratic ideology, but the real one. Other varieties of them are also possible, but basically the struggle will be between these ideologies. It is for this reason that our platform is based not on temporary positions, but has a long-term character, and is a model that has to be put into practice, and incidentally, it is now being successfully put into practice in the countries of Eastern Europe.

We also differ in the fact that we do not simply talk about social policy but have elaborate programs for specific problems—for example, the elimination of unemployment.

Our basic principle in the sphere of economics: The market—as much as is possible, and state regulation—as much as is necessary.

One more feature of the DPA [Democratic Party of Armenia] is that we will be a guaranteed partner, first of all for Russia and the other CIS states, but we will maintain normal relations with all others. This is not dependence on Russia, but the selection of a priority ally, about which we will speak frankly to the whole world. I would also like to note especially that the party not only has programs but also a team of specialists that is capable of putting them into effect.

3. We promise an honest treatment of our duties, and we promise that we will not take care of our own welfare to the detriment of society's welfare. By bringing order, we will resolve many problems in the country—of course, within reasonable time limits. We will adhere to the principle of social justice, which will make it possible to provide people a living wage and guarantees for the poor strata of society. The formula here is well known: a flexible tax policy plus appropriate social funds.

Using the industrial potential of Armenia, we promise to find priority branches with which it is possible to enter the world market. We will refuse all credits that will lead the country into credit slavery.

Naturally we do not promise paradise, and we do not promise to resolve the energy problem immediately, in two or three months—this will require time. It will be necessary to elaborate a national program for each problem and to involve first-rate specialists in this.

Only after acquiring complete information on the situation in the republic will it be possible to talk about guaranteed promises. But, in any case, we promise only that which is really feasible.

AOD's Lazaryan on Election, Referendum

954F2553A Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA in Russian 13 Jun 95 p 3

[Interview with AOD leader Ter-Iusik Lazaryan by Ida Martirosyan; place and date not given; under the rubric "Alternatives 'For'—'Against'": "'For Us the Constitution Is More Important Than the Elections'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Martirosyan] Mr. Lazaryan, how justified is the opinion that the reason the ruling party is so strongly in favor of the adoption of the Constitution is because it stands to gain the most from it?

[Lazaryan] That is absolutely wrong. The very use of the word "advantage" in the question is wrong. This is about necessity. Of the need for it—yes, the ruling party is convinced, just as the Republic bloc as a whole is convinced. Incidentally, the fact that it unites, among others, parties that until recently were in opposition to one another shows that the AOD [Armenian Pannational Movement] is not alone in its conviction that it is necessary to adopt a new Basic Law. This is the position of the healthy forces in society which link the country's further political development to this. It is another matter that the AOD invests more effort in this cause than any other organization

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does. This is brought about mainly by the fact that we have more ramified structural capabilities on the scale of the country. The second thing is that the burden of responsibility for the country's development lies on our shoulders and not on the opposition's. And, finally, the last thing. We are deeply convinced that without a Constitution, it will be impossible for the state to develop further—either economically or politically. We are already running up against legal inadequacies. When moving from one political system to another, from totalitarianism to democracy, we must legislatively reinforce this transition in order to rule out the possibility of revanche as well as the possibility of the assumption of power by any forces that rely on chaos and internal instability. And, of course, we also see a need for the Constitution as a way of bringing the construction of statehood, which we began from these positions, to the earmarked level.

And, I repeat, we are the most interested party because we bear the burden of high responsibility.

[Martirosyan] It is true that the opposition states that power for you is not so much responsibility as an end in itself, citing as evidence the extremely large amount of authority guaranteed for the president by the corresponding articles of the draft Constitution.

[Lazaryan] That is an absolutely distorted interpretation. In reality the president now has a great deal more authority than what is earmarked by the draft Constitution. Incidentally, both the current Law on the President and the draft Constitution are the fruits of the labor of the current parliament.

I must note that the draft of the Basic Law gives the president less authority than the presidents of France, the United States, etc. have. We think that the draft Constitution reflects very skillfully and completely the aspects pertaining to all spheres of our life activity. We have not taken any special path of our own, we have not claimed any discoveries or inventions in developing the draft. We have taken advantage of the best that exists in world practice with the corresponding adjustments.

[Martirosyan] How do you feel about the assertion that the referendum is not the best form for the adoption of the Constitution, that the people are not really able to figure out the legal technicalities and will vote "for" simply because they have been persuaded that a Constitution is needed?

[Lazaryan] I consider this a speculative approach on the part of the opposition who, in order not to lose ground, are advancing such demagogic ideas.

[Martirosyan] Why are two such significant events as the elections and the referendum taking place at the same time? Some people see this as "tactical maneuvers" and say that everyone is involved in the elections, the passions are seething only around them, and this will help to slip in amidst the stir a Constitution that is "advantageous" to you.

[Lazaryan] You see, the synchronicity of the elections and the referendum, on the one hand, is expedient, and, on the other, this is what is creating difficulties. Believe me, it would have been much more advantageous for us to hold them separately, because in practice it turns out that the entire burden of conducting the referendum lies on our shoulders, on our candidates, who therefore bear a double burden. Many of them are working not so much on their election campaigns as on agitation work related to the Constitution. There is no doubt that this will be reflected in the election campaign. But we have no alternative in terms of a choice of priority—the Constitution is more important. So the coincidence of the two events plays more into the hands of the opposition, which is completely focussed on the election campaign.

The second essential aspect is related to the arithmetic of the matter—the systems for counting votes in the elections and the referendum are different. Thus as distinct from the elections, the referendum involves a quorum, and the opposition has one additional chance—no matter how few people come to the ballot boxes, the elections will still take place. But we have to work to make sure that the necessary number participate in the referendum so that it will be legally valid. That is, in providing for this number, we are actually working to a certain degree for the opposition, giving them voters.

These are two undoubtedly difficult problems whose solutions we have taken responsibility for. On the other hand, in the synchronization of the elections and the referendum there is an aspect which is dominant for us and has much greater political significance—the victory of the Constitution in and of itself will mean a victory of the ruling forces. On this plane, even if we lose a couple of spots in the elections because of the synchronization, on the whole we will be victorious because the state will have a Constitution.

[Martirosyan] There is another issue which the opposition will not let pass—the rigging of the results of the voting.

[Lazaryan] That is absurd. Judge for yourself, if in one electoral district commission 14-15 of the 26 members represent the opposition, and there is falsification, why not say that they did it?

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[Martirosyan] What was the principle by which the party list of the Republic bloc was compiled? What was the pivotal point that brought these people together?

[Lazaryan] You will agree that the current situation is rather different from the one that existed in 1991-1992, etc. We embody a certain program, we have made certain changes, and progress is apparent. And many have been convinced of this, and, being convinced, they have expressed a desire to make their contribution to the country's further development. That is the pivotal point of the Republic bloc. The number of those wishing to join was very large, much more than 222. But we have limited ourselves to this number, having accommodated or, rather, embraced all spheres and all segments of the population. Represented on our list are business people, intelligentsia, representatives of local self-government, production workers, economists, politicians, and so forth. I do not know what the result of the elections will be, but in drawing up the list we tried to represent all the diversity of both the social and occupational spectrum.

[Martirosyan] Do you think that this is a natural process of the return of the intelligentsia to the Movement without allowing that one of the incentives bringing them to Republic was the desire to be in power or close to power?

[Lazaryan] The latter is not likely to be the case, the more so since the majority of those represented on the list are in power to one degree or another anyway. And those who are not at the "helm" have been loyal to us previously, showing a readiness to cooperate. The dominant desire to be in the AOD is still based on the fact that its course is correct. I have spoken with practically all of the candidates, and the main thing that is motivating each of them is an unwillingness to go back to 1991-1992 and a desire to help us get through the current stage in order to enter the next one, which will be more stable.

So the return of the intelligentsia to us is not a desire to be in power. They have come in order to follow our path with us.

[Martirosyan] And the last thing. Who, in your view, is your most serious competitor.

[Lazaryan] I simply do not think there is one. The opposition has not managed to unite in order to become a serious competitor. This is probably to be expected. After all, most of our current opposition have come from the AOD. And they left because of personal ambitions. The role of the second, the third, or the tenth does not suit some of them and therefore they have created their own parties so that the second may be first and the tenth may be second. Therefore they are not psychologically able to join together because they would lose their leadership, however small it may be. This is why the opposition was never consolidated even at this moment, in a situation where they could play a significant role.

NPGS Criticizes Election Commission Actions

954F2569B Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian 13 Jun 95 p 1

[Article by Ye. Galoyan: "Robert Amiryan Refuses To Uphold the Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Lawlessness during the election campaign is becoming the main tool of the authorities," NPGS [Scientific-Production and Civil Union] Chairman Agasi Arshakyan told a GOLOS ARMENII correspondent.

After filling out all the documents on time and collecting about 12,000 signatures, representatives of the NPGS experienced great difficulties in registering with the Central Election Commission. The further things went, the worse it got. Without any justification, brazenly, cynically, without any explanations, they refused to register many candidates. Today 11 people were "rejected" and, as the NPGS thinks, all of them had good chances in the pre-election marathon.

Thus in District No. 43 immediately after submitting his signatures, a candidate from the NPGS was "kicked out." The TsIK did not tell union representatives of the commission's decision to reject him, and therefore the NPGS was actually deprived of a chance to protest in court the unilateral decision made by TsIK Chairman R. Amiryan regarding this.

In District No. 50 Ashot Manucharyan was refused registration. It seems that the only reason was that Supreme Council Chairman Babken Araktsyan, for whom the TsIK is creating hothouse conditions, is running in the same district. As Agasi Arshakyan noted, a documentary film that defames A. Manucharyan is being shown on Armenian television for the fourth time now.

And here is another example of arbitrary behavior—a member of the district election commission from the NPGS, Artashes Oganesyan, was called into the army, which is a violation of Article 8 of Chapter 3 of the Republic Armenia Law on Elections to the National Assembly.

Telephone conversations with TsIK Chairman R. Amiryan produced no results. He actually refused to uphold the law.

The NPGS, of course, does not intend to sit with its hands folded. All illegal decisions will be appealed. To-

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day the NPGS will hold a news conference with the participation of not only journalists but also foreign observers and representatives of embassies in the Republic of Armenia.

Opposition Protests at Election Commission

954F2569A Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA in Russian 13 Jun 95 p 1

[Article by V. Sepanyan: "Control, Alas, Was Necessary"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In order to avoid repeated and tedious checking of documents upon entry to the staff headquarters of the Central Election Commission [TsIK] for elections to the National Assembly, for several days now journalists have preferred to communicate with TsIK members exclusively by telephone. Let us note that the strict conditions for entry adopted by the guard are explained primarily by an incident that occurred a couple of days ago at staff headquarters. According to the testimony of the commission's secretary, Ruben Manukyan, on 7 June at 1200 a group of representatives of a number of opposition parties burst in on him demanding that the TsIK Chairman Robert Amiryan review the question of registering the Armenian Nationalist Party Tsegakron. Emotions in the chairman's office heated up to the point of mutual insults and even the shaking of fists. Because of the police detachment that hastened to the scene, the incident was if not quelled, at least "suppressed." Mr. Manukyan reported also that criminal charges had been filed in this case.

It is not surprising that increased control has been maintained at the Central Election Commission in recent days as well, during which the procedure of registration of sociopolitical organizations has continued.

On 8 June at its regular session the TsIK by a majority vote rejected the registration of the Tsarist Party of Armenia and the sociopolitical organization Women of the Armenian Country as well.

The Agrarian People's Party and the Democratic Party of Armenia were registered at this same session of the TsIK.

At its last session the Central Election Commission registered five parties for participation in the election: the National Democratic Union, the sociopolitical organization National State, Arakelutyun, People's Organization, and Shamiram. There were also "rejectees" that day, one of which was the National Union.

Let us note that the commission's decision to refuse to register them was dictated, in the first place, by the presentation of the signature books with a small number of voter signatures and, in the second place, by the existence on the lists presented by the parties of more than 300 questionable signatures. In this connection there were six groups of three people each working in the TsIK to verify signatures: If a signature was questionable, it was verified.

As secretary of the Central Election Commission Ruben Manukyan reported, 13 sociopolitical organizations were registered for participation in the elections to the National Assembly, five parties were refused registration, and four others did not submit the proper documentation.

And so the registration of candidate deputies has been complete and the pre-election race has begun. May the best men win!

PRAA Leader on Constitution Referendum

954F2551A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian 10 Jun 95 p 3

[Interview with Ruben Mirzakhanyan, chairman of the republic board of the Ramkavar-Azatakan of Armenia Party, by Shamiram Agabekyan; place and date not given: "The Ramkavars Are Refraining From Assessments. For the Time Being...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] The forthcoming constitution referendum and, simultaneously, the National Assembly elections have exacerbated considerably, as is already apparent, the political confrontation between the authorities and the opposition. So they should have, for that matter. It is well known that the ruling force with the satellite parties is unequivocally propagandizing the AOD [Armenian Pannational Movement] version, which has been approved by parliament, as the most consummate legal document. But the opposition rejects it, discerning in this basic law the legal base of dictatorship—AOD, naturally. And only the Ramkavar-Azatakan of Armenia Party is today somewhere between a "for" and an "against," saying neither yes nor no to the Constitution.

What, though, is the position of the PRAA [Ramkavar-Azatakan Party of Armenia]? Our correspondent turned for an explanation to Ruben Mirzakhanyan, chairman of the republic board of the Ramkavar-Azatakan of Armenia Party.

[Agabekyan] Mr. Mirzakhanyan, the words that were heard at the PRAA news conference, which characterize, in fact, your party's approach to the draft basic law to be put to a referendum on 5 July: "It is better to have at least some constitution than nothing," have made the rounds of all the news media. But Armenia has, after all, "some" constitution. A constitution that is being flouted and ignored by the authorities....

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[Mirzakhanyan] The opinion that we have a constitution is erroneous. There is a constitution de jure, but de facto, no. For the laws adopted in the past five years, specifically the law on the president, reduce to nothing, in fact, a number of fundamental articles regulating state government. In a situation where the president of the republic has acquired the absolute power to form the government, parliament's possibility of expressing no confidence in anyone from the government is practically infeasible.

The people need to be told the truth: The draft basic law presented by the Constitutional Commission of the Supreme Council contains a number of extremely undemocratic provisions and creates a real possibility of the legislative consolidation for the president of dictatorial powers. Nonetheless, it is better to have a basic law than to have nothing other than the total license of the authorities.

[Agabekyan] Where, though, are the guarantees that this license will end with the adoption of a new constitution, especially one legislatively enshrining the possibility of dictatorship? After all, even in the old constitution the section dealing with human rights kept to the best international standards....

[Mirzakhanyan] Any legal document, the basic law included, should be seen as a single whole, for the articles regulating state government also condition the mechanism of the assurance of human rights.

In the Soviet Constitution this mechanism was totally absent, although, truly, the section on human rights was sustained at a high legal level. Merely Article 6 dealing with the vanguard role of the Communist Party reduced to nothing the whole series of articles regulating human rights. It was not fortuitous that Russia's democratic forces began their activity with a demand for the abolition of Article 6.

How far this version of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia is capable of accomplishing the important task of assurance of an effective mechanism of state government geared to the guaranteed observance of human rights, real life will show.

What is troublesome is something else: the overriding power of some subject of power—an antidemocratic phenomenon—is enshrined in legislation. This, accordingly, could reduce to nothing the requirements of the articles concerning human rights. If even the draft constitution "passes" the referendum, our party will seek in every possible way adjustments to the part of the constitution that concerns presidential authority and the formation of the judiciary and also local government.

[Agabekyan] As I have satisfied myself, the position of the PRAA and, specifically, of its leader as regards this draft constitution is very ambivalent. As yet, in any event. But some people are of the opinion that the PRAA has essentially said "yes" to the AOD constitution....

[Mirzakhanyan] I declare officially that the party has made no decision "for" or "against." The republic board of the PRAA adopted a decision, which was published in AZG on 20 May of this year, according to which the draft basic law was sent for discussion to the PRAA clubs. Only when the discussion is complete will the party make its final decision.

We are surprised, incidentally, by the bilateral speculation surrounding the position of the PRAA. On the one hand the authorities and their news media believe for some reason or other, despite the PRAA statement, that our party is for the draft constitution. On the other, representatives of the radical opposition, having latched onto the version of the official news media, are leveling carping criticism at the PRAA, presenting some stories as a fait accompli.

The similarity of the positions should not come as any surprise in principle. After all, both the first and the second are creatures of the square which is well known to all and ranters of the same wave who subsequently, during the shareout of power chairs, quarreled. Although today the former associates are hostile toward one another, the style and level of thinking of both are the same. It is the calamitous situation of the people that is the result of this spiritual unity.

[Agabekyan] How would you comment in this case on the recurrent appearances in the news media of Rafik Petrosyan, a member of the republic board of the PRAA, who is essentially campaigning in support of the adoption of the constitution?

[Mirzakhanyan] As a member of the Liberal Party and a lawyer, Mr. Petrosyan is entitled to express his personal opinion of the draft constitution. Particularly considering that the PRAA will say "yes" or "no" to the basic law later.

Azerbaijan

Security Strengthened in Baku, Nearby Areas

NC2006140095 Baku TURAN in English 2006 GMT 19 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, June 19 (TURAN) — A security regime has been strengthened in Baku and in the nearby populated areas over the last days. Additional armed posts are established round the city. According to an officer, "Interior bodies were instructed to check thoroughly all suspicious people."

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Last Saturday [17 June] a session was held at which a decision on strengthening measures of security in Baku was adopted, according to reliable source in the Interior Ministry. "For this purpose additional posts were established. We check cars and people from far and middle abroad in order to prevent delivery of arms to the city," source said.

Aliyev Fires, Appoints Government Officials

LD2006140195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1344 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Sevindzh Abdullayeva and Viktor Shulman]

[FBIS Translated Text] Baku, 20 Jun (ITAR-TASS) — Ramiz Mammadov, Azerbaijan's deputy [interior] minister and internal troops commander, has been removed from his post for incompetence in protecting state interests and other grave errors in his work, says a decree by President Aliyev circulated today.

The Azerbaijani president today also appointed a new military prosecutor of the republic — (Yagub Rzayev). He replaces Nizami Takhmanov who, according to the republican procuracy, was dismissed for failing to provide the necessary supervision of garrison procuracies, interfering in the procedure of investigations, and creating conditions that allowed bribery in the department.

Oil Transportation Seen Economically Grounded

MK2006130095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 20 Jun 95 p 9

[Unattributed report in the "Records" column: "The Transneft President Supports the Russian Variant of Oil Transportation From the Azerbaijani Caspian Shelf"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Valeriy Chernyayev, president of the "Transneft" joint-stock company dealing with oil transportation, believes that "the use of the Russian variant to transport Azerbaijani early [rannyaya] oil from Caspian shelf deposits is most well-grounded economically." In his words, yet another argument in favor of the Russian variant is that the work on modernization of terminals in the Novorossiysk port — the capacity of which upon completion will reach 15 million tonnes of oil — has already started. After some special work is performed on the presently acting Groznyy-Baku oil pipeline (which is proposed by Russia for the transportation of Azerbaijani early oil), it will be possible to pump some 17 million tonnes of oil in the reverse direction — from Baku to Novorossiysk. Valeriy Chernyayev is sure that there will be no technical problems as far as reversing the oil pipeline, since Russia has experience in conducting similar work. In the future, oil pipeline capacity can be raised to 40 million tonnes by constructing parallel lines.

Georgia

Shevardnadze Returns to Tbilisi From Israel

LD2006194295 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1850 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Last night Georgian Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze and members of the Georgian delegation visiting Israel met Israeli Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres. At the meeting Georgian-Israeli relations and problems of modern politics were discussed. [passage omitted]

At the end of the meeting, Shim'on Peres and Georgian Foreign Minister Aleksandre Chikvaidze signed an air transport agreement. [passage omitted]

Shevardnadze and members of the Georgian delegation returned to Tbilisi today.

Russian Ships To Defend Georgia in Chechen Attack

LD2006133795 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1200 GMT 20 Jun 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ajaria is lucky; this is what Admiral Eduard Baltin, commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, said on 18 June after his meeting with Ajaria Supreme Council Chairman Aslan Abashidze. [passage omitted: opening of Batumi-Novorossiysk sea route discussed]

Following this meeting, the Russian Black Sea Fleet's [word indistinct] ship and the amphibious ship Olshanskiy, commanded by Admiral Eduard Baltin and with a special Russian marine infantry battalion on board, started patrolling waters off the port of Poti on 19 June. The operation had been agreed with the Georgian Defense Ministry.

First Rank Captain Aleksandre Javakhishvili, commander of Georgian amphibious assault forces, arrived in Poti yesterday.

According to the Russian media, the amphibious landing force will defend Georgia's borders in the event of an attack by Chechen paramilitaries.

The Russian amphibious landing forces have raised the issue of railway protection in western Georgia.

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Military Force Said 'Necessary' in Abkhazia

AU2106110695 Tbilisi REZONANSI in Georgian 15-16 Jun 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Tamaz Nadareishvili: 'I Believe It Is Necessary To Use Military Force'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Georgian Deputy Prime Minister Tamaz Nadareishvili, chairman of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic Supreme Council, recently returned from Gali. In a conversation with a BGI correspondent, he pointed out:

"In the course of the working meetings, we demanded: First, the transfer of the headquarters of the peacekeeping forces and UN observers to Gali; second, the return of the refugees without time-limits and forms; third, the peacekeeping forces should be transferred from the Enguri river to the Ghalidzga river; the Abkhazian police, fighters, and administration should be withdrawn from Gali rayon. Only after Georgian jurisdiction has been restored can we speak about the mass return of refugees to Abkhazia. At the first stage, we may allow Russian peacekeeping forces to remain in Gali. We have lists of refugees from all rayons and villages, and we have a record of all the streets and houses. If this process gets under way, the problem will be resolved in a minimum period of time. Parallel to this, we are working on the return of refugees to Gagra. After Gali, refugees should start to return to Ochamchire and Gulripshi. According to our plan, we will return to Abkhazia this year.

"As regards the current situation in Abkhazia, Tqvarcheli is today a ghost town. One can say that only the elderly have remained there, those who want to die on their own land. The situation is the same in Ochamchire. Only cosmetic improvements have been made in Sukhumi. In general, very few people are left there. There are 25,000 Abkhazian nationals registered in Russia. Gali has become a gathering place for criminal elements."

In response to the question whether an opposition exists in Abkhazia and whether he is in contact with it, Tamaz Nadareishvili stated that such an opposition does not officially exist. "It is already clear to everyone today that, to all intents and purposes, the genocide of the nation has taken place. The Abkhazians are facing the real threat of extinction. No one now is able to oppose the Ardzinba regime; certain people have been publicly executed by firing squad. It should take some time before the opposition will be able to have its say. We are in contact with individual members of the opposition who, for the moment, are trying to keep a low profile."

Nadareishvili categorically states: "I repeat that we will not be able to regain Abkhazia by peaceful means. I believe it is necessary to use military force. It will be possible to return refugees peacefully to those rayons under Abkhazian administration according to forms and time schedules. The return of 100,000 refugees in a matter of days to those areas where there will be Abkhazian police and administrative structures signifies war, which needs no explanation."

INTERFAX on Murder of Shevardnadze Associate

LD2006183995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1644 GMT 20 Jun 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature, compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Petrovskiy and edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Chairman of the Revival and Democracy Fund known as the Shevardnadze fund and a close friend of the Georgian leader Soliko Khabeishvili, 60, died in a Tbilisi hospital after being mortally wounded on Tuesday [20 June] morning outside his home by unidentified gunmen, INTERFAX was informed by the press center of the Georgian Interior Ministry.

His driver was shot dead at the site.

According to the Interior Ministry fire was opened at Khabeishvili when he left his house in the city center and was getting into his car.

The assassins fled on a car.

The Revival and Democracy Fund received donations from international organizations and private individuals supporting the expansion of democracy in Georgia.

During the past two months Khabeishvili led the organizing committee of an international conference on culture against violence and intolerance due to be held in Tbilisi under UNESCO auspices.

Shevardnadze now on a visit in Israel will return to Tbilisi on Tuesday afternoon.

Murder Investigation Begins

LD2006184595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1756 GMT 20 Jun 95

[By Tengiz Pachkoriya]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tbilisi, June 20 (ITAR-TASS) — Proceedings are initiated by the Georgian Prosecutor's Office in connection with the assassination of Soliko Khabeishvili, close associate of Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze and head of the Fund for Democracy and Rebirth. The Fund was established by Eduard Shevardnadze in 1992.

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Khabeishvili, 60, was shot and killed outside his home in Tbilisi. His driver was seriously wounded during the attack and died later in a hospital.

A joint operative and inquiry group comprising representatives of the Prosecutor's Office, the State Security Service and the Interior ministry of the republic, has been set up for the investigation of this murder case, a spokesman for the State Security Service said.

Shevardnadze: Murder 'Act of Revenge'

LD2106105195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0942 GMT 21 Jun 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tbilisi, June 21 (INTERFAX) — Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze said that the murder of Saliko Khabeishvili, the chairman of the Democracy and Revival Fund (the Shevardnadze Fund) in Tbilisi on Tuesday was an act of revenge for the order established in Georgia.

This outrageous crime was organized by the forces which are trying to fish in troubled waters, Shevardnadze told journalists upon his return from a two-day official visit to Israel. "The moment a ray of hope appears, these murderers and criminals do everything they can to destabilize the situation," he said.

He also said that the struggle against the destructive forces will be intensified and that he would meet with the power bodies leaders in Tbilisi shortly to discuss ways of combating terrorism.

Meanwhile, almost all political forces in Georgia have condemned the murder of Khabeishvili and accused the power bodies of inactivity and inability to deal with terrorists. The leaders of some political parties demanded that the interior minister and the head of the security service be removed from their posts.

Khabeishvili, 60, was Shevardnadze's friend and ally since they worked in the Komsomol [Communist Youth League] together. He died on his way to hospital on June 20 after he was gunned down by unknown people near his home in the center of Tbilisi. His driver was killed on the spot. The criminals escaped from the scene of the crime on a car.

During the past two months, Khabeishvili chaired the organizing committee of the international conference Culture Against Violence and Irreconcilability to be held under UNESCO aegis.

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